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Abstract 
 
This dissertation addresses the under-studied area of the role of the top management team 
(TMT) and board of directors in the development of academic spin-off companies (ASOs) 
originating from public research institutes. ASO research receives growing attention 
internationally following the rise in commercialization activities in the vast majority of 
universities. The studies identify the barriers to and facilitators of ASO formation and growth, 
which are related to faculty attributes and incentives, university technology transfer policies 
and practices, and the external environment. Few studies examine the founding team 
demonstrating that it evolves in to a TMT and board during legal incorporation and that the 
TMT heterogeneity has significant performance consequences. Even fewer studies investigate 
the board in ASOs. This is surprising since well-networked outside directors may contribute 
to ASO development by increasing a firm’s legitimacy and thus reducing liabilities of 
newness and providing access to critical external resources that young ASOs need to survive.  
In this dissertation I therefore contribute by addressing this research gap and I explore the 
board formation and changes in board composition and try to relate these changes to the 
development stages of an ASO. Given limited prior research on board dynamics I employ an 
inductive multiple case research design. I also examine the role of the board in accessing 
needed external managerial resources and how the board and TMT themselves can be 
valuable resources that help an ASO to achieve the important entrepreneurial milestone of 
acquiring venture capital. For these studies the data on 135 ASOs in Norway are collected and 
analyzed using logistic regression.  
I find that the dynamics of the development stages in an ASO is related to the dynamics 
of its board. In successful ASOs the board contribution is dynamic. The board chair’s social 
networks seem to be essential when attracting key members to the board of an ASO.  Key 
board members bring in needed resources that the TMT lacks, ranging from finance and 
industry experience in earlier stages to executive and marketing/sales experience in later 
development stages. Thus, they help an ASO to prove a venture’s viability and approach a 
stage of sustainable returns. Board size and networking appear to be important when 
recruiting new TMT members with necessary competences who open for new growth 
opportunities. ASOs that have value adding boards and TMT members with diverse 
functional and industry backgrounds succeed in recruiting new team members and acquiring 
venture capital. The likelihood of attracting venture capital increases if ASOs have previously 
managed to receive seed capital and support from industrial partners. 
 
  
Sammendrag 
 
Denne avhandlingen utforsker hvilken rolle ledelse og styre spiller i utviklingen av 
akademiske spin-off bedrifter (ASO). Forskning på etablering av teknologibaserte bedrifter 
fra universiteter, dvs. ASO bedrifter, får økende internasjonal oppmerksomhet ettersom 
kommersialiseringsaktiviteter øker ved de aller fleste universiteter. Studier identifiserer 
faktorer som hemmer og fremmer ASO formasjon og vekst, for eksempel karakteristika ved 
fakultetet og insentiver, universitetenes teknologioverførings politikk og praksis, og eksternt 
miljø. Få studier har sett på etableringsteam og vist at det utvikler seg til lederteam og styre 
under bedriftens juridiske oppstart, og at lederteamets sammensetning har viktige 
konsekvenser for bedriftens prestasjonsevne. Færre studier har sett på styret i ASO bedrifter. 
Dette er overraskende fordi eksterne styremedlemmer med et godt nettverk kan bidra til 
utvikling av en ASO ved å øke bedriftens legitimitet og skaffe tilgang til kritiske eksterne 
ressurser som unge ASO bedrifter trenger for å overleve.  
Avhandlingens bidrag er derfor å utforske hvordan styrets sammensetning dannes / 
endres og prøve å sette disse endringene i sammenheng med en ASO utvikling. Fordi tidligere 
forskning på styredynamikk er begrenset er multiple caser brukt som forskningsdesign. 
Videre undersøkes styrets rolle i anskaffelsen av nødvendige eksterne ledelsesressurser og 
hvordan styret / ledelsesteam selv kan være betydningsfulle ressurser som hjelper ASO til å 
oppnå en viktig milepæl - venture kapital finansiering. For disse studiene ble det samlet inn 
data fra 135 norske ASO bedrifter og disse ble analysert ved hjelp av logistisk regresjon. 
 Funnene i studiene viser at dynamikken i de forskjellige utviklingsfaser som ASO går 
igjennom henger sammen med dynamikken i styret. Styrets bidrag er dynamisk i vellykkete 
ASO bedrifter. Styrelederens sosiale nettverk synes å være vesentlig når det gjelder det å 
finne nye styremedlemmer. Nøkkelpersoner i styret tilfører ressurser som lederteamet 
mangler og som varierer fra finansiell og industriell erfaring i tidligere faser til ledelses og 
markedsføring / salgs erfaring i senere utviklingsfaser. Slik hjelper eksterne styremedlemmer 
bedriften til å styrke sin levedyktighet og nærmer seg da neste fase hvor avkastningen gjerne 
stabiliserer seg.  Styrets størrelse og nettverksbygging fremgår som viktige faktorer når det 
gjelder det å rekruttere nye medlemmer til lederteamet med nødvendig kompetanse som åpner 
opp for nye vekstmuligheter. ASO bedrifter som har bidragsytende styre og 
lederteammedlemmer med variert funksjonell og industriell bakgrunn lykkes med å rekruttere 
nye teammedlemmer og anskaffe venture kapital. Samtidig øker sannsynligheten for å skaffe 
venture kapital hvis ASO bedriften tidligere har lyktes med å skaffe finansiell støtte fra 
såkornfond og industrielle partnere.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation relates to the development of academic spin-off firms (ASOs).  ASOs 
are high-tech new firms founded by employees in a public research organization such as a 
university or research institute, around a technology which had initially been developed at the 
public research organization (Birley 2002). Academic entrepreneurship and, in particular, 
research on ASOs is a new research area, which receives growing attention internationally 
(Shane 2004; Wright et al. 2007a). This may be attributed to the rise in commercial activity 
and spin-off creation that has recently occurred in the majority of universities (Lockett et al. 
2005). Governments increasingly recognise the need to support the process of technological 
change with the aim of spawning more high-growth knowledge-intensive companies from 
university research, which are important generators of national growth and societal 
development (O’Shea et al. 2004; Wright et al. 2004; Lindholm-Dahlstrand and Klofsten 
2002).  The importance of the topic is also reflected in the increasing spin-off literature, 
which various researchers have tried to systematize (Autio 2000; O’Shea et al. 2004; Siegel 
and Phan 2005; Rothaermel et al. 2007; Djokovic and Souitaris 2008). 
The research focusing on spin-off creation has tried to identify the barriers to and 
success factors behind spin-off formation and growth (Rothaermel et al. 2007). The barriers to 
spin-off creation include informational gaps, lack of competence in founding teams, 
inadequate funding, lack of structural support, unsupportive university culture, and clash of 
culture between industry and academia (e.g. Steffensen et al. 2000; Franklin et al. 2001). 
Among success factors are benefits associated with university involvement in spin-off 
formation, university policies on intellectual property strategy, networking activities of ASOs, 
and resource endowments (e.g. Di Gregorio and Shane 2003; Lockett et al. 2003). The 
success behind new ASO venture creation is attributed to the quality of human resources (i.e. 
faculty, TTO personnel, founding team), technology endowment, and funding from 
university, industry, and venture capitalists (e.g. Shane and Stuart 2002; O’Shea et al. 2005).   
The research that tries to explain a successful spin-off development on the team level 
is limited. These studies demonstrate the importance of team heterogeneity (e.g. Ensley and 
Hmieleski 2005; Vanaelst et al. 2006). Also, the exploration of the board as a locus of 
analysis when explaining early performance differentials is an under-studied area. This may 
be attributed to the focus on new firm creation and the university-related factors (e.g. 
universities’ and TTO policies and practices, faculty characteristics) rather than the 
development of ASO companies after their legal establishment and the success factors outside 
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their research environment. Hence, in an attempt to address this research gap, I explore the 
development of ASO companies along two group dimensions: team and board of directors. 
Team and board in ASOs are curious research objects because the origin of ASOs coming 
from public research institutes has an impact on the ASO’s founding team (Clarysse and 
Moray 2004) and initial board composition (Vanaelst et al. 2006). Furthermore, ASOs are 
new ventures in transition, which go through several stages of activity (Vohora et al. 2004), 
and need to build and develop a team (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005) and board structure and 
processes (Filatotchev et al. 2006) if they are to succeed.   
The development of an ASO may be seen as resource-driven (Penrose 1959; Feldman 
and Klofsten 2000). Technology is one important growth-driving resource (Autio 2000). Due 
to an ASO’s origin, technology and tacit knowledge around the technology held by the 
scientist-entrepreneur is a core resource. The fact that a new ASO venture is established 
around a new research-based product or service implies complexity. This complexity requires 
more skills than one founder is likely to have, and is therefore most likely responded to by the 
formation of a team of entrepreneurs, instead of one sole entrepreneur (Gartner 1985). 
However, started by scientist-entrepreneurs around a core technological innovation, ASOs 
often have human capital that is technological in nature. An ASO team is, therefore, 
unbalanced lacking necessary complementary commercial expertise and networks and need to 
be developed if an ASO is to continue growing (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Wright et al. 
2007a).  
ASOs are often highly innovative and introduce products and services, which are new 
and unique in the market internationally (Heirman and Clarysse 2006). This uniqueness adds 
to existing complexity and implies that an ASO team must learn to manage a firm that is itself 
new while simultaneously learning to manage a firm that is also different and unique (Ensley 
et al. 2002). The resulting ambiguity produces liabilities, which are absent in more established 
firms and labelled the liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe 1965). The liabilities of newness 
derive from the fact that new ventures are unfamiliar and without precedent. Consequently, 
ASO teams must learn to rely largely upon themselves for information and for the generation 
of ideas and solutions.  If ASOs are to survive, they must quickly overcome these liabilities 
by establishing the firm’s legitimacy and reduced uncertainty (Singh et al. 1986). This means 
that ASO teams must in practice learn to run a new firm, cope with a new environment and 
deal with new stakeholders while utilizing unfamiliar social networks (Ensley et al. 2002). All 
this must be done quickly in pace with the changes in the external environment and with 
minimal losses in efficiency and motivation. Thus, the ability to produce novel, off-hand 
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solutions and to adapt quickly to the external environment is an important attribute of high 
performing team (Ensley et al. 2002; Wright et al. 2007b). Hence, the team and its 
performance appear to be the main key to an ASO’s survival and successful development.    
As the firm grows, the accumulated stock of resources begins to empty the capacity of 
the firm’s existing managerial resources, embodied in the management team, to maintain the 
coherence of the administrative organization (Penrose 1959). Thus, the nature and 
composition of the management team may need to change to enable growth. For ASOs, this 
implies that scientist-entrepreneurs need to bring in professional managers who possess 
capabilities better suited to running an established firm.  This may be problematic since 
scientist-entrepreneurs tend to select new members from the sources with whom they share 
scientific network ties (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Mosey and Wright 2007). Such a 
tendency creates team homogeneity towards research and technology backgrounds.    
Along with being creative, efficient and flexible, ASO teams may use a board of 
directors as a mechanism for establishing legitimacy and reducing uncertainty to overcome 
liabilities of newness (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  The board may help the new venture 
overcoming its liability of newness by legitimizing the firm’s activities (Selznick 1949) and 
promoting legitimacy (Harrison 1987). Such strategy involves attracting experienced and 
well-connected directors to the board of an ASO who can play an important role in accessing 
critical external resources (Lynall et al. 2003). The board represents a way to get access to the 
expertise, networks and managerial competence, which ASOs have great demand for. Thus, 
board may be a source for finding team members with necessary managerial competence or 
potential external financiers. ASOs often operate in industry niches characterized by high 
levels of growth (Shane 2004) and require highly skilled board members (Forbes and Milliken 
1999). The boards in such firms exhibit higher levels of influence on firm activities compared 
to other types of firms (Hambrick and Abrahamson 1995). Several entrepreneurial firm 
studies have demonstrated an active involvement of board members in the firm’s strategic 
decisions playing roles such as providing a sounding board and a source of advice in decision-
making rather than merely performing monitoring and control (e.g. Deakins et al. 2000; 
Rosenstein 1988). Hence, the board may play a great role in the sustainable development of 
an ASO. Yet, the research on the board in ASOs is limited.   
Thus, I address the research gaps, which exist in the academic spin-off literature by 
exploring the role of the team and board in ASO development. The introduction chapter is 
structured as follows. First, I account for the objectives, research questions and the 
contributions made in this work, and describe the context expressed by the Norwegian 
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innovation system, which supports the creation and development of ASOs. Second, key 
concepts and the main theoretical perspectives used in the dissertation and their implications 
are presented. Third, I clarify the epistemological position of my work and present the key 
methodological issues related to the literature review and the development of multiple case 
studies and survey. Finally, the main findings of the dissertation, implications and limitations 
are discussed, and future research directions are suggested.         
 
 
1. Objectives, research questions and context 
 
The main objective of this research is to add to the existing knowledge on academic 
spin-off companies, which is dominated by the studies on the firm, university and technology 
transfer office (TTO) level. There are few spin-off studies on the team level and even fewer 
studies that focus on the governance in ASO firms. Also, there has been little research on the 
development of an ASO outside the research environment when an ASO project incorporates 
in a legal company. Thus, the major contribution of this dissertation is that I address this 
research gap by focusing on the management in ASOs, which includes the top management 
team (TMT) and board of directors, and I try to explore which TMT and board features are 
associated with sustainable ASO development. Also, by doing this, I add to governance 
research and respond to recent calls for a closer investigation of boards in privately-held firms 
(Uhlaner et al. 2007; Huse 2007). Further, I advance the research on high-tech new ventures, 
in which the significance of teams has recently been re-emphasized (Wright et al. 2007b).  
Finally, I add to venture capital research and try to link several types of early stage finance to 
the ASO’s ability to acquire VC, which is one of the main thresholds in ASO development. 
 
The specific research questions in the dissertation are as follows: 
 
 
In the literature review (paper 1) I try to carry out a comprehensive literature review of 
the stream of research on team and board in ASOs. The research questions are as follows: 
 
What is the state of the art of research on team and board in academic spin-offs? What 
are the main research gaps and how can they be addressed? 
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The objective is to map and assess the existing studies on team and board in ASOs and 
identify main research gaps. Thus, the paper aims to stimulate and direct future research on 
team and board in ASO companies.  
In paper 2, we (me and my co-supervisor) respond to the calls for a closer 
investigation into board dynamics, and the purpose of the study is, therefore, to explore how 
boards are formed and how boards evolve through various stages of a spin-off process. The 
research questions are as follows:   
 
Which board members do academic spin-offs add, and why, in the start-up stage? 
When, why and how do the main changes in board composition occur during subsequent 
stages? 
 
Our paper 2 aims to extend previous research. It studies boards in early stage 
Norwegian and US spin-offs, rarely addressed by governance studies which mainly focused 
on mature firms employing cross-sectional data and treating the board as a static concept 
(Gabrielsson and Huse 2004). Given limited prior research on board evolution we use 
inductive logic and in-depth cases (Eisenhardt 1989). Second, the paper responds to recent 
suggestions in governance literature to use other theories than agency theory (Huse 2007). 
Specifically, we combine stage-based, resource dependence and social network theories. 
Third, it focuses explicitly on changes in the boards of ASOs. Accordingly, the paper adds to 
academic entrepreneurship research by linking board changes to development stages (Vohora 
et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006).  
In paper 3 we (me and my chief supervisor) address the following research question: 
 
What board features are associated with new team member addition in academic spin-
offs? 
 
We attempt to provide additional insights into the neglected area of the dynamics of 
the TMT in high-tech new ventures, rarely addressed by TMT studies, which mainly focused 
on well-established firms (Ensley et al. 2002). We also respond to suggestions in the 
entrepreneurial team literature to use a broader definition of team turnover considering team 
member entry and exit (Ucbasaran et al. 2003). Specifically, we draw on the resource 
dependence perspective and investigate the role of board composition and networking in the 
new team member addition process.  
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Paper 4 investigates the following research question: 
 
What distinctive academic spin-off characteristics are associated with venture capital 
financing?  
 
The purpose of paper 4 is to examine distinctive ASO characteristics, which are 
associated with venture capital funding. Particularly, we (my colleague, chief supervisor and 
I) seek to examine the role of different types of early stage finance such as finance from the 
portfolio seed funds, informal and industrial investors as important predictors of venture 
capital (VC) acquisition in ASOs. Moreover, we are concerned with the trade-offs affiliated 
with team size and diversity in management teams and company boards. Hence, the paper 
aims to extend our understanding of the role of the TMT (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005), board 
(Clarysse et al. 2007) and prior finance in ASOs by linking their structural design 
characteristics to VC acquisition.   
 
1.1 Norwegian context 
 
In 2003, Norway made a legislative change, similar to the Bayh-Dole Act in the US in 
1980, where researchers no longer hold title to their inventions (Rasmussen et al. 2006a). 
Since this change, the universities own the intellectual property rights (IPR), and TTOs have 
been established in order to commercialize and manage the IPR. The most important 
government agencies within innovation and industry development are the Research Council 
of Norway and Innovation Norway (ibid). The Research Council of Norway finances both 
basic and applied research and is the main funding partner for research activities at the 
universities, research institutes, and in industry. 
FORNY is a joint program between the Research Council of Norway and Innovation 
Norway (Rasmussen et al. 2006a). It was established as a program in 2000, but has existed as 
a project since 1995. The goal of the FORNY program is to increase the creation of wealth in 
Norway by commercializing research-based business ideas with significant market potential. 
The program is aimed at universities, research institutes, and university hospitals. The 
financial support is to be channeled towards knowledge-intensive ventures (including 
academic spin-offs) with a high profit potential. The FORNY program has several initiatives 
aimed to increase the commercialization of research from Norwegian R&D institutions. The 
program has funds for idea generation, commercialization, proof of concept, and leave of 
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absence allowing academics to work on ideas and test their concepts on a full-time basis. 
Indirectly, through TTOs, FORNY deals with pre-startup ASOs, which are in the research and 
opportunity framing stages (see Fig. 1). The actors that support an ASO through various 
development stages are illustrated in Fig. 1 and described below. 
Innovation Norway (IN) lends financial and managerial support to the founders of the 
ventures with growth potential, including ASOs, which have been legally started up (from the 
interview with the IN officer). In the very early post-startup stage (right after legal 
incorporation as depicted in Fig. 1) IN helps to build a team around entrepreneurs and 
reimburse a larger part of incubator expenses (ibid). “After the incubator period and until the 
ASO may apply for more grants from Innovation Norway, there is a gap” (ibid). This gap may 
be filled by seed capital, which is usually used to verify technology and map market 
opportunities and firm’s competitive advantages. There are a number of nationwide and 
regional public-private seed capital funds. Some of them are supported by IN. Recent 
evaluations show that Norwegian seed capital funds should be larger to fill in the existing gap 
(Grünfeld et al. 2009). An additional way to fill the financing gap in the early post-startup 
stage is to seek finance from informal investors (Sørheim 2003) who are wealthy private 
individuals. Many of the Norwegian informal investors are well-networked and co-invest with 
other informal investors (ibid). A small fraction of them are actively involved as board 
members or consultants in the firms they invest in (ibid).   
In later post-startup stages, when the technology is verified and the venture has proved 
its viability, an ASO may apply for a public and industrial R&D contract grant. By having this 
scheme, IN stimulates ASOs to cooperate with the public sector (e.g. hospitals, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces) and industry. One of the aims of the scheme is the joint 
development of internationally competitive products by ASOs with domestic and international 
industrial partners (customers). Under an industrial R&D scheme an ASO and a large 
industrial actor only have to collaborate on new product development.  
Whether an ASO is supported by IN through a public or industrial R&D grant or not, 
an ASO may seek additional venture capital financing to nurture the company’s growth. VC 
firms usually invest in companies in the growth phase with considerable market-related risk. 
Various VC firms have different investment focuses and their financing may therefore be 
overlapped with, for instance, seed financing if the focus is on early stage companies (NVCA 
2009).   
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Fig. 1 Support of the academic spin-off development (adapted and modified from 
Innovation Norway, Trondheim office)  
 
 
The fraction of late stage investments in the Norwegian venture capital market is relatively 
smaller, and the fraction of early stage investments is relatively greater, compared to the 
markets in Europe and North America (Berg-Utby 2007). Whereas the international VC 
industry is dominated by institutional capital, the Norwegian VC market is prevailed by 
public capital and private individuals (ibid).  Along with finance a VC investor can also 
provide resources related to strategic and service activities, giving counseling and being “a 
door-opener” for an ASO.     
As with studies in other countries, most spin-off studies in Norway primarily 
investigated government and university initiatives to promote and support commercialization 
of academic research (e.g. Rasmussen et al. 2006b; Rasmussen and Sørheim 2006). The 
contribution of my dissertation is therefore to explore the development of Norwegian ASO 
companies that were legally established after various government and university initiatives 
has been introduced. 
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2. Theoretical perspectives used in the dissertation 
 
To avoid possible confusion, this section starts with the definition of three concepts 
that are central in the dissertation. These concepts are academic spin-off firm development, 
the top management team and board of directors. Then the main theoretical perspectives used 
in the dissertation are discussed. These theoretical perspectives are resource dependence and 
resource-based views.  
 
2.1 Defining key concepts used in the dissertation 
 
2.1.1 Academic spin-off development 
To define ASO development I draw on literature on stages in new firm development, 
which builds on a life-cycle perspective on organization. In general, stage-based models 
identify the organizational characteristics exhibited within each stage of development and 
suggest the changes required in the behaviour and practices within an organization if it is to 
progress to the next stage (e.g. Smith et al. 1985; Miller and Friesen 1984; Kazanjian 1988; 
Van de Ven and Poole 1995). A key advantage of using literature on life-stage models is that 
“it adds to our understanding of the rather complex phenomenon of growth, describing how 
growth happens and the effect that it has on organizations” (Kazanjian 1988: 258). Stage-
based approaches were criticized to have “an overly simplistic view of an organization 
developing through a series of predictable stages” (ibid). More recent stage-based 
perspectives recognize the role of feedback and the potential for non-linear development 
(Vohora et al. 2004).  
An ASO can be seen as a threshold firm undergoing transitions and moving from one 
development stage to the next (Clarysse and Moray 2004; Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 
2006). To progress to the next stage an ASO venture has to overcome the thresholds it faces. 
This process is characterized as iterative and non-linear with setbacks and steps forward. 
Therefore, the successful ASO development is, rather than by sales and profit, defined by 
whether the ASO has overcome certain thresholds and achieved important entrepreneurial 
milestones. For instance, attracting external finance, e.g. venture capital, is a key constraint on 
the development of ASO firms (Wright et al. 2003, 2006). Thus, having achieved VC 
financing may be seen as an important entrepreneurial milestone marking an ASO’s success. 
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    2.1.2 Top management team and board of directors 
A top management team is defined as a group of people who are responsible for 
managing an ASO and making key strategic decisions related to ASO development. It should 
be noted that an academic spin-off team is a dynamic concept. Recent studies that build on 
stage-based models demonstrate that during legal incorporation of the firm the TMT and 
board of directors are formed (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Filatotchev et al. 2006). The founding 
team that has led an ASO through the research stage splits into the TMT and board during the 
legal establishment of the firm. The founding team members become members of the TMT, 
board or both. For instance, academic founders and surrogate entrepreneurs introduced from 
outside academia (Franklin et al. 2001) may become part of both the TMT and board 
(Vanaelst et al. 2006). Other people who help academic founders in the pre-startup stage, such 
as TTO officers, become board members (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Filatotchev et al. 2006). Thus, 
the overlap of the TMT and board of directors can emerge.   
A concept of ASO development adds to the complexity of team and board concepts. 
As an ASO develops and reaches growth and maturity, the changes in management and 
governance structure occur (Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006; Filatotchev et al. 2006). 
That is, new members may be introduced to the team and/or board. Some members may shift 
their positions from being a top manager to becoming a board member or leave the 
organization. This implies that with firm development the TMT and board may become less 
overlapped and even completely separated.  
     
2.2 Resource dependence and resource-based perspectives  
 
The main perspectives used in this dissertation are those pertaining to value creation in 
the firm. Value creation perspectives deal with resources and strategies. One of these 
perspectives is a resource dependence view, which has an external focus. Another perspective 
is a resource-based view of the firm, which provides an internal focus.     
 
2.2.1 Resource dependence perspective 
In the resource dependence perspective, which has strong roots in sociology (Weber 
1947), the maximization of power defines organization success (Kanter 1979; Pfeffer 1981; 
cf. Ulrich and Barney 1984: 472).  In this perspective, organizations are viewed as coalitions, 
changing their structure and patterns of behavior to acquire and maintain necessary external 
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resources. “The ability to acquire and maintain critical external resources is the key to 
organizational survival” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 2). By acquiring needed external 
resources an organization decreases its dependence on others and, hence, changes its power 
relations with other organizations.  The resource dependence perspective has three 
assumptions that explain how organizations work to acquire power. First, organizations are 
assumed to be comprised of internal and external coalitions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Coalitions emerge from social exchanges that are formed to influence and control behavior. 
Second, the environment is assumed to contain scarce and valued resources essential to 
organizational survival (Pfeffer 1978). Hence, organizations have to deal with uncertainty 
regarding resource acquisition. Uncertainty comprises of the variability and complexity in 
acquiring resources from other organizations. Third, organizations are assumed to acquire 
control over resources that minimize their dependence on other organizations and also 
maximize the dependence of other organizations on themselves. Reaching both goals is 
thought to affect the exchange between organizations, thus affecting an organization’s power 
(Pfeffer 1981).  
One of the pioneering contributors to resource dependence view, Selznick (1949), has 
moved the ongoing power discussion (Weber 1947) further and viewed organizations as those 
that “have capacity to develop distinctive competences” (cf. Ulrich and Barney 1984: 472). 
Organizations “then draw resources from actors external to the organization to support these 
central tasks through co-optation” (ibid: 472).   Co-optation is a tactic for managing 
dependence. For instance, the board of directors is “one vehicle for co-opting important 
segments of the environment” (Pfeffer 1973: 362). Selznick’s original power insights and 
theme of the organization either adapting to the environment, or adapting the environment 
itself has subsequently been pursued by other researchers (e.g. Thompson 1967; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 1981).   
Resource dependence perspective views a firm as an open system, which depends on 
external organizations and environmental contingencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Corporate boards represent a mechanism to manage external dependency (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978) and reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer 1972) by linking the 
organization with its external environment through networking and legitimacy. Within 
resource dependence perspective, organization survival depends on the acquisition of scarce 
and valued resources from the environment in a stable and low cost manner. Appointing 
directors on the board, who have access to and control needed external resources or influential 
groups that possess these resources, represents reduced uncertainty and lower search costs for 
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the firm. Thus, in the resource dependence view, the linking task of the board is emphasized 
by the importance of board composition including having well-networked directors. Boards 
with a larger number of members are better than smaller boards since each director may 
provide the organization with different linkages to the external environment.  
Resource dependence view suggests that boards span the boundary between 
organization and its environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). An organization benefits from 
this boundary-spanning activity by means of co-optation and connection. Co-optation refers to 
placing the influential stakeholder representatives on the board (Pfeffer 1972). The contacts of 
such directors with the main stakeholder groups and their prestige in these groups are 
associated with decreased firm dependency.  Directors’ connections enable communication 
between the firm and external organizations. Board members are also seen as the providers of 
legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The prestige and reputation of the directors in the 
stakeholder groups enable the board to legitimize the firm’s actions, mobilize external support 
and acquire critical external resources. Co-optation, connection and legitimacy facilitate the 
development of stable, low cost resource relations, which as resource dependence view posits, 
is a precursor to organizational survival over time.  
Resource dependence theory was a dominant approach in various disciplines like 
sociology, strategy and organization theory for many years (Huse 2007). Later, resource 
dependence perspective has been supplemented with contributions from social network 
theorists (e.g. Westphal 1999; Carpenter and Westphal 2001). Social network theory is a 
sociological perspective, which posits that “a firm’s economic actions are informed, 
influenced, and enabled by the network of accumulated stable and preferential social 
relations” (Granovetter 1985; cf. Lynall et al. 2003: 419). From this perspective, board 
composition is the reflection of the social networks of the principal stakeholders (ibid: 419). 
While the resource dependence theory focuses on the board as facilitating the acquisition of 
resources, social network theory focuses on a firm’s existing social networks as predictable 
paths that may be used to acquire these resources.  In the social network perspective, the 
important board tasks are related to networking, door-opening, legitimacy, and 
communication in inter-organization relations.  
  Resource dependence perspective provides an external focus from firm-internal 
perspective and “views the board as an administrative body linking the organization with its 
environment” (Huse 2007: 62). Within this perspective, the primary role of boards is to serve 
as “boundary spanners” and critical resource suppliers to reduce the firm’s external 
dependency and thus to contribute to value creation in the firm. The social network resources 
 13
of the board members that are used to attract necessary external resources are emphasized in 
the resource dependence perspective. The benefit of this perspective is that it helps to explain 
the acquisition of resources beyond the boundaries of the firm. The shortcoming is that it can 
not provide a sufficient explanation for the existing resources of the firm, their characteristics, 
and how and why they enable or constrain new firm growth. For instance, the resource 
dependence perspective tells us little about the human resources, including competence, 
knowledge and skills of the people involved in the organization, and how the human 
resources can be used to achieve organizational success. By turning to a resource-based 
approach one can account for this shortcoming. 
     
2.2.2 Resource-based perspective 
A resource-based perspective views the managerial team and the firm’s board as firm 
internal resources that can give a competitive advantage to a firm and thus be associated with 
organizational success (Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991, 2001; Barney and 
Wright 1998).  In this perspective, the managerial team is important because “it is managers 
that are able to understand and describe the economic performance potential of a firm’s 
endowments” (Barney 1991: 117). A managerial team is a firm resource that “due to causal 
ambiguity and social complexity, provide greater potential to be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage” than individuals (Barney and Wright 1998: 39). A resource-based 
perspective has been suggested as appropriate for understanding the board in young firms 
(Zahra and Filatotchev 2004).  
The resource-based view of competitive advantage examines the link between a firm’s 
internal characteristics and performance (Barney 1991).  This view suggests that firms obtain 
sustained competitive advantages by implementing strategies that exploit their internal 
strengths and avoid internal weaknesses. There are two basic assumptions. First, the firms 
within an industry or group may be heterogeneous with respect to the strategic resources they 
control. Resources and capabilities can be heterogeneously distributed across competing 
firms. Second, these strategic resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms, and thus 
heterogeneity can be long lasting. The long lasting differences due to the resources 
heterogeneously distributed across competing firms “can help explain why some firms 
consistently outperform other firms” (Barney 2001: 649). Given these assumptions, it is 
argued that resources are rare and valuable. When these resources are also simultaneously 
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difficult to imitate, substitute and transfer they can generate a sustained competitive 
advantage.  
A firm’s human resources include all of the knowledge, experience, skill, and 
commitment of people involved in the organization and their relationships with each other 
and with external actors (Barney and Wright 1998). Managerial team members of a firm may 
possess skills that are valuable and rare. The synergy emerges from the managers working 
together. “The exploitation of the synergistic value is quite costly” and the competitive 
advantage stemming from the results of the team work is “causally ambiguous”, and thus, 
hard “if not impossible for competitors to imitate” (ibid: 39).  Human resources may be 
divided into general skills and specific skills (Flamholtz and Lacey 1981). General skills like 
“the knowledge of general management” are transferrable between firms (Barney and Wright 
1998). Specific skills such as the knowledge of technology developed by a firm provide value 
only to one specific firm. Firm-specific skills are difficult to substitute and transfer to other 
firms.  Working together, managerial team members “become involved in socially complex 
relationships that are not transferrable across organizations, thus only benefiting the 
organization in which these relationships develop” (ibid: 39). Thus, the human resources 
embodied in the managerial team of the firm that are simultaneously rare, valuable, 
inimitable, non-substitutable and non-transferrable create value for the firm and are the source 
of organization success. 
Governance choices may, in the resource-based perspective, affect the creation of 
economic rents (Huse 2007). The difference in economic rents will appear between boards 
that may provide access to valuable, rare, costly-to-imitate and non-substitutable resources 
and boards that only focus on minimizing agency costs, i.e. maximizing value for external 
stakeholders of the firm (Barney et al. 2001). The research on the service tasks of the board, 
e.g. networking, advising and mentoring, as opposed to control tasks, has existed several 
years (Huse 2007). The resource-based researchers made attempts to place the service task 
approach to the boards into the resource-based framework and consider the board as a 
strategic resource impacting organization success. Their arguments are that the resource and 
knowledge of board members may be particularly important for increasing a firm’s strategic 
flexibility and ensuring long-term growth and survival (e.g. Zahra and Filatotchev 2004; 
Filatotchev et al. 2006).  
The resource dependence perspective views board members primarily as connectors to 
external resource providers. The resource-based perspective suggests that board members may 
be advisors to the management team and human resource providers themselves supplying the 
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firm with necessary knowledge, skills and competencies (Aguilera and Jackson 2003). In 
general, the resource-based perspective implies that including people on the board whose 
resources are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable may be a way of providing the 
firm with sustainable competitive advantage.  Boards are valuable for the whole firm and not 
only for external actors. Highly skilled board members with firm-specific knowledge are 
scarce. The processes within the boardroom and results of board work are difficult to imitate. 
The services provided by board members to the firm are non-substitutable. 
In brief, the unique configuration of the human resources provided by team and board 
members will contribute to value creation in the firm and, hence, enhance the firm’s prospects 
for success.       
 
2.3 Implications of theoretical perspectives 
 
In paper 1, which reviews the ASO literature, I draw on a stage-based approach to 
define ASO development and show how both team and board may evolve. Paper 2 explores 
board formation and change and draws on the stage-based, resource dependence and social 
network perspectives. Applying these theories, the initial board members will reflect the 
personal networks of the founder(s) and bring resources that the founding team needs. Over 
time, changes in board composition will occur and subsequent board members will be 
recruited from the social networks of key external stakeholders and bring critical external 
resources that the TMT lacks. In paper 3, using resource dependence perspective, board size, 
number of outside directors and their networking activity are hypothesized to be important 
predictors of acquiring external managerial resources, i.e. adding new member to the TMT. 
 Paper 4 draws implicitly on resource-based perspective. ASOs are viewed as facing 
VC financing constraint (Westhead and Storey 1997; Wright et al. 2006). Because VC 
investors are concerned with managerial talent and credibility, an ASO firm that has the 
unique configuration of managerial resources may be more likely to overcome this constraint 
and thus outperform its competitors. Size of and diversity in both the management team and 
board are, as we contend, the most important structural measures generally considered as 
advantageous to entrepreneurial firms (e.g. Ucbasaran et al. 2003; Beckman et al. 2007; 
Zimmerman 2008). Hence, we hypothesize that the size and diversity (heterogeneity in 
experience and skills) of the team and board will contribute to obtaining VC funding. 
Diversity refers to heterogeneity in various demographic, personality and more directly task-
related cognitive (or background, experience) characteristics of top management members. 
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Furthermore, on the analogy of the pecking order hypothesis applied in the spin-off literature 
(Wright et al. 2006), we expect that ASOs look for internal (seed fund) and alternative forms 
of external financing (from informal and industrial investors) before they seek venture capital. 
For potential VC investors the way an ASO was previously financed may serve as an 
indication of the ASO’s uniqueness in terms of managerial resources and credibility that can 
provide an ASO with a competitive advantage. Prior finance configuration of an ASO is 
therefore also hypothesized to make a contribution to the VC acquisition.     
 
 
3. Methodological considerations 
 
In this section, I will first account for the epistemological position held in this 
dissertation. Then, I will discuss the key issues related to the methods used in the thesis. 
 
 
3.1 Epistemological position  
 
A long-lasting debate has existed between two contrasting views of how social science 
research should be conducted (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). These two traditions are 
positivism and social constructionism (ibid). The key idea of positivism is “that the social 
world exists externally, and that its properties should be measured through objective methods, 
rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition.” (ibid: 57). 
The research issue is whether the research results are an accurate reflection of reality. Social 
constructionism is a new paradigm, which has been developed during the last half century, 
“largely in reaction to the application of positivism to the social sciences.” (ibid: 58). In this 
view, the reality is socially constructed and given meaning by people (Berger and Luckman 
1966), rather than determined by objective and external factors. The origins of the labels and 
who influenced their acceptance are of the greatest interest for social constructionists. 
The middle epistemological position between positivism and social constructionism is 
relativism (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). The relativist position assumes that different 
observers may have different points of view and that the truth is determined through 
consensus between different viewpoints (ibid). Thus, the relativist researcher is concerned 
with that a broad sample of viewpoints has been taken into account. In both the positivist and 
relativist positions it is assumed that there is a reality which exists independently of the 
observer, and hence the job of the scientist is to identify this pre-existing reality.  From the 
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relativist position, “the assumed difficulty of gaining direct access to reality means that 
multiple perspectives will normally be adopted, through both triangulation of methods and the 
surveying of views and experiences of larges samples of individuals” (ibid: 63).   
Case studies may be used in quite different ways by different proponents. Although 
the dominant texts about case method come from the positivist end (e.g. Yin 1994), the 
method can also be designed in ways consistent with relativist and constructionist 
perspectives (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). The relativist position has been developed 
particularly through the work of Kathy Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007; cf. ibid). This relativist view on cases is inspired by both positivism and social 
constructivism. Methodology is, thus, eclectic. Eisenhardt (1989) advises to use prior designs, 
but allows flexibility about their adaptation; to apply triangulation of methods; and to conduct 
both analyses, within case (constructionist approach) and across cases (positivism).   
The acceptance of a particular epistemology usually leads the researcher to adapt 
methods that are characteristic of that position (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). It is also possible 
to infer, which epistemological position the researcher holds, sometimes implicitly, from the 
methods employed by the researcher. The triangulation of data and methods used in my 
thesis, that is the combination of multiple case studies largely inspired by Eisenhardt (1989) 
and survey of ASO firms, and my attempts to find consensus between different viewpoints to 
determine truth, place me in a relativist position.  
A relativist position is not “a useful compromise” between positivist and social 
constructionist positions that combines the strengths and avoids limitations of each (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2008: 73). It has its own strengths and drawbacks. Acknowledging the value of 
using multiple sources of data is the main strength. Also, the relativist position may enable 
generalizations beyond the present sample, and may be conducted efficiently, for instance, 
when a survey is outsourced to experts. The first drawback is that larger samples are required 
if results are to have credibility, and this may be costly. For example, if case study is used 
then not one or two but four to about ten cases should be in the sample. Next, if survey is used 
and standardization is required, it means that the researcher may not be able to deal 
effectively with the cultural and institutional difference found within international studies. 
Finally, it may be hard to reconcile discrepant sources of data that point to different 
conclusions. 
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3.2 Development of multiple case studies and survey  
 
In this subsection, I will present some central methodological issues encountered in 
the literature review and during the development of the multiple case studies and survey. As 
characteristic of relativist position, the methods in the dissertation studies are both qualitative 
and quantitative. Data sources and methods used in the studies are summarized in Table 1.  
In the literature review a comprehensive and detailed literature analysis was 
conducted. The resulting data were discussed according to the suggested framework 
considering structure and processes of the team and board in ASOs. The understudied topic of 
board dynamics in ASOs is addressed by employing multiple case inductive research design 
that provides empirical richness and may produce novel and thorough theoretical insights 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Board features associated with new team member addition in ASOs are 
analyzed by using logistic regression. The hypotheses about structural design characteristics 
associated with successful venture capital acquisitions in ASOs are tested with hierarchical 
logistic regression on the financial, team and board levels.  
 
3.2.1 Background and literature review  
 Prior to starting my PhD I was not familiar with the exciting topic of 
commercialization of research results from universities through the creation of spin-off 
companies. Therefore, to become better acquainted with the topic, I started reading on the 
topic and I carried out several interviews with the people involved in technology transfer and 
commercialization processes. These people were from such support organizations as (i) 
Innovation Norway (local office in Trondheim) which grants incubator and other stipends to 
ASOs, (ii) technology transfer office NTNU TTO established in 2004, one year after Norway 
had made the Bayh-Dole Act-like legislative change, (iii) commercialization organization 
Leiv Eriksson Nyskapning which has existed long before NTNU TTO was established and 
fulfilled similar functions of facilitating commercialization and spin-off activity from research 
institutes in Trondheim, (iv) TTO Campus Kjeller in Oslo, and (v) the FORNY program, a 
unit under the Research Council of Norway, which is in charge of stimulating 
commercialization of research results nationally. I also interviewed a couple of academic 
founders with long experience of commercializing their research, asking them about the 
challenges they met during their endeavours. Some of the problems described by practitioners 
caught my attention, which helped me to delimit my research and focus on the management in 
ASOs. 
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Table 1 Methods used in the dissertation studies 
 
Paper title Data  Method 
Top management team and 
board in academic spin-offs:  
a taxonomy of the studies on 
group level 
Published literature. 64 spin-off articles 
and 40 team and board articles in 27 core 
management and entrepreneurship 
journals. 
Review, analysis and 
synthesis of the 
literature 
Exploring board formation and 
evolution of board composition 
in academic spin-offs  
 
Case data on eleven academic spin-offs.  
Secondary data: Brønnøysund Register 
Center, the official export and trade 
directory Nortrade, the business search 
engine Purehelp, the Link Silicon Valley 
directory, the San Jose Mercury News, 
extensive web searches. 
Multiple case 
inductive study 
Board features associated with 
new team member addition in 
academic spin-offs 
Collected survey data on 135 academic 
spin-off companies. 
Logistic regression 
analysis 
Design characteristics 
associated with venture capital 
acquisitions in academic spin-
offs 
Collected survey data on 135 academic 
spin-off companies.  
Hierarchical logistic 
regression analysis 
 
 
 
The literature review (paper 1) is mainly based on articles published in core 
management journals, which were systematically identified using the ABI/INFORM, EBSCO, 
Science Direct and JSTOR databases. About 65 articles were selected that studied the 
academic spin-off phenomenon. Then, I read and analyzed each article to create a database in 
which the following data were coded: (i) author name(s) and journal of publication, (ii) year 
published, (iii) geographical location of the ASO cases, (iv) theory, (v) method, (vi) unit of 
analysis, and (vii) research focus of the article. Next, since there are few studies on team and 
board level in ASO research I tried to identify articles on entrepreneurial teams and board in 
ASOs and high-tech new ventures. First, I studied the reviews of the new venture team 
literature by Cooper and Daily (1997) and Birley and Stockley (2000) and a seminal review 
book on board research by Huse (2007). These works and articles identified in the previous 
step provided an immediate entry into the literature on team and board in high-tech new firms. 
Then, to avoid reference bias, I used electronic reference retrieval services to track all relevant 
articles. Finally, I read and analyzed these articles and designed a detailed database in which I 
coded the following data: (i) author name(s), year and journal, (ii) theory, (iii) industry/firm 
type, (iv) dependent variable(s), (v) independent dependent variable(s), (vi) control 
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variable(s), (vii) method, and (viii) main findings. The resulting data revealed the patterns 
regarding team and board in ASOs that I discuss in the literature review.  
 
 
3.2.2 Multiple case studies  
Given limited prior research on board evolution, the inductive logic and in-depth cases 
(Eisenhardt 1989) are used to explore board formation during the start-up stage and changes 
in board composition in subsequent stages of ASO development (paper 2). Sampling, data 
gathering and analysis are carefully accounted for in the appended paper 2. Here, I will 
present some key issues related to the processes.  
Following Eisenhardt (1989), the sample of ASOs is selected to give a substantial 
degree of variance. It was especially important to sample ASOs, which were in different 
development stages, to better capture the dynamic aspects of board composition during a 
firm’s life cycle. Occurrence of at least one board change (new person added, not merely role 
change) is a “must” case choice criterion. Another important criterion is the enduring 
involvement of the scientist-entrepreneur or externally introduced entrepreneur occupying a 
key position in the firm, e.g. CEO, CTO or board chair. Such a person who has taken the 
venture through the founding process and is aware of the current operations of the company is 
expected to provide more detailed and relatively accurate descriptions related to board 
formation and evolution compared to other employees.  
Additional data were collected from other sources, and such triangulation improves 
reliability by providing a check against the accuracy of informant responses (Yin 1994). Half 
of the cases were ASOs from US universities, situated in Silicon Valley, a region with strong 
VC industry tradition, and Michigan, a region with relatively weak developed VC support. In 
paper 2, we posit that recent legislative changes (that university, not researchers, own the 
IPR) and a strong public role in the commercialization of research may make Norway 
representative of smaller western European countries. Hence, ASOs may be seen as fairly 
common in the US and Norway, but the surrounding networks and support structure, which 
we try to account for, vary widely.   
Data analysis incorporates within-cases analysis and cross-case analysis, relying on 
methods suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Eisenhardt (1989). Conceptual 
insights concerning boards in ASOs were drawn out and refined during an iterative process as 
the case studies progressed. This iteration between theory and data helps sharpen constructs, 
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strengthens the internal validity of findings, and raises the generalizability of results 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
As with all methods multiple case studies have both advantages and limitations. 
Whereas single case studies offer insight into one particular example, multiple cases provide 
us with empirical richness and may also generate generalizable and more accurate theoretical 
insights (Eisenhardt 1989). In replication logic, used in this study, cases which confirm 
emergent relationships enhance confidence in the validity between the relationships (Yin 
1984). Cases “which disconfirm the relationships often can provide an opportunity to refine 
and extend the theory” (Eisenhardt 1989: 542). “When a relationship is supported, the 
qualitative data often provide a good understanding of the dynamics underlying the 
relationship, that is, the ‘why’ of what is happening” (ibid: 542). This is crucial for the 
establishment of internal validity of the findings (ibid). Discovering the underlying theoretical 
reasons for why the relationship exists also helps to establish the internal validity.  
We have conducted one or two interviews per firm using a limited number of cases. 
Overall, we attempted to address this limitation by studying cases that were in different stages 
of development, to better capture the evolutionary aspects (i.e. changes) of board 
composition. As for Norwegian cases we could trace all board changes through the database. 
This limitation is thus addressed by checking the responses against the database and, if 
needed, asking additional questions after interviews.  
Similar to hypothesis-testing research, multiple case study research involves 
measuring constructs and verifying relationships. However, these processes are more 
judgemental in case studies because the researchers can not apply statistical tests (Eisenhardt 
1989). Within and across cases analyses of the data help to reduce this bias (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). Full display of evidence and procedures in the published work (i.e. paper 2) 
also helps enabling readers to apply their own standards (Eisenhardt 1989). Following 
Eisenhardt’s advice (1989), to improve internal validity and generalizability of the findings, 
we have tried to tie the emergent insights to existing literature during data analysis. Yet, the 
confidence that the findings are valid and generalizable may be further strengthened if other 
researchers achieve similar findings in a very different context (ibid).  
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3.2.3 Development of the survey study 
Literature review and multiple case studies have given valuable insights into the 
academic spin-off phenomenon, which were helpful when designing the questionnaire. 
Quantitative methods are used in papers 3 and 4.  
The questionnaire was sent to the CEO of 353 companies considered as originated 
from Norwegian universities and public research institutes in autumn 2008. The sample 
contains 318 companies, which are registered as having used the university TTO or 
technology licensing-like organizations in the FORNY database. The rest of the companies 
were found in other sources. Anonymity for all companies and informants was assured. 53 
firms reported that they are not ASOs or are no longer active. After about two-three rounds of 
personal phone calls to the CEOs 135 academic spin-off companies returned their 
questionnaires resulting in a response rate of 45 %.  
For both paper 3 and 4, the appropriate method was logistic regression because of the 
binary dependent variable: new team member addition in the former case and VC acquisition 
in the latter case. In paper 3, a simple two-step logistic regression analysis was used to test the 
significance in predicting new member addition of the independent board variables over the 
control variables. In paper 4, the hierarchical logistic regression analysis assessing multiple 
themes against a dependent variable was used since we hypothesized on the overall theme 
level and aimed at testing the significance in predicting the VC acquisition of the independent 
variables on three levels: finance, TMT and board.  
The advantage of quantitative approaches is that they provide objectivity in that 
hypotheses are tested by applying statistical criteria to the measurements taken (Hair et al. 
2006). Since population characteristics are inferred from a sample, cross-sectional studies 
must carefully consider how well the selected subset represents the larger population (ibid). 
Due to an active involvement of the Research Council of Norway in facilitating the creation 
of spin-off companies through the FORNY program there have for about fifteen years been 
attempts to trace and register all ASOs in the database. This population consists of the spin-
off companies created since 1995 (or earlier if it was possible to identify) which involves 
academic researchers, university technology or both, which all fit the definition of an ASO 
adopted in this dissertation. As less than ten percent of the start-ups that fit the definition of an 
ASO were identified through other sources than the FORNY database (e.g. web search), I 
assume that the characteristics of the sample are comparable to those of the whole population 
of ASO companies (in Norway). 
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There may be some survival bias in the sample, as in most entrepreneurship studies 
(Davidsson 2004). This bias is somewhat reduced since our cases represent the whole range 
of ASO stages, from the very early stages to maturity and decline stages. The cases in early 
(research) and decline stages amount to 4.4 % of the sample. Non-response bias refers to the 
mistake one expects to make in estimating a population characteristic based on a sample of 
survey data, in which, due to non-response, certain types of survey respondents are under-
represented (Hair et al. 2006). Testing for non-response bias generally involves comparing 
two different samples drawn from the same population. The sample of the non-respondents 
was drawn from the FORNY database, which is, as already mentioned, representative of the 
entire population. I tested non-response bias using three characteristics, on which there was 
available data: the amount of employees, firm age and operating revenues in 2007. Mean 
values and tests for differences in mean values between respondents and non-respondents can 
be found in the appendix to the dissertation. The respondents had on average fewer employees 
and lower operating revenues compared to non-respondents. The average age of responding 
and non-responding firms was approximately the same.  This may indicate that our sample is 
somewhat biased towards the smaller ASOs. However, no statistically significant differences 
are found, which indicates that non-response bias should not be of concern.   
Common method variance, variance that is attributed to the measurement method 
rather than the constructs of interest, refers to the amount of spurious covariance shared 
among variables because of the common method used in collecting data (Malhotra et al. 
2006). Common method bias is problematic because it may cause bias in the estimates of the 
true relationship among theoretical constructs. Common method variance can either inflate or 
deflate observed relationships between constructs. The only feasible method in our setting is 
the Harman one-factor test (Aulakh and Gencturk 2000; Podsakoff and Organ 1986). If most 
of the items load on one factor, the common method bias is present. In both paper 3 and 4, the 
test indicates that common method bias is not a major issue.  
The studies are cross-sectional which means that the underlying processes behind the 
assessed relationships can not be captured. The findings in the studies are representative of 
Norwegian ASOs.  
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4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this dissertation, I have sought to ascertain the significance of the team and board in 
academic spin-off companies. Teams and board in ASOs as high-tech new firms represent a 
promising, yet under-studied, research area. In new ASO start-ups the team and board may 
overlap. The processes occurring within and across team and board boundaries are so 
intertwined that it can be hard to isolate one unit from another. Therefore the spin-off studies 
that focused explicitly on the team in an ASO often looked implicitly at the board (e.g. 
Vanaelst et al. 2006). And vice versa, studies that focused on boards also considered teams 
(e.g. Filatotchev et al. 2006; Clarysse et al. 2007).  Hence, the contribution of the dissertation 
is that it explores the role of both team and board in ASO development.  
The research on team and board in ASOs seems to be in its infancy, and this offers 
plenty of research opportunities. As suggested in paper 1, one can distinguish roughly 
between two basic dimensions: structure and processes of the team and board. Structure refers 
to the size and composition (i.e. skill mix) of the group. Processes may occur within or across 
group boundaries, e.g. conflict in the team, new board member addition. While there appear 
to be a number of studies addressing team and board structure in high-tech new ventures, 
there are much fewer studies addressing team and board processes. Yet, there are many 
research gaps (as paper 1 shows) with regard to both dimensions that future research on team 
and board in ASO firms could fill.  
 Previous spin-off research finds that ASO teams are homogeneous in terms of 
background makeup, with less developed intra-team processes compared to independent high-
tech firms (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005). Backgrounds and skills of the board members in 
ASOs are found to be complementary to those of the team (Clarysse et al. 2007).  However, 
spin-off studies tell us little about to what extent the amount and nature of human resources, 
i.e. team and board size and diversity, contribute to sustainable ASO development. Paper 4 
attempts to address this research gap.  
In paper 4, I (and my co-authors) measure ASO development as overcoming one of 
the most important entrepreneurial milestones, namely attracting VC financing. The findings 
show that ASOs with larger teams and higher diversity in functional and industry 
backgrounds among the team members (with support from seed funds and industry) are more 
likely to attract VC financing than ASOs with board members who are diverse in their 
educational backgrounds (and with support from informal investors).  These findings extend 
and refine previous research, confirming that the human capital of the management team may 
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usefully predict entrepreneurial success (Shane and Stuart 2002; Ucbasaran et al. 2003; 
Beckman et al. 2007; Zimmerman 2008). While we did not find the board to be an important 
predictor of VC acquisition, it became apparent that in order to contribute to ASO 
development a board would require the inclusion of members with certain backgrounds and 
skills. Paper 2 sheds light on which members ASO firms recruit during start-up and in the 
subsequent development stages, how and why; e.g. which social networks are utilized when 
looking for new board members and which resources new board members bring to the 
venture. 
Paper 2 contributes by studying board processes, i.e. how the board is formed and how 
it evolves. It also tries to relate board changes to the stages of development. We propose that 
the board at founding will most likely consist of the scientist-entrepreneurs and people from 
the scientist-entrepreneurs’ networks. The board is therefore quite homogenous in terms of 
board member background. The board composition changes over time and new board 
members bring critical resources that the top management team lacks. These resources range 
from finance and industry experience in earlier stages, to executive and marketing/sales 
experience in later stages. New board members are found primarily through the chair’s 
networks, regardless of the size of the firm stake held by the board chair. Further, we propose 
that the additions of key board members are associated with the progress of a spin-off. That is, 
outside directors help the ASO to achieve credibility, thus, proving the viability of the 
venture, and to move the spin-off closer towards the next development stage, in which the 
ASO achieves sustainable returns.    
As prior spin-off studies demonstrate, recruiting new members is a key element in 
ASO team formation and further team development (e.g. Clarysse and Moray 2004; Forbes et 
al. 2006; Vanaelst et al. 2006). Recruitment of new members depends on the competences 
needed and existing social networks. Adding new members to the team is critical when high-
tech firms experience very rapid growth, and hence need more managerial resources, or when 
high-tech firms have very slow growth and need new top managers who could improve this 
situation (Boeker and Wiltbank 2005). While existing research focuses on the team structural 
characteristics (e.g. heterogeneity in functional and educational specialization) that are 
associated with new team member addition (e.g. Ucbasaran et al. 2003; Chandler et al. 2005), 
we know little about the role of the board in recruiting activity. Paper 3 addresses this gap. 
The findings in paper 3 suggest that ASO companies which have larger and more active 
networking boards are more likely to add new members to the team. The lack of growth in 
ASOs seems to increase the likelihood of adding a new member. Overall, paper 3 proposes 
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that the joint networking effort of both internal (employed in the firm) and external board 
members contributes to the recruiting of new team members. 
   
4.1 Implications 
 
The nature of ASO research is mostly empirical; however, the number of theoretical 
contributions is increasing. This dissertation draws on several theoretical perspectives and has 
therefore several theoretical implications. First, the research demonstrates that the stage-based 
perspective can successfully be used to measure an ASO development in terms of overcoming 
key thresholds, that is, achieving credibility and sustainability (paper 2) and acquiring VC 
financing (paper 4). Next, we combine stage-based, resource dependence and social network 
theories to describe changes in board composition (paper 2). We find that these theories are 
important complements to research on boards in new ventures, dominated by agency theory 
(Huse 2007; Uhlaner et al. 2007). These perspectives all provide partial explanations for 
board change processes, but have to be employed in combination to better understand the 
phenomenon. At last, the resource dependence perspective provides an explanation for the 
board’s role in attracting necessary external managerial resources in ASOs (paper 3).  
Resource-based perspective was drawn on to explain to what extent a firm’s internal 
resources contribute to achieving an important entrepreneurial milestone – VC acquisition 
(paper 4). Thus, resource dependence and resource-based perspectives give supplementary 
explanations of the board’s role in ASO development. While the former provides an 
explanation as to how the board can facilitate ASO development by attracting new members 
to the team, the latter may explain how the board and team themselves can be useful resources 
and, hence, sources for sustainable ASO development.         
Understanding team and board also has important implications for practitioners. When 
forming a team, TTOs and entrepreneurs should pay attention to cognitive diversity. The 
diversity in functional and industrial backgrounds of the team members is positively related to 
new team member addition (paper 3) and the ASO’s ability to attract VC funding (paper 4). 
This is in line with prior research, which shows that early stage technology-based firms 
overcome various thresholds (e.g. receiving VC funding, going public) when they have teams 
that are complete in terms of the functions of marketing, finance, operations, and engineering 
(Zimmerman 2008; Beckman et al. 2007) and heterogeneous in industry experience (Chandler 
et al. 2005). For practitioners seeking sustained ASO development, this implies that they 
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should adjust the team’s functional and industrial diversity as early as possible by adding 
members with relevant expertise to the management team.       
Next, the findings suggest that changes in the board may be seen both as an effect of 
an ASO’s development and progress to a new stage, and as a driving force in this 
development (paper 2). The board chair’s social networks seem to be essential when attracting 
new members to the board who could supply an ASO with needed external resources. This 
result emphasizes the importance of the professional board chair in ASO development. The 
networking activity of the whole board appears to be significant when recruiting new 
members to the top management team (paper 3). An important policy message is therefore to 
include the perspective of board networking contribution and dynamics in mechanisms 
intended to support ASO development. For instance, certain types of public funding seeking 
to stimulate spin-off creation could be made contingent on the ability to attract professional 
outside directors to the board of an ASO. Hence, for policy-makers and practitioners, this 
implies that it may be necessary to develop policies that meet the needs of ASOs in finding 
well-networked outside directors. Further, the findings suggest that the seed funding and 
alliances with industrial partners are positively related to an ASO’s ability to obtain VC 
funding (paper 4). Consequently, efforts to develop networks and relationships with early 
stage investors, industrial partners and executives who can be potential professional board 
members may be an important additional component in general and specific assistance 
programs. This may imply that TTOs should recruit staff or hire experts with working 
experience in established companies in private high-tech sectors, not only in start-ups. Policy 
makers should also consider the possibility of extending seed funding, which ASOs may 
apply for, and designing support schemes that could stimulate to greater involvement of 
strategic industrial partners in ASOs. Such actions may help address the concerns that ASOs 
are being created when they are immature in terms of human capital with quite homogeneous 
teams and boards and, thus, unable to move the business forward. These actions may also help 
the teams to increase the chances that they will obtain necessary external financing from VC 
investors.   
 
 
4.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
Since the nature of most ASO studies is empirical, and there are still few studies on 
team and board in ASOs, I tried to make a comprehensive and detailed literature analysis of 
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the stream of research on both team and board in primarily ASOs, but also other high-tech 
new ventures (paper 1). In the literature review I attempted to provide some directions for 
future research which could develop the area. In this dissertation I contribute to the 
dimensions of structure and processes across the group boundaries; still, the theme of intra-
group dynamics is left out. Hence, future researchers may try to further explore the internal 
processes and relationships between the variables, which have been extensively studied in 
other contexts or disciplines, and theorize about, or even test the applicability of, these 
relationships in an ASO context.  
Next, due to multiple cases research design the model developed in paper 2 is related 
to specific phenomena pertaining to board dynamics in ASO firms. Other papers (3 and 4) are 
cross-sectional studies of Norwegian ASOs. Hence, more studies in other countries and 
contexts could be done to strengthen the generalizability of the findings. Future researchers 
may also attempt to conduct longitudinal studies to better capture the evolutionary aspects of 
team and board composition and to ensure the proper sequence of events and changes in 
characteristics through development stages. Future studies could explore in-depth the role of 
team and board in various stages of firm development.  
Finally, we have only focused on team member addition, and have been able to 
explain the drivers of board member additions. Future research may investigate the other side 
of turnover – member exit – in more details, as the drivers of member entry and exit vary 
(Ucbasaran et al. 2003). Consequences of both team and board member addition are important 
as well. For instance, Beckman et al. (2007) show that high-tech venture teams that add 
members obtain initial public offering faster. The qualitative findings of the dissertation show 
that external board members add value by bringing additional resources that the management 
team lacks and, thus, contribute to ASO development. The results of the survey indicate that 
most important additions to the team were usually positive with needed competence brought 
by the new member, resulting in the emergence of new growth opportunities and even 
increased sales. Still, future research could address the question of the consequences of team 
and board member entries and departures for ASO development. For instance, additions to 
and departures raise important governance issues in terms of how changes in the equity 
holdings are negotiated and may disturb intra-group processes, which in turn may affect firm 
performance. We have been able to observe some effects of additions on firm development. 
Further research may explore departures of team and board members, negotiation and tension 
issues, and examine whether the membership changes are conflict-loaded or imposed by 
powerfull stakeholders and how this would affect group cohesion and effectiveness. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
 
Team and board are important factors that affect academic spin-off development. The 
dynamics of the development stages in an ASO is related to the dynamics of its board. In 
successful academic spin-offs the board contribution is dynamic. Larger and actively 
networking boards contribute to attracting new team members with necessary competences 
who open for new growth opportunities and help ASO business to move forward. Key board 
members bring in needed resources that the team lacks, ranging from finance and industry 
experience in early stages to executive and marketing/sales experience later. Thus, they help 
an ASO to prove a venture’s viability and approach a stage of sustainable returns. Key board 
members are found primarily through the social networks of the professional board chair. 
ASOs that have contributing boards and team members with diverse functional and industry 
backgrounds succeed in recruiting new team members and achieving an important 
entrepreneurial milestone of acquiring venture capital. The problem of achieving this 
milestone may be reduced if ASOs have previously managed to receive seed capital and 
support from industrial partners. The top management team and board that contribute to 
commercialization of university research by facilitating sustainable spin-off firm development 
represent an exciting research area with numerous opportunities for future research.    
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Abstract 
 
Reviewing the state of the art of academic spin-off firm (ASO) research by collating 65 spin-
off articles published in a variety of academic journals, I identify that there are few studies on 
group level, which all point to a need for more research on team and board in ASOs. Arguing 
that team and board and their role in ASO development is an important, yet complex and 
under-researched topic, I try to carry out a comprehensive literature review of the stream of 
research on team and board in primarily ASOs and other high-tech new ventures, comprising 
of 40 articles. I suggest a framework for considering team and board in ASOs, which includes 
structure and processes, and discuss the findings and future research opportunities within this 
framework. Finally, I present conclusions, implications and limitations of the study.  
 
Keywords: literature review, academic spin-offs, top management team, board 
 
1. Introduction  
Entrepreneurship research has undergone drastic changes in the past thirty years 
(Landström 2000). In response to the changing world economy and research needs, several 
new areas have emerged. One of these new areas that receives growing attention 
internationally is academic entrepreneurship (Shane 2004). In particular, research on 
academic spin-offs (ASOs) has recently grown. This may be attributed to the rise in 
commercial activity and spin-off creation that has recently occurred in the majority of 
universities and research institutes (Lockett et al. 2005).  
ASOs are high-tech new firms founded by employees of the public research 
organization (PRO) such as a university or research institute around a core technological 
innovation which had initially been developed at PRO (Birley 2002). Governments 
increasingly recognise the need to support the process of technological change with the aim of 
spawning more high-growth knowledge-intensive companies from university research 
(O’Shea et al. 2004; Wright et al. 2004). Despite the importance of ASO companies as 
generators of national growth and societal development (Lindholm-Dahlstrand and Klofsten 
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2002; Steffensen et al. 2000), researchers only recently started to focus explicitly on ASO 
firms (Djokovic and Souitaris 2008). There were attempts to review and categorize spin-off 
literature, which rapidly increased in the new millennium (Autio 2000; O’Shea et al. 2004; 
Siegel and Phan 2005; Rothaermel et al. 2007; Djokovic and Souitaris 2008). 
Previous studies on spin-off creation have tried to explain the variation in spin-off 
formation and suggest policies that would increase this activity at universities (Autio 2000; 
O’Shea et al. 2005). These studies mainly identify the factors which affect the spin-off 
creation process related to faculty attributes and incentives, university and technology transfer 
offices’ (TTO) commercialization policies and practices, and region or industry specifics 
(O’Shea et al. 2005; Rothaermel et al. 2007; Autio 2000; Shane 2004). However, the research 
that tries to explain a successful spin-off development on the team level is limited 
(Rothaermel et al. 2007). These studies focus on team networks, composition, formation and 
evolution of team heterogeneity and attempt to link team characteristics to ASO growth 
(Nicolaou and Birley 2003b; Clarysse and Moray 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006; Ensley and 
Hmieleski 2005). Although the entrepreneurial team is recognized as a crucial factor to new 
venture growth (Cooper and Daily 1997; Birley and Stockley 2000), it has yet to be 
extensively studied yet in academic entrepreneurship (Shane 2004).    
The exploration of the board as a locus of analysis when explaining early performance 
differentials between ASO firms is an area which has not been studied thoroughly. An 
exception is the study by Clarysse et al. (2007) that shows that the outside board members in 
ASOs have skills which are complementary to those of the team members. The lack of 
research on boards in ASOs is surprising since many ASOs as high-tech firms operate in 
industry niches characterized by high levels of growth and this, in contrast to large 
companies, requires highly skilled board members (Forbes and Milliken 1999) and greater 
involvement of the board in the firm’s strategic decisions (Hambrick and Abrahamson 1995). 
Thus, the boards in ASOs may exert a stronger influence on firm performance compared to 
other companies. In addition, due to newness and a lack of basic resources, the boards in 
young ASO start-ups may be helpful by offering legitimacy, networking and access to 
resources (not only monitoring and control) (Lynall et al. 2003; Huse 2007). This may require 
close interaction between the team and board members, who make decisions about ASO 
development strategy, and an active involvement of board members in the firm’s activities.  
ASOs can be seen as transition firms, which try to overcome various thresholds, e.g. 
gathering human resources, and achieve entrepreneurial milestones, e.g. attracting external 
funding (Vohora et al. 2004; Clarysse and Moray 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006). To enable a 
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Fig. 1 Team, board and academic spin-off development 
firm’s transition from academia to market, both the team and board of an ASO need to be 
developed (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Filatotchev et al. 2006). As shown by Vanaelst et al. 
(2006), during legal incorporation, the founding team divides into two major teams: the top 
management team (TMT) and the board of directors. The TMT and board may represent 
separate entities or they may overlap, as illustrated in Fig. 1. For instance, a scientist-
entrepreneur may be a member of both the TMT and board, while a university TTO may place 
its representative on the board of the ASO (ibid). To increase chances of acquiring external 
funding, ASOs should attract people with commercial expertise and/or those who could 
enhance the firm’s credibility in the eyes of customers and exchange partners (Vohora et al. 
2004; Wright et al. 2004, 2006). Such people may be recruited to the TMT or board (ibid, 
Lynall et al. 2003). Once agreed to invest in an ASO, the external financiers often require 
seats on the board (Clarysse et al. 2007). An increasing stake for external owners represents a 
reduction in TMT ownership. This may imply that some scientist-entrepreneurs have to leave 
the board. Therefore, one might expect that, as an ASO develops, the TMT and board undergo 
changes. Thus, the board represents a management unit, which overlaps the TMT in the 
period of legal incorporation. After changes/transitions, the TMT and board may become less 
overlapped and eventually completely separated (see Fig. 1). 
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Thus, the board in ASOs is apparently an important component of the ASO 
management and represents a crucial factor, which may affect ASO development. Hence, I 
argue that the spin-off studies aiming to contribute to research on group level should consider 
both the team and board. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to map and assess the 
existing studies on team and board in ASOs and to identify specific research gaps.  In 
particular, I try to conduct a comprehensive review of the literature on team and board in 
primarily ASOs and other high-tech new ventures. The assessment and synthesis should make 
this research topic more accessible to scholars, contributing to its diffusion in the scientific 
community. I suggest the framework for considering team and board in ASOs containing the 
group structure and processes. Finally, I try to provide some directions for future research 
through which the number of scholars, who wish to participate in the growing academic spin-
off research and contribute to the studies on group level, will hopefully be increased.  
The paper is structured in several parts. This introduction (section 1) is followed by a 
methodology (section 2). Next, I present the results of the scope study of prior academic spin-
off and new venture team/board research (section 3). Then, I discuss findings along two 
dimensions, structure and processes in the team/board, and propose future research directions 
(section 4). Finally, I conclude and present implications and limitations of this study (section 
5).  
 
 
2. Methodology  
The literature review process is “a key tool used to manage the diversity of knowledge 
for a specific academic inquiry” (Tranfield et al. 2003: 208). Conducting a literature review 
often enables the researcher to map and assess the existing body of knowledge and to identify 
specific research questions to direct future research (ibid). A rigorous literature review starts 
with the scope study to assess the relevance and size of the literature and to delimit the subject 
area (ibid). Within management, scope studies may need to consider cross-disciplinary 
perspectives and alternative ways in which a research topic has previously been tackled. In 
this paper, the scope study of academic spin-off research provided an indication that there is a 
need for more studies on team and board. The importance of the topic was ascertained by 
considering previous studies on team and board in high-tech new ventures. 
To develop a comprehensive overview of the ASO research and studies on team and 
board, I applied a three step exploration process. For initial access to the literature, I began by 
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studying a seminal book on academic entrepreneurship by Scott Shane (2004). By collating 
the spin-off papers, which had previously been published in various academic journals and 
using own research, Shane’s book provided an immediate and accessible entry into the 
literature on academic entrepreneurship. Next, I identified and studied the special issues and 
review articles published on topics related to academic entrepreneurship. 
In step two I attempted to track all relevant articles referred to by any of the articles 
analyzed in the previous step. To avoid reference bias, I used electronic databases like 
ABI/INFORM, EBSCO, Science Direct and JSTOR to identify all scholarly spin-off articles 
published in refereed journals. About 65 articles that studied the academic spin-off 
phenomenon were selected. Next, I read and analyzed each article to create a database in 
which the following data were coded: (i) author name(s) and journal of publication, (ii) year 
published, (iii) geographical location of the ASO cases, (iv) theory, (v) method, (vi) unit of 
analysis, and (vii) research focus of the article (see Table 1). The database is mainly adapted 
from the spin-off literature review by Djokovic and Souitaris (2008). However, I additionally 
identified ASO studies published in 2006-2007, and for all reviewed articles I specified the 
geographical location of the focal cases (not authors), sample size and content, unit of 
analysis, and research focus. The unit of analysis, following Lockett et al. (2005), may be 
region, public research organization (e.g. university or research institute), technology transfer 
office (TTO), incubator, venture, network, team, or individual. I also re-categorized theories 
used in the articles and noted which theory was used in-stead of the basic distinction between 
empirical, conceptual and theoretical papers applied by Djokovic and Souitaris (2008). This 
additional re-categorization is marked by a star symbol in the table overhead and in italics in 
table 1. 
In the final step, since there are few studies on team and board level in ASO research I 
went through a process similar to the one described above to identify articles pertaining to the 
topic of entrepreneurial teams and boards in high-tech new ventures. I studied the reviews of 
the new venture team literature by Cooper and Daily (1997) and Birley and Stockley (2000) 
and a seminal review book on board research by Huse (2007), which provided me with initial 
references. Then I used electronic reference retrieval services to track all relevant articles. 
Finally, I read and analyzed these articles and created a detailed database in which I coded the 
following data: (i) author name(s), year and journal, (ii) theory, (iii) industry/firm type, (iv) 
dependent variable(s), (v) independent dependent variable(s), (vi) control variable(s), (vii) 
method, and (viii) main findings. The database is presented in Table 2. Five of the fourteen 
board articles consider small and medium firms without specifying industry, and two articles 
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consider firms in hotel and banking industry. Their inclusion is justified due to few studies on 
boards in high-tech new ventures, and that they use value-added, as opposed to agency, 
approach.    
Research synthesis relates to methods for summarizing, integrating and, where 
possible, accumulating the findings of different studies on a topic or research question 
(Mulrow 1994; cf. Tranfield et al. 2003). The simplest and widely used form of synthesis is a 
narrative review that attempts to identify what has been written on a subject or topic 
(Tranfield et al. 2003). An alternative approach to synthesis is meta-analysis, which enables 
the pooling of data from individual studies to allow for an increase in statistical power and a 
more precise estimate of effect size (Glass 1976; ibid). The qualitative nature of most studies 
on spin-off creation, which use case-based methods and are mainly concerned with processes 
(Rothaermel et al. 2007), makes a meta-analysis difficult to implement, since such studies 
rarely measure the phenomenon in the same way.  
Following Tranfield et al. (2003), I use a meta-synthesis approach, which enables 
researcher to take into account “all important similarities and differences in language, 
concepts, images, and other ideas around a target experience” (Sandelowski et al. 1997: 669) 
The advantage of meta-synthesis is that it allows the conducting of synthesis in an interpretive 
and inductive manner, which is suitable when the studies are qualitative. Further, meta-
synthesis is aimed at improving upon traditional narrative reviews, which have been widely 
criticized (Fink 1998; Hart 1998), by adopting explicit processes of bringing together the 
findings on a chosen theme. The results of meta-synthesis help the investigator to achieve a 
greater level of understanding of the topic or subject chosen.         
I combine “reciprocal translations” and “lines of argument synthesis” techniques 
(Beck 2001), which are used when different reports address similar issues and when reports 
examine different aspects of the same phenomenon. The resulting data reveal the patterns 
regarding team and board, the analysis of which enables to distinguish between the studies of 
team/board structure and processes as dependent and/or independent variables. In the sections 
below, I will proceed with a report of the results and discussion. Following Tranfield et al. 
(2003), I start with providing a “descriptive analysis” of the field, presenting the results based 
on the conducted scope study of the ASO and new venture team/board research. Then, the 
“thematic analysis” is presented based on the meta-synthesis where findings, emerging 
patterns and future research directions are discussed. 
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3. Results 
This section describes the results based on the scope study of the research on academic 
spin-off creation and the team/board in high-tech new ventures. 
 
3.1 Academic spin-off research 
There is an agreement between researchers that the spin-off stream, while producing a 
wealth of empirical data, is mainly a-theoretical (Nicolaou and Birley 2003a; Djokovic and 
Souitaris 2008; Rothaermel et al. 2007), describing different aspects of the spin-off 
phenomenon or exploring relationships between constructs without providing a consistent 
explanation to account for those relationships (O’Shea et al. 2004).  Possible reasons for it are 
the relative novelty of the ASO phenomenon and its complexity (Djokovic and Souitaris 
2008) and the embryonic stage of academic entrepreneurship in the life cycle of academic 
fields (Kuhn 1962), where “a 25-year history is considered a very short time when compared 
with, for example, the 50-year history of strategy or the more than 225-year history of 
economics” (Rothaermel et al. 2007: 9). In addition, as Davidsson et al. (2001) note, there is 
no normative or overarching theory of entrepreneurship, which also may be the reason for the 
empirical / a-theoretical nature of most ASO studies.  
The number of theory-driven papers has been increased in the past seven years. 
Similarly to Djokovic and Souitaris (2008), I identified whether the article was conceptual, 
empirical or phenomenon-focused (see Table 1). Such judgement is subjective, and the 
categorization is therefore an approximation. When the paper was theory-driven, I noted 
which theories were used (see Table 1). Alike the broader field of entrepreneurship 
(Davidsson et al. 2001), academic entrepreneurship “borrows” theories from existing 
disciplines and fields. Among the most often used theoretical perspectives are resource-based 
view (31 % of reviewed ASO articles), followed by different network perspectives (23 %), 
including social networks, social capital, university-firm and university-industry linkages, and 
followed by stage-based (15 %) and evolutionary views (15 %) of the firm.  The remaining 15 
% had other approaches (e.g. institutional, pecking order). About a quarter of these studies 
have mixed approaches, e.g. the study may combine the resource-based and stage-based 
views. 
Most of the research on academic spin-offs has been conducted in the U.S., closely 
following by the studies mostly of single countries in continental Europe and the studies of 
ASOs in U.K. Similar to the published entrepreneurship research (Davidsson 2004), the 
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majority of ASO studies consider the venture level of analysis (46 %). The venture-level 
studies are followed by the studies with public research organization (23 %), TTO (9 %) and 
team (9 %) as units of analysis. Thirty percent of the articles have mixed units of analysis. 
The reason that so few studies consider team level can be that, as Davidsson (2004) notes, it is 
difficult to obtain a sampling frame and/or secondary data on them.  
Quantitative regression methods are most often used when studying the factors 
associated with the successful TTOs and public research organizations where the spin-off 
formation rates are high. There are slightly more qualitative, case-based methods than 
quantitative ones in the venture-level studies. As Rothaermel et al. (2007: 15) assess it, “the 
choice of methods appears to be not only a reflection of the underlying research questions, but 
also conditioned upon the availability of appropriate data”. Hence, it seems that it is difficult 
to obtain needed, preferably longitudinal data at the venture-level of analysis. Only two of six 
team-level spin-off articles are quantitative, and the remaining articles are qualitative and 
case-based reflecting the challenge of obtaining data on teams. All papers at team level are 
recent and theory-driven. The paper on board level is also recent and adopts a multiple-
theoretical approach, with theories traditionally used in the studies of large corporations, and 
quantitative method. The team/board-level studies represent valuable contributions to the area 
and emphasize the need for more studies of team and board to better understand how these 
groups affect ASO development/growth.  
 
3.2 New venture team and board studies 
The studies on team and board in ASOs and high-tech new ventures are summarized in 
Table 2.   Previous new venture team studies demonstrate that entrepreneurial teams are at the 
center of the crucial activities of new firms (Cooper and Daily 1997). It is recognized that 
many other factors influence firm performance, including the environment, the financing 
available, and the strategy adopted (ibid). Nevertheless, these factors are more or less related 
to the team which makes decisions about what markets to enter, how to compete, and how to 
raise financing.  Thus, entrepreneurial teams are significant in their impact on their firm’s 
performance (Virany and Tushman 1986; Kamm et al. 1990; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
1990; Shane 2004). Yet, despite its importance, the entrepreneurial teams have not been 
extensively studied (Birley and Stockley 2000). 
   
 
45
T
ab
le
 1
 A
 li
st
 o
f t
he
 re
vi
ew
ed
 sp
in
-o
ff
 a
rti
cl
es
 
 
A
ut
ho
rs
 
Y
ea
r 
Co
un
try
* 
Th
eo
ry
* 
M
et
ho
d*
 
U
ni
t o
f 
an
al
ys
is*
 
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 fo
cu
s*
 
M
cQ
ue
en
 a
nd
 W
al
lm
ar
k 
(T
ec
hn
ov
at
io
n)
 
19
82
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Em
pi
ric
al
 
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e,
 3
6 
sp
in
-
of
fs
 
PR
O
 / 
ve
nt
ur
e Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f i
nn
ov
at
iv
e 
ac
tiv
ity
 a
nd
 it
s r
el
at
io
n 
to
 tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 a
ct
iv
ity
 a
t C
ha
lm
er
s i
s d
es
cr
ib
ed
. 
D
ou
tri
au
x 
(J
B
V
) 
19
87
 
C
an
ad
a 
Ph
en
om
en
on
-
fo
cu
se
d 
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e,
 3
8 
fir
m
s
ve
nt
ur
e 
Th
e 
au
th
or
 o
bs
er
ve
s t
he
 e
vo
lu
tio
n 
of
 a
ca
de
m
ic
 e
nt
re
pr
en
eu
ri
al
 fi
rm
s a
nd
 
ev
al
ua
te
d 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
ir
 li
nk
s w
ith
 a
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
. 
Sm
ilo
r, 
G
ib
so
n,
 K
oz
m
et
sk
y 
(J
B
V
) 
19
89
 
U
S 
Ph
en
om
en
on
-
fo
cu
se
d 
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
an
d 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
re
gi
on
 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s d
ev
el
op
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
 fr
am
ew
or
k 
of
 a
 te
ch
no
lo
po
lis
 w
he
el
 
fr
om
 st
ud
yi
ng
 th
e 
dy
na
m
ic
s o
f h
ig
h-
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
gr
ow
th
 in
 A
us
tin
, T
ex
as
. 
Sm
ilo
r, 
G
ib
so
n,
 D
ie
tri
ch
 (J
B
V
) 
19
90
 
U
S 
Em
pi
ric
al
 
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e,
 2
3 
sp
in
of
fs
 
ve
nt
ur
e 
As
se
ss
 th
e 
fa
ct
or
s t
ha
t e
nh
an
ce
 a
nd
 in
hi
bi
t t
he
 fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 sp
in
-o
ut
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 fr
om
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f T
ex
as
 a
t A
us
tin
. 
R
ob
er
ts
, M
al
on
e 
(R
&
D
 
M
an
ag
e)
 
19
96
 
U
S 
/ U
K
 
Ph
en
om
en
on
-
fo
cu
se
d 
8 
R&
D
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
PR
O
 
Th
is
 p
ap
er
 d
ev
el
op
s f
iv
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
al
 'm
od
el
s' 
fo
r f
or
m
al
 e
ffo
rt
s 
ai
m
ed
 a
t s
pi
nn
in
g 
of
f n
ew
 c
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 c
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at
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, C
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at
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 c
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f c
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 p
at
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 c
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 c
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 c
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in
di
vi
du
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 o
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 c
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 c
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m
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&
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 b
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at
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ra
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at
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f c
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.
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at
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at
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D
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at
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at
e 
ra
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s o
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C
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re
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 re
se
ar
ch
 
on
 th
e 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 tr
an
sf
er
 p
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ra
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 d
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D
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at
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s b
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at
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 p
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at
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 c
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 c
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 C
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at
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C
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 m
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 m
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 c
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 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
. 
G
ra
nd
i, 
G
rim
al
di
 (S
B
E)
 
20
03
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at
iv
e,
 4
0 
sp
in
-
of
fs
 
te
am
 
Ex
pl
or
e 
th
e 
ne
tw
or
ki
ng
 c
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r o
f k
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 m
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r r
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at
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 b
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 c
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at
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at
iv
e,
 1
0 
sp
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m
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at
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re
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f p
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 c
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Team characteristics have been carefully examined by the researchers of strategic 
management, organizational behaviour and social psychology (cf. Clarysse and Moray 2004). 
One may distinguish between roughly two research streams: the social psychology and 
demographic stream (ibid; Birley and Stockley 2000). The social psychologists have studied 
conflict, problem-solving, decision-making and other processes and outcomes within the 
boundaries of the group. The demography researchers have used e.g. age and tenure as 
proxies for experience and maturity accordingly and other demographic characteristics, which 
could be measured more accurately than the processes.  The “upper-echelons” demography 
researchers applied the demographic proxies to top management teams.  
The relatively infant research on new high-tech venture teams seems to be influenced 
by the team theories and frameworks used in neighbouring disciplines. The theory-driven new 
venture team studies therefore adopt either group psychology (e.g. Ensley et al. 2002; Ruef et 
al. 2003) or demographic approaches (Beckman et al. 2007; Zimmerman 2008). Hence, there 
is a high percentage of quantitative studies, which link team characteristics to firm 
performance at a certain point in time (see Table 2 pages i-iii) or link team, firm and other 
characteristics to team change/turnover (see Table 2 pages iv-vii). A handful of the studies are 
qualitative and look at team processes primarily in ASOs.   
Due to the overlap of the team and board (see Fig. 1) and an active involvement of 
outside directors in ASOs, the spin-off studies that focus explicitly on the team in an ASO 
often look implicitly at the board (e.g. Vanaelst et al. 2006). And vice versa, studies that 
focused on boards also considered teams (e.g. Filatotchev et al. 2006; Clarysse et al. 2007). 
Confusion related to what constitutes an entrepreneurial team in growth-oriented new 
ventures also exists (Cooper and Daily 1997). This is not clear since various studies define a 
team differently. Kamm et al. (1990) suggest that a team consists of two or more individuals 
who are involved in the pre-startup activities and who formally establish and share ownership 
of their new firm. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) define team members to be founders if 
they worked full-time in executive-level positions when the firm was founded. Ensley et al. 
(1998) state that individuals have to fulfill three criteria in order to be considered members of 
the team: they (1) have jointly established a firm; (2) have a financial interest; and (3) have a 
direct influence on the strategic decisions of the firm. Other researchers have made the equity 
stake condition stricter and have imposed a minimum equity stake before one can be 
considered a member of the entrepreneurial team (Ucbasaran et al. 2003). 
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re
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, p
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at
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re
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l d
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 d
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l t
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re
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 b
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re
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re
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re
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re
gr
es
si
on
 
an
al
ys
is
 
I. 
A
. S
up
po
rt 
fo
r: 
Te
am
 si
ze
 
in
flu
en
ce
 a
dd
iti
on
s (
+)
 (n
ot
 
de
pa
rtu
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). 
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m
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s d
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, f
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at
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 d
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at
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re
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 b
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C
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 p
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ra
tio
ns
 in
 a
 
lo
ca
lit
y 
th
an
 a
s a
 re
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), 
Ex
it 
Te
am
 si
ze
, T
ea
m
 a
ge
, 
Fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
, F
un
ct
io
na
l 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e,
 
En
tre
pr
en
eu
ria
l 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
 
Fi
rm
 si
ze
, A
ge
, 
In
du
st
ry
, 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
(h
os
til
ity
) 
Lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
an
al
ys
is
  
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 te
am
 si
ze
 a
nd
 te
am
 
m
em
be
r e
nt
ry
 (–
), 
fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
 te
am
 
an
d 
te
am
 m
em
be
r e
xi
t (
–)
, 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
ria
l e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
ex
it 
(+
). 
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  T
ea
m
 st
ud
ie
s w
ith
 te
am
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s a
s d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
A
rt
ic
le
 
T
he
or
y 
N
, i
nd
us
tr
y 
Y
 (D
V
) 
X
1, 
et
c.
 (I
V
)
C
on
tr
ol
s 
M
et
ho
d 
M
ai
n 
fin
di
ng
s 
V
an
ae
ls
t, 
C
la
ry
ss
e,
 
W
rig
ht
, 
Lo
ck
et
t e
t 
al
. 2
00
6 
(E
TP
) 
Te
am
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
C
og
ni
tiv
e 
an
d 
af
fe
ct
iv
e 
co
nf
lic
t. 
Sh
ar
ed
 c
og
ni
tio
n:
 
su
pp
or
t, 
ru
le
s, 
go
al
, a
nd
 
in
no
va
tio
n 
or
ie
nt
ed
 te
am
s 
10
 U
SO
s i
n 
B
el
gi
um
.  
 Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
an
al
ys
is
 is
 a
 
sp
in
-o
ut
 p
ro
ce
ss
. 
U
ni
t o
f a
na
ly
si
s 
– 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
ria
l 
te
am
. 
En
tre
pr
en
eu
ria
l 
te
am
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t /
 
ev
ol
ut
io
n.
 
Te
am
 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
: 
ex
pe
rie
nt
ia
l, 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
ria
l 
an
d 
co
gn
iti
ve
 
n/
a 
 
n/
a 
C
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
N
ew
 m
em
be
rs
 d
o 
no
t i
nt
ro
du
ce
 
an
ot
he
r p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e 
on
 h
ow
 to
 d
o 
bu
si
ne
ss
. N
ew
co
m
er
s r
ei
nf
or
ce
 
th
e 
co
gn
iti
ve
 h
om
og
en
ei
ty
 
(s
up
po
rt 
an
d 
in
no
va
tio
n 
or
ie
nt
ed
 
pe
op
le
) a
nd
 th
ey
 a
re
 n
ot
 b
us
in
es
s 
de
ve
lo
pe
rs
 w
ith
 d
iff
er
en
t g
oa
l 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
(s
im
ila
r s
tra
te
gi
c 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n)
. C
on
fli
ct
s a
re
 th
e 
re
as
on
 fo
r d
ep
ar
tu
re
. R
es
ou
rc
es
 
ar
e 
th
e 
re
as
on
 fo
r t
ea
m
 a
dd
iti
on
.  
W
ie
rs
em
a,
 
B
an
te
l 
19
93
 (S
M
J)
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l 
ad
ap
ta
tio
n 
fr
am
ew
or
k,
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
85
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s, 
38
0 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ith
in
 T
M
T 
TM
T 
tu
rn
ov
er
 
(th
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 in
 
19
80
 w
ho
 w
er
e 
no
 lo
ng
er
 w
ith
 
th
e 
fir
m
 in
 
19
83
) 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l m
un
ifi
ce
nc
e,
 
in
st
ab
ili
ty
, a
nd
 c
om
pl
ex
ity
 –
 
al
l i
nf
lu
en
ce
 fi
rm
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (R
O
A
), 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
ch
an
ge
, a
nd
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
 
(te
nu
re
, e
du
ca
tio
n 
cu
rr
ic
ul
um
) 
M
ea
n 
ag
e,
 
m
ea
n 
fir
m
 
te
nu
re
, m
ea
n 
te
am
 te
nu
re
 
Pa
th
 a
na
ly
si
s 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
ch
an
ge
, e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
in
st
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 c
om
pl
ex
ity
 h
av
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
n 
tu
rn
ov
er
 (n
ot
 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
). 
In
di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l f
ac
to
rs
 th
ro
ug
h 
fir
m
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 w
er
e 
no
t 
su
pp
or
te
d.
 F
irm
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 w
as
 
no
t s
ig
ni
fic
an
tly
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
tu
rn
ov
er
.  
 B
oa
rd
 st
ud
ie
s w
ith
 b
oa
rd
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s a
s i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 (a
nd
 fi
rm
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
s d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e)
 
D
ai
ly
, 
D
al
to
n 
19
92
 (J
B
V
) 
B
oa
rd
s i
n 
sm
al
l 
an
d 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
ria
l 
fir
m
s 
10
0 
fir
m
s i
n 
U
K
 
Fi
rm
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
: 
In
ve
st
or
 a
nd
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
re
tu
rn
s 
Fo
un
de
r-
C
EO
, C
EO
 d
ua
lit
y,
 
C
EO
-c
ha
ir,
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 
ou
ts
id
e 
di
re
ct
or
s, 
to
ta
l 
nu
m
be
r o
f d
ire
ct
or
s 
n/
a 
M
A
N
O
V
A
, 
C
an
on
ic
al
 
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
be
ne
fit
s o
f h
av
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
di
re
ct
or
s. 
M
od
es
t 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 a
dv
an
ta
ge
s w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
w
ith
 g
re
at
er
 n
um
be
rs
 a
nd
 
pr
op
or
tio
ns
 o
f o
ut
si
de
 d
ire
ct
or
s. 
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Bo
ar
d 
stu
di
es
 w
ith
 b
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rd
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s a
s i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 (a
nd
 fi
rm
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
s d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e)
 
A
rt
ic
le
 
T
he
or
y 
N
, i
nd
us
tr
y 
Y
 (D
V
) 
X
1, 
et
c.
 (I
V
)
C
on
tr
ol
s 
M
et
ho
d 
M
ai
n 
fin
di
ng
s 
Fr
ed
rik
se
n,
 
K
lo
fs
te
n 
19
99
 (B
ab
so
n 
Pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s)
 
B
oa
rd
 li
te
ra
tu
re
, 
bo
ar
d 
ty
po
lo
gi
es
 
68
 m
an
ag
er
s o
f 
V
C
-b
ac
ke
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 a
nd
 
68
 v
en
tu
re
 
ca
pi
ta
lis
ts
 
Fi
rm
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
Sa
le
s, 
pr
of
its
, 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
so
ur
ce
s, 
m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
, 
R
&
D
 a
ct
iv
ity
, 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
et
c.
 “
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 p
la
n”
.  
Fo
rm
al
 p
ow
er
 o
f t
he
 C
EO
 
an
d 
th
e 
bo
ar
d.
 
In
si
de
rs
/o
ut
si
de
rs
. L
ac
k 
of
 
di
re
ct
or
 in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
. S
ta
rt 
ye
ar
 fo
r t
he
 p
or
tfo
lio
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
, N
um
be
r o
f 
em
pl
oy
ee
s, 
Sh
ar
e 
ow
ne
d 
by
 
V
C
, R
&
D
 a
ct
iv
ity
 in
 %
, 
po
rti
on
 th
at
 is
 se
ed
 o
r s
ta
rt-
up
 p
ha
se
, V
C
 o
r o
ut
si
de
 
ch
ai
rm
an
.  
n/
a 
A
N
O
V
A
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
tw
o 
di
ff
er
en
t t
yp
es
 o
f 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 st
ru
ct
ur
es
: f
or
m
al
 
bo
ar
d 
re
la
te
d 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 tr
us
t 
an
d 
op
en
ne
ss
 re
la
te
d.
 F
irm
s 
w
he
re
 a
 p
ow
er
 o
ve
r d
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
is
 e
qu
al
ly
 d
is
tri
bu
te
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
EO
 a
nd
 th
e 
bo
ar
d 
ha
ve
 b
et
te
r p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
C
ar
et
ak
er
 b
oa
rd
 ty
pe
 h
as
 th
e 
be
st
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
.  
G
eo
rg
e,
 
W
oo
d,
 K
ha
n 
20
01
 
(E
&
R
D
) 
Li
nk
ag
es
 w
ith
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
bo
ar
d 
in
te
rlo
ck
s 
B
an
ki
ng
 
in
du
st
ry
 in
 th
e 
U
SA
, 7
0 
re
sp
on
se
s 
Fi
rm
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
: 
R
O
A
 a
nd
 R
O
E 
B
oa
rd
 v
ar
io
us
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
, 
ne
tw
or
ki
ng
 st
ra
te
gy
, 
in
te
rlo
ck
, b
oa
rd
 si
ze
, 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l h
os
til
ity
, 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
ria
l o
rie
nt
at
io
n 
n/
a 
Si
m
pl
e 
lin
ea
r 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
m
od
el
 
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 a
 n
et
w
or
ki
ng
 st
ra
te
gy
 
pe
rf
or
m
ed
 b
et
te
r t
ha
n 
th
os
e 
fir
m
s 
th
at
 d
id
 n
ot
 a
ct
iv
el
y 
pu
rs
ue
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f n
et
w
or
ks
  
   
Bo
ar
d 
stu
di
es
 w
ith
 b
oa
rd
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s a
s d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
B
or
ch
, H
us
e 
19
93
 (E
TP
) 
In
fo
rm
al
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
ne
tw
or
ks
 a
nd
 
bo
ar
ds
 
10
4 
re
sp
on
se
s 
fr
om
 h
ot
el
s i
n 
N
or
w
ay
 a
nd
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Bo
ar
d’
s 
ne
tw
or
ki
ng
 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t 
B
oa
rd
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
(s
iz
e,
 
fa
m
ily
,  
fr
ie
nd
sh
ip
 a
nd
  
bu
si
ne
ss
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
, 
em
pl
oy
ee
s, 
ex
ec
ut
iv
es
, 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
), 
tru
st
 a
nd
 
pr
oc
es
se
s (
ro
le
 in
te
gr
at
io
n 
et
c.
), 
in
ce
nt
iv
e 
(m
ot
iv
at
io
n)
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
si
ze
, 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
in
du
st
ry
, 
lo
ca
liz
at
io
n 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ul
tip
le
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
an
al
ys
es
 
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
re
ve
al
ed
 th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
di
re
ct
or
s’
 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 in
 ta
ki
ng
 c
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
ne
tw
or
ki
ng
 fu
nc
tio
ns
 o
f 
co
nt
ac
tin
g 
an
d 
lo
bb
yi
ng
.  
C
la
ry
ss
e,
 
K
no
ck
ae
rt,
 
Lo
ck
et
t 2
00
7 
(S
B
E)
 
A
ge
nc
y,
 
re
so
ur
ce
 
de
pe
nd
en
cy
, 
so
ci
al
 n
et
w
or
ks
 
14
0 
B
el
gi
an
 
hi
gh
-te
ch
 st
ar
t-
up
s 
Bo
ar
d’
s h
um
an
 
ca
pi
ta
l 
co
m
pl
em
en
ta
rit
y 
an
d 
su
bs
tit
ut
io
n 
(R
&
D
, 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 a
nd
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e)
 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 o
rig
in
, V
C
 
fin
an
ci
ng
, h
um
an
 c
ap
ita
l o
f 
th
e 
fo
un
di
ng
 te
am
 (R
&
D
, 
fin
an
ci
al
, c
om
m
er
ci
al
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e)
 
Fo
un
di
ng
 
ye
ar
, i
nd
us
try
 
se
ct
or
, s
ec
to
r 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
in
 
fo
un
di
ng
 
te
am
, t
ea
m
 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
 
B
in
ar
y 
lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
, 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
m
od
el
 
Fo
un
di
ng
 te
am
s a
dd
 o
ut
si
de
 
di
re
ct
or
s w
ith
 si
m
ila
r e
xp
er
ie
nc
e.
 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 st
ar
t-u
ps
 a
dd
 o
ut
si
de
 
di
re
ct
or
s w
ith
 c
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 
hu
m
an
 c
ap
ita
l. 
V
C
 d
ire
ct
or
s a
re
 
co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 if
 th
e 
fo
un
di
ng
 
te
am
 h
as
 R
&
D
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e,
 a
nd
 
ar
e 
su
bs
tit
ut
es
 if
 te
am
 h
as
 fi
na
nc
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
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A
rt
ic
le
 
T
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or
y 
N
, i
nd
us
tr
y 
Y
 (D
V
) 
X
1, 
et
c.
 (I
V
)
C
on
tr
ol
s 
M
et
ho
d 
M
ai
n 
fin
di
ng
s 
D
ea
ki
ns
, 
O
’N
ei
ll,
 
M
ile
ha
m
 
20
00
 (E
 &
 
In
no
v 
M
gm
t 
St
ud
) 
Th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
ou
ts
id
er
s 
23
 sm
al
l 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 in
 
Sc
ot
la
nd
 
Th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
C
EO
 
an
d 
no
n-
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
di
re
ct
or
  
n/
a 
n/
a 
46
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
ith
 C
EO
s a
nd
 
ou
ts
id
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
A
n 
in
pu
t-o
ut
pu
t m
od
el
 o
f t
he
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
C
EO
 a
nd
 n
on
-e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
 
in
 th
e 
ro
le
 a
s c
on
su
lta
nt
, c
ou
ns
el
lo
r, 
ad
vi
so
r, 
an
d 
m
en
to
r i
n 
th
e 
sh
or
t a
nd
 lo
ng
 
te
rm
. 
D
ea
ki
ns
, 
O
’N
ei
ll,
 
M
ile
ha
m
 
20
00
 (V
C
) 
R
ol
e 
of
 V
C
 a
nd
 
no
n-
V
C
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 
di
re
ct
or
s 
46
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
ith
 fo
un
di
ng
 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
rs
 in
 
23
 sm
al
l f
irm
s 
in
 S
co
tla
nd
 
Th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
r 
an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 
di
re
ct
or
 
n/
a 
n/
a 
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
an
d 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 
B
ot
h 
V
C
 a
nd
 n
on
-V
C
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 o
ut
sid
e 
di
re
ct
or
s b
ro
ug
ht
 v
al
ue
-a
dd
in
g 
be
ne
fit
s. 
V
C
 d
ire
ct
or
s p
er
fo
rm
ed
 m
or
e 
th
an
 m
er
e 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
fu
nc
tio
ns
, t
he
y 
w
er
e 
us
ed
 a
s a
 
va
lu
ab
le
 re
so
ur
ce
 b
y 
th
e 
fo
un
di
ng
 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
rs
. 
Fi
et
,  
B
us
en
itz
, 
M
oe
se
l, 
B
ar
ne
y 
19
97
 
(J
B
V
) 
A
ge
nc
y 
th
eo
ry
, 
Po
w
er
 th
eo
ry
, 
B
oa
rd
 d
iv
er
si
ty
, 
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 
Ju
st
ic
e 
th
eo
ry
 
20
5 
fir
m
s w
ho
 
ha
d 
re
ce
iv
ed
 a
t 
le
as
t o
ne
 ro
un
d 
of
 V
C
 fu
nd
in
g.
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 a
ge
 is
 
4.
9 
ye
ar
s. 
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r 
of
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s i
s 
14
5.
 
D
is
m
is
sa
l 
(in
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
de
pa
rtu
re
) o
f 
ne
w
 v
en
tu
re
 
te
am
 m
em
be
rs
. 
43
 c
as
es
 o
f 
di
sm
is
sa
l 
re
po
rte
d.
  
Li
m
its
 o
n 
m
an
ag
er
s’
 
sa
la
rie
s, 
di
sm
is
sa
l 
co
ve
na
nt
s t
o 
fo
rc
e 
a 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
ha
ng
e,
 
ea
rn
-o
ut
 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
, s
al
es
, 
bo
ar
d 
si
ze
, V
C
-
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
se
at
s, 
et
c.
 
 
Lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
C
on
tra
ct
ua
l c
ov
en
an
ts
 li
m
iti
ng
 sa
la
rie
s 
pa
id
 to
 th
e 
ve
nt
ur
e 
m
an
ag
er
s a
re
 re
la
te
d 
to
 fe
w
er
 d
is
m
is
sa
ls
. T
he
re
 is
 a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
sa
le
s i
m
pr
ov
em
en
t 
pe
r e
m
pl
oy
ee
 si
nc
e 
fir
st
-r
ou
nd
 fu
nd
in
g 
an
d 
di
sm
is
sa
l. 
N
um
be
r o
f s
ea
ts
 o
n 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
(-
). 
V
C
s o
n 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
(+
). 
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
(-
). 
Fi
la
to
tc
he
v,
 
To
m
s, 
W
rig
ht
 
20
06
 (I
nt
 J 
of
 
M
gm
t F
in
) 
C
or
po
ra
te
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 li
fe
-
cy
cl
e,
  r
es
ou
rc
e 
an
d 
st
ra
te
gy
 
ro
le
s 
27
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 
sp
in
-o
ff
s, 
IP
O
, 
m
at
ur
ity
 fi
rm
s, 
lis
te
d 
co
rp
or
at
io
ns
 in
 
U
K
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
n/
a 
n/
a 
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
(in
te
rv
ie
w
s)
 
an
d 
qu
an
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Vanaelst et al. (2006) attempts to clarify the ambiguity of team definition by investigating ASO 
cases. The authors illustrate how an entrepreneurial team evolves from the pre-founding team, 
consisting mainly of the researchers, to the founding team, which may include a surrogate 
(external) entrepreneur and is ready to legally incorporate the ASO venture. Once the new 
venture is legally established, the founding team divides into two major teams: the top 
management team and the board of directors (ibid), as depicted in Fig. 1. 
Similar to ASO studies, studies on board in new entrepreneurial firms appear to be a-
theoretical (see Table 2 pages vii-x) examining board typologies, the role and contributions of 
outside directors, the relationships between outside directors and leading entrepreneur etc. 
(Fredriksen and Klofsten 1999; Borch and Huse 1993; Pye 2004; Deakins et al. 2000 a, b; 
Rosenstein et al. 1993). One might say that these studies implicitly consider board as a means by 
which firms can manage external dependency (Selznick 1949; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Borch 
and Huse 1993; George et al. 2001). In small firms, due to a lack of basic resources, the various 
service tasks of the board will be more highly valued than in large firms (Huse 2007). The 
boards are shown to have an active involvement by e.g. offering legitimacy in the business 
community or helping with networking rather than merely performing monitoring and control 
(e.g. Deakins et al. 2000a, b; Borch and Huse 1993; Huse 2007). The board members are often 
seen as a pool of helpers, playing roles such as providing a sounding board, a shoulder to cry on 
or a source of advice in decision-making (Johannisson and Huse 2000). Studies on board in new 
high-tech firms have indicated that venture capitalists are often a key stakeholder group 
(Rosenstein 1988; Fried et al. 1998). Venture capitalists and other external directors may provide 
managerial competence and other valuable resources, all of which can be of great help for young 
start-ups (Deakins et al. 2000a). 
Prior governance studies mainly employed agency theory and cross-sectional data on 
boards in large organizations (Lynall et al. 2003; Huse 2007). The research on board in new 
high-tech ventures, which is in its infancy, along with agency perspective, also attempts to 
incorporate social networks and resource dependency theories to improve our understanding of 
corporate governance in privately-held firms. The studies that link various board characteristics 
to new venture performance are quantitative and draw on frameworks, which were applied to 
large publicly-listed corporations. The studies that treat board composition and processes as 
dependent variables are both quantitative and qualitative. Few studies have sought to address the 
board gap in ASO research and looked explicitly at the boards in ASOs (e.g. Filatotchev et al. 
2006; Clarysse et al. 2007).  
In brief, the research streams studying new ASO firm creation and team/board in new 
ventures seem all to be in their infancy. The majority of spin-off and new venture board studies 
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are a-theoretical. The research on team/board not only in the context of ASOs, but also high-tech 
new firms is limited. Many of the theory-driven papers draw on the theories or frameworks used 
in neighbouring well-established disciplines and/or applied to large corporations. 
 
4. Discussion 
Currently, no literature review exists that specifically focuses on spin-off studies on 
group level and provides an overarching framework to encompass the different pieces making up 
group-level studies, e.g. team and board studies. The development of such a framework is a 
worthwhile attempt because it is quite hard to advance the field without an agreed-upon 
categorization scheme (cf. Rothaermel et al. 2007). The framework may serve as a useful tool, 
which makes the existing body of knowledge more accessible and easier to understand for 
novice researchers, which in turn should enhance the diffusion of the research topic and its 
impact. Therefore, in this section, I will first present the framework used to discuss team and 
board studies. Then, I discuss the findings within this framework. 
Aranda et al. (1998) suggest a broad categorization for all types of teams including team 
structure (essentials like size, membership criteria, skill mix), process (group rules, participation, 
decision-making), culture (values, rituals, learning), and politics (conflicts, relationships with 
external agents). Thus, their framework accounts for team structure and processes occurring 
internally in the team. Although, Aranda et al (1998) touch on the subject of new member entry 
and team member exit as a part of team culture, they do not explicitly consider processes that 
cross the boundaries of the team such as team formation and change. In the reviewed studies, 
these processes are exemplified as crucial parts of team development which may influence an 
ASO’s transition from academia to a commercial environment. Hence, they should be included.  
In their review Cooper and Daily (1997) suggest the following three categories when 
considering entrepreneurial teams in growth-oriented new firms: process of team formation 
(recruiting, prior relationships, contributions and benefits), team functioning (roles, 
heterogeneity, consensus and other psychological variables), and influences of team composition 
(stability, size) on firm performance.  Thus, they explicitly address team formation and intra-
team processes. They discuss the reasons for and consequences of team member exits and their 
effect on firm performance; yet, they leave out new member additions during the firm’s 
development and their influence on firm performance. The major problem is that their 
framework lacks an independent discussion of the team’s observable structure consisting of 
essentials like size, membership criteria and composition. For instance, heterogeneity, which is 
an element of team composition, is treated under the team functioning category, and team size - 
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under the last category, but it is important to have a proper understanding of team essentials 
before proceeding to how they are related to the team processes and firm development.  
The reviewed articles can basically be classified according to two dimensions: those 
considering team structure and those considering processes. Hence, I suggest that two main 
dimensions of the team should be discussed: structure and processes. Team structure includes 
size, membership criteria and composition (Aranda et al. 1998). Team processes include the 
processes across and within the team boundaries, i.e. external and internal processes. External 
processes are about team member addition or exit and would cross the circle of the team, which 
is depicted in Fig. 1. Internal processes are about e.g. conflict, cohesion and would occur within 
the team circle depicted in Fig. 1. Since the board is a management unit, which can be 
considered a team (group) and may overlap the TMT in an ASO (see Fig. 1), I propose that 
similar dimensions, i.e. board structure and processes, should be discussed for this unit. Thus, the 
framework includes the basic elements of the team/board, i.e. structure and external/internal 
processes. Such framework reflects that the team and board in ASOs are dynamic concepts since 
both units undergo changes during ASO firm development. 
 
4.1 Structure 
Forming a new team offers a unique opportunity to design a team with preferred features 
to increase the likelihood of team and hence firm's success (Aranda et al. 1998). Essential 
elements of team structure are team size, membership criteria and composition (ibid).  
 
4.1.1 Team size, membership criteria and composition 
As for the team size, large teams have been associated with success in high-tech ventures. 
In the study by Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) team size is linked to firm growth. 
Weinzimmer (1997) has tested the applicability of the “upper-echelon” TMT variables on small-
firm growth and found support for positive linkages between team size and average age of team 
members and firm growth. Chandler et al. (2005) demonstrate that larger initial team size 
provides an advantage for new organizations (not more than 5 years old). In the case-based study 
by Vanaelst et al. (2006) the number of persons in ASO teams ranged from two to eight, 
depending on the venture’s phase. Most studies have an “optimistic” approach implying that 
larger teams bring more and diverse resources to the firm, which is positive for firm’s 
development (Beckman et al. 2007). “Entrepreneurial TMTs are often deeply involved in the 
choice of prospective team members”, and achieving consensus and personal chemistry is 
therefore assumed to be less problematic in entrepreneurial firms than in established firms 
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(Beckman et al. 2007: 150). These arguments need to be empirically tested in the context of 
ASOs.       
An important aspect of deciding team composition is to look for contribution to the team 
and start-up rather than the proximity of team members (Aranda et al. 1998). In terms of human 
capital, scientist-entrepreneurs usually contribute the tacit knowledge, which is an innovative 
research idea or technological solution to a problem (Cooper and Daily 1997; Franklin et al. 
2001). However, there is also an element of proximity. ASO founding teams are shown to be 
homogeneous with concentrated R&D human capital and networks limited to academia, which 
they utilize when trying to find potential team members during legal incorporation (Ensley and 
Hmieleski 2005; Mosey and Wright 2007).  
When the ASO is legally established, members with commercial and industry-specific 
knowledge should be recruited to the TMT to enable further development (Franklin et al. 2001; 
Shane 2004; Wright et al. 2007). In new venture team studies greater team member 
heterogeneity of functional backgrounds (e.g. in terms of the functions of marketing, finance, 
operations, and engineering) is found to be associated with new venture success (Weinzimmer 
1997; Zimmerman 2008). Other types of heterogeneity are also found to be beneficial in 
entrepreneurial firms. For instance, Beckman et al. (2007) find that broad access to information 
by virtue of having TMT members, who have worked for many different employers (affiliation 
diversity) and have diverse prior experience (functional diversity), tend to be associated with 
positive outcomes, e.g. attracting venture capital (VC) and going public. Zimmerman (2008) 
finds that heterogeneity in the TMT’s functional background and educational background is 
associated with greater capital raised through an initial public offering. Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1990) have linked heterogeneity in industrial experience to venture growth.   
Compared to independent start-ups, ASO top management teams are found to have more 
homogeneous teams in terms of background mix, i.e. education, functional expertise, industry 
experience, and skills, and have lower performance in terms of net cash flow and revenues 
(Ensley and Hmieleski 2005). It is recognized that obtaining VC financing is crucial for ASO 
development, yet, it is one of the main obstacles that ASO ventures face due to the 
underdeveloped TMTs and the reduced venture’s credibility (Chiesa and Piccaluga 2000; Shane 
and Stuart 2002; Wright et al. 2006). The existing ASO research fails to identify more 
specifically which structural characteristics, including team size and heterogeneity, are 
associated with VC acquisitions successfully made by ASO ventures.  Although it is known that 
for venture capitalists TMT quality is one of the most important funding criterions (MacMillan et 
al. 1985; Zacharakis and Meyer 1998), the existing studies do not give us an answer to what kind 
of background mix and, hence, diversity of knowledge and skills among team members is 
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associated with successful ASO development and positively related to achieving main 
entrepreneurial milestones like obtaining VC financing or going public.  
Spin-off studies demonstrate that a number of public and private financing initiatives 
have been developed aiming to support early stage ASOs and to fill the financing gap (Lerner 
2002; Leleux and Surlemont 2003; De Clercq et al. 2006; Wright et al. 2006). Type and amount 
of prior financing may serve as important markers of the ASO’s team quality for potential 
external financiers, that is, the ASO team has passed through some screening (De Clercq et al. 
2006; Wright et al. 2006).  However, there has been surprisingly little research regarding the 
extent to which these public and private financing initiatives have actually improved the 
development of ASO firms and helped ASOs in obtaining VC financing. Also, considering that 
the VC acquisition is one of the main thresholds that ASO firms face due to the reduced TMT 
quality, there is surprisingly little knowledge regarding TMT characteristics including size and 
composition that are associated with successful VC acquisitions in ASOs. 
Wright et al. (2004) suggest that the forming of an ASO as a joint venture may be an 
effective route, because the industrial partner is potentially a rich source of surrogate 
entrepreneurs and can supply managerial and marketing capabilities. Through cooperative 
strategies universities can partner with established firms in industry to pool resources, co-opt 
legitimacy and build credibility in order to start and develop the new venture (ibid). However, 
their study is based on four U. K. cases. Future studies could further test empirically and in other 
contexts as to what extent a joint venture commercialization route actually facilitates the ASO 
development and growth. 
 
4.1.2 Board size, membership criteria and composition 
Boards help firms to establish links with the external environment in order to secure 
resources, and a large board will handle this task better than a small board (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). The greater the need for external linkages the larger the board should be. According to 
Jensen (1993), the ideal size is between seven and eight board members (cf. Huse 2007). In 
Scandinavian countries, the number of board members tends to be small (Huse 2007). Also, 
research on threshold (VC-backed) firms suggests that the board is likely to be small, with 
significant activity and influence shared among all members (e.g. Sapienza et al. 2000). The 
questions of how boards look like at different stages of an ASO’s life cycle and to what extent 
and how the board size affects ASO development are unexplored.  
During spin-off creation the intellectual property (IP) needs to be formally transferred 
from the university to the ASO. In return for transferring the IP to the ASO the university will 
commonly take an equity stake in the ASO (Clarysse et al. 2007). Hence, a parent organization 
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controls a strategically important resource and thus may require the presence of outside board 
members. The external stakeholders in ASOs are often linked to the firm by the provision of 
finance (ibid). Equity providers may be venture capitalists who make financial investments due 
to the firm’s potential for significant economic returns (ibid). VC investors demand the presence 
of outside board members to monitor their interests (Lynall et al. 2003). Venture capitalists are 
considered investors who contribute value to the start-ups in excess of their monetary 
investments (Baum and Silverman 2004; Deakins et al. 2000a).  VC investors improve the 
performance of the firm by shaping their strategies (Fried et al. 1998), increasing the firm’s 
reputation (Busenitz et al. 2003) and facilitating the firm’s professionalization (Hellman and Puri 
2002).  
New venture board studies highlight that the main benefits of having outside directors on 
the board are networking (Deakins et al. 2000a) and specialized commercial or marketing 
expertise (Rosenstein 1988).  External directors may also contribute to small firm development 
by bringing additional informal networks, providing contacts in new markets and assisting in 
acquisition of resources (Borch and Huse 1993). Other roles of outside directors include 
counselling and advisory (Daily and Dalton 1993), impact on strategic planning processes, 
involvement in recruitment, training and staff development (cf. Deakins et al. 2000a). 
Similar to ASO team studies, little is known about the size and composition of the board 
in ASOs and whether the larger and more diverse boards are advantageous for ASO development 
or not. The boards with more diverse experience and background mix may be more likely to 
have larger networks and hence provide ASOs with more connections to potential VC providers. 
In terms of board contribution, ASOs are demonstrated to attract outside members with 
backgrounds and skills which are complementary to those of the founding team (Clarysse et al. 
2007). Previous governance studies theorize which competences board members should have to 
be effective and thus contribute to the firm’s success (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse 2007). 
For instance, board members in high-tech firms should preferably have the functional area 
knowledge and skills (finance, marketing etc.) and firm-specific knowledge and skills (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Kotz 1998). Nevertheless, the research provides limited knowledge about 
what kind of background mix and diversity among board members actually contributes to ASO 
development. 
Prior spin-off research demonstrates that it may be easier for scientist-entrepreneurs from 
higher quality institutions to attract necessary human and financial capital (Di Gregorio and 
Shane 2003). Yet, the knowledge about the role of the board in accessing critical resources 
necessary for ASO growth is limited. The researchers argue that having board members who are 
able to contribute to the development of the firm resources may considerably increase the ASO’s 
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growth and survival (Filatotchev et al. 2006; Huse 2007). For instance, the qualitative evidence 
shows that the networking that outside directors do is experienced by small firm CEOs as 
beneficial (Rosenstein et al. 1993; Deakins et al. 2000a). However, there is still little evidence 
regarding the extent to which e.g. board networking and advising actually contribute to 
assembling necessary resources that would move the ASO forward.  
 
4.2 Processes 
“Teams need to be structured in a way that allows for the benefits of stability and the 
vitality of change” (Aranda et al. 1998: 2). Little systematic research has been conducted on the 
process by which teams are formed (Cooper and Daily 1997; Forbes et al. 2006) and how teams 
evolve from the research environments (Clarysse and Moray 2004). Despite the notion that the 
team is the most important factor that makes professional investors decide to enter a company 
(e.g. Cyr et al. 2000; Wright et al. 2006), as the VC literature points to, there is a lack of 
theoretical development as well as presentation of data or empirical analysis.  
 
4.2.1 Team external and internal processes 
A key element of team formation is recruitment of key persons, which depends on the 
competences needed and existing networks (Clarysse and Moray 2004; Forbes et al. 2006; 
Vanaelst et al. 2006). As spin-off studies point out, the team formation process involves 
interaction with external agents such as TTO officers and industry, learning to run a team and 
articulation of roles (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Clarysse and Moray 2004; Grandi and Grimaldi 2003). 
For scientist-entrepreneurs located in universities recruiting may be a particularly challenging 
task. There may be few opportunities to find potential co-founders who combine industry and 
technical expertise with the functional experience needed to form a balanced team. Such support-
organizations, facilitating spin-off creation as incubators and TTOs, may play the role of 
intermediaries who connect researchers with such people and build a network of contacts who 
may be interested in investing in, and managing, technology-based spin-offs (Nicolaou and 
Birley 2003b). 
ASO studies show that an ASO team changes over time and people added to the team 
have different experience than original members, but do not introduce another perspective on 
how to do business (Vanaelst et al. 2006). General high-tech firm research demonstrates that 
both fast growth and a lack of firm growth are associated with team change (Boeker and 
Karichalil 2002; Boeker and Wiltbank 2005). Current spin-off research provides case-based 
evidence on the drivers (or motives) and consequences of team member additions and departures 
in ASOs (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Forbes et al. 2006; Francis and Sandberg 2000). For instance, 
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new team members bring necessary resources or they may be recruited because of personal 
chemistry or readily available networks. More research could be done to explore what drives 
team member additions and departures, under which conditions team membership changes occur 
and how these changes affect ASO development. In new ventures, the consequences of team 
changes seem to differ depending on how far the new venture has developed (Chandler et al. 
2005) and on whom leaves the team, founder or other TMT members (Beckman et al. 2007). For 
example, Beckman et al. (2007) find that the founder departures from the TMT and additions of 
TMT members increase the likelihood that a firm will achieve an initial public offering. TMT 
member departures, in turn, reduce the likelihood that the firm will go public.   
As for internal processes, Ensley and Hmieleski (2005) find that the ASOs teams are 
more homogeneous in terms of internal team dynamics (i.e. shared strategic cognition, potency, 
cohesion and conflict) compared to independent start-ups, which may be the reason that ASOs 
have lower performance than other start-ups. The link between internal processes and firm 
performance could be better examined. Ensley et al. (2002), for example, provide evidence that 
TMT cohesion is positively related to new venture growth. More studies on intra-team processes 
(e.g. conflict, cohesion) in ASOs are welcomed additions to ASO literature. Intra-team dynamics 
may also be an entry point for researchers on micro level trained in psychology, a group 
currently obviously absent from spin-off research stream (cf. Rothaermel et al. 2007).  
 
4.2.2 Board external and internal processes 
The existing spin-off studies provide some knowledge about which board members ASO 
firms attract to the board during legal start-up. For example, a scientist-entrepreneur may become 
a board member and TTO and VC organizations may place their representatives on the board of 
the ASO (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Clarysse et al. 2007). Filatotchev et al. (2006) have provided 
evidence of 27 ASOs from UK universities as ventures facing a founder-manager/IPO (initial 
public offering) threshold, which requires access to external resources and expertise that may be 
obtained through initial board members. However, their focus was on the life-cycle of the 
governance and strategic dynamics in both young and established companies. Considering the 
facts that it may be challenging for scientist-entrepreneurs to recruit new members due to limited 
(academic) networks and that the board may make a considerable contribution to the ASO 
development (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Mosey and Wright 2007; Filatotchev et al. 2006; 
Huse 2007), additional research on how and why ASOs find and attract people to the board 
should be helpful.  
Identified current ASO research does not provide knowledge on how a board develops 
through different stages of ASO development, what drives changes in board composition and 
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what consequences these changes have for ASO development. There is also little research on 
how and to what extent the board contributes to and influences team member additions and 
departures in ASOs. New venture board studies provide some evidence. For example, drawing 
on agency and power perspectives, usually applied to large corporations, researchers demonstrate 
that in high-tech firms greater CEO and VC ownership and increasing VC representation on the 
board is likely to lead to more TMT changes in terms of replacing TMT members rather than 
adding new members (Boeker and Wiltbank 2005; Hellman and Puri 2002; Fiet et al. 1997).   
The research conducted on the board as a group (team) in ASOs was not identified. 
According to Huse (2007), it is not common to consider the board as a team. One reason for this 
is that the board meets infrequently. However, a board consists of people who have a 
psychological dependence on each other. Board members will thus have to relate to group norms 
rather than to individual norms (ibid). Forbes and Milliken (1999) integrate the demographic 
literature on boards with the literature on group dynamics and discuss criteria that may 
distinguish effective boards from ineffective ones. For boards to become more effective, i.e. 
meet the task expectations, researchers should focus on board socio-psychological processes, and 
in particular those related to group participation and interaction, the exchange of information, 
and critical decisions (e.g. cohesiveness, openness). There is a need to open the “black box” 
between board composition and firm performance (Huse 2007) to better understand how the 
processes within the board impact firm development.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This literature review has sought to ascertain the significance of team and board in 
academic spin-off companies. Team and board in high-tech new ventures is a promising, yet 
unexplored, research stream, and ASOs represent an interesting dynamic context for studying 
team and board. For researchers wishing to contribute to the spin-off studies on group level, 
there is an opportunity to address the existing gaps related to the TMT and board structure and 
processes and their relationships to firm performance. It is also an opportunity to respond to 
recent calls of the team and board researchers to treat both groups as dynamic entities and use 
other theories than those traditionally applied to TMT and board in large organizations, e.g. 
upper-echelon and agency theory. For instance, the resource and stage-based perspectives widely 
used in ASO research can fruitfully be applied in the studies on team and board in ASOs. ASO 
research could go beyond identifying resource endowments or scarcity at the university, TTO 
and individual level and focus on how TMT and board can contribute to sustained ASO 
development. How can team and board be important resources that add value to the ASO firm? 
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Team dynamics is shown to be related to ASO dynamics. Is there dynamics in board? If so, can 
it be related to the stages an ASO goes through?   
Although the ASO research has become quite international, most published studies to 
date are from the U.S. and selected European countries. There are many studies on teams in 
ASOs from single universities. Few studies are conducted across countries. The majority of the 
reviewed new venture team studies are U.S. centric. Reviewed new venture board studies are 
primarily from selected European countries. Hence, the scholars should be careful when 
interpreting past results and take into consideration cultural specifics, e.g. U.S. team culture or 
board culture and internal processes in Great Britain. In terms of research methods, most of new 
venture team studies rely on survey designs. Quantitative studies on team in ASO firms could be 
a useful addition to existing qualitative ASO team studies, which allow the testing of 
generalizability of the findings. The neglected area of boards in ASOs can benefit from using 
inductive qualitative methods that enable generating new insights into phenomenon. Quantitative 
methods (e.g. regression models) applied in new venture board studies can also be drawn on 
when studying boards in ASOs, which may strengthen the validity of prior findings.  
Overall, there is much about teams and boards in ASOs as new high-tech firms that has 
not been studied systematically (Cooper and Daily 1997; Davidsson et al. 2001; Shane 2004; 
Huse 2007), and this presents numerous opportunities for future research. One of the 
opportunities for research is, for instance, to investigate which structural team and board 
characteristics are associated with successful ASO development, and how these structural 
characteristics of management units together with various public and private financing options 
may contribute to attracting essential external financing such as venture capital. Another 
promising research avenue is to explore external processes that cross the boundaries of the team 
and board. For instance, recent studies on the formation and evolution processes in ASO teams 
are characterized by a limited number of cases from one region. Also, very little research has 
been done on the processes by which boards are formed and how they evolve. Few studies have 
explicitly addressed boards in ASOs and most of the literature is primarily conceptual. Hence, 
there is a need for more empirical investigation as well as theory development. For example, 
what factors influence board formation, and how the board changes over time? What is the 
board’s contribution to TMT development? How do boards in ASOs function? 
Understanding team and board has important implications for practitioners. For instance, 
if teams with certain structural attributes are more likely to function effectively, this has 
implications for lead entrepreneurs and TTOs as they work to form teams.  This also has 
implications for venture capitalists who prior to investing are often concerned with the quality of 
the ASO team (Wright et al. 2006). For universities, a better understanding of teams may bring a 
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new knowledge of how to develop more mature teams (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005) and thus 
make them more attractive for investors (Wright et al. 2006). In a similar vein, if boards with 
certain structural attributes are more likely to be add value and function effectively and thus 
contribute to ASOs, this has implications for lead entrepreneurs as they look for board members. 
University TTOs that have a better understanding of boards are more likely to search for and 
network with potential board members that add value to their ASO projects.  
This paper is certainly not without limitations. First, since the nature of most ASO studies 
is empirical, and there are still few studies on team and board in ASOs, I tried to provide some 
directions for future research which could develop this area. Therefore, the relationships between 
some variables have received greater attention, depending on whether or not they have been 
addressed by pevious spin-off research. Future researchers may try to identify and focus on the 
relationships between certain variables, which have been extensively studied in other contexts or 
disciplines, and theorize about, or even test the applicability of, these relationships in an ASO 
context. Second, both the TMT and board have been quite extensively studied in other contexts 
(e.g. large corporations) and disciplines (e.g. social psychology), and, thus, each of them 
represent a broad stream of research. Arguing that team and board in ASOs as early stage firms 
are intertwined entities which should both be considered, I reviewed both TMT and board 
studies. This should not be a problem since the research on team in ASOs is in its infancy, and 
the research on board in ASOs is almost absent. Future research could explore the extent of the 
interaction between team and board and their joint influence on ASO performance. Finally, 
research on both team and board as groups of individuals entails several methodological issues, 
which are not discussed in this paper. More studies are needed to examine how academic 
entrepreneurship researchers can tackle the methodological issues and measurements when 
investigating various group characteristics and their effect on firm growth.  
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Exploring board formation and evolution of board composition 
 in academic spin-offs 
 
Abstract          
An in-depth analysis of eleven cases is used to provide insight into the neglected area of the 
dynamics of boards in academic spin-offs. Drawing on stage-based, resource dependence and 
social network theories, we explore board formation and changes in board composition 
occurring in Norwegian and US spin-offs. We find that these theories are important 
complements to earlier research on boards in technology-based new ventures. The process of 
board formation is mainly driven by social networks of the founders. Although we find 
differences in the initial board compositions in Norwegian and US spin-offs, there is 
convergence over time in subsequent board changes, which are mainly driven by the social 
networks of the board chair. Additions of key board members are associated with the 
progress of a spin-off developing from one stage to another. Several avenues for future 
research and implications are discussed. 
 
 
Keywords    Boards of directors, Academic Spin-offs, Stages, Resources, Social Networks  
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1. Introduction  
Earlier board studies have mainly investigated mature firms, using samples from large US 
firms, agency theory and multivariate analyses of secondary data (Lynall et al. 2003; Huse 
2007).  Research into boards in small and entrepreneurial firms has focused on boards as a 
means by which new firms can manage external dependency (Selznick 1949; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978; Borch and Huse 1993; George et al. 2001). Venture capital (VC) involvement 
in boards of small firms has also been studied (Rosenstein 1988; Fried et al. 1998; Deakins et 
al. 2000; Sapienza et al. 2000). More recent research incorporates social exchange, identity, 
social networks, organizational justice, game and other theories to improve our understanding 
of corporate governance in private firms (Uhlaner et al. 2007). 
Still, little attention has been devoted to the board of directors in academic spin-off 
companies (ASOs). ASOs are usually based on technology formally transferred from the 
parent organization, which is a public research organization such as a university or research 
institute. Boards in ASOs are particularly interesting to study since ASOs are new ventures in 
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transition, which go through a number of stages of activity and need to develop resources and 
capabilities (Vohora et al. 2004) and board structure and processes (Filatotchev et al. 2006) to 
enable their transition from a non-commercial environment to the market. 
Once resource needs have been determined and a team has been selected, it will usually 
be necessary to obtain additional resources from outside the venture in the startup stage 
(Timmons and Spinelli 2004). Scientist-entrepreneurs may attract experienced and well-
connected directors to their boards who can play an important role in accessing critical 
external resources (Lynall et al. 2003). However, finding appropriate board members is a 
challenge for scientist-entrepreneurs with networks limited to peers within academia (Cooper 
and Daily 1997; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Mosey and Wright 2007). In addition, to move 
an ASO forward to the next development stage, the new configurations of resources and 
capabilities should be obtained. This can be done by attracting new external directors 
providing access to new resources. Thus, one might expect that different board members are 
needed on the board in different stages. The board composition may thus change reflecting the 
firm’s life cycle (Lynall et al. 2003).   
Few studies, however, look explicitly at the boards in ASOs. Clarysse et al. (2007) have 
provided quantitative evidence on board composition in ASOs. They found that high-tech 
start-ups, with a public research organization as an external equity stakeholder, are more 
likely to include outside board members with complementary skills to the founding team than 
ASOs with venture capitalists or founders as the main stakeholders. Filatotchev et al. (2006) 
have provided evidence of 27 ASOs from UK universities as ventures facing a founder-
manager/IPO (initial public offering) threshold, which requires access to external resources 
and expertise. Vanaelst et al. (2006) studied the entrepreneurial team development in ten 
Belgian ASOs. They showed that after legal establishment of the venture the founding team 
evolves into two other teams: the management team and the board. However, their focus was 
on the founding and management team. Showing that the boards in ASOs may change, these 
studies emphasize the need for more in-depth research on changes in board composition in the 
firm’s lifecycle.  Yet, the majority of board studies has taken a snapshot of the board 
composition at a certain point, and linked it to performance. 
Responding to these calls for a closer investigation into board dynamics, the purpose of 
this study is, therefore, to explore how boards are formed and how boards evolve through 
various stages of a spin-off process. We address this research gap by investigating (1) Which 
board members do ASOs add, and why, in the start-up stage?  (2) When, why and how do the 
main changes in board composition occur during subsequent stages? 
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Thus, our paper extends previous research and makes a number of contributions. First, it 
studies boards in early stage Norwegian and US spin-offs, rarely addressed by governance 
studies which mainly focused on mature firms employing cross-sectional data and treating the 
board as a static concept (Gabrielsson and Huse 2004). Given limited prior research on board 
evolution we use inductive logic and in-depth cases (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 
1989). Second, it responds to recent suggestions in governance literature to use other theories 
than agency theory (Huse 2007). Specifically, we combine life cycle, resource dependence 
and social network theories and find that these theories are important complements to research 
on boards in new ventures. Third, it focuses explicitly on changes in the boards of ASOs. 
Accordingly, the paper adds to academic entrepreneurship research by linking board changes 
to development stages (Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006) and dominant tasks 
(Kazanjian 1988) and suggesting that board changes are associated with the progress to the 
next stage with outside directors contributing to overcoming critical junctures.  
Below, we start by outlining our framework based on stage-based, resource dependence, 
and social networks theories. Next, we discuss the research design and data collection 
methods, followed by a presentation of the findings and a development of propositions. 
Finally, we conclude and discuss future research directions and policy implications.  
 
 
2. Theory 
 
To introduce a dynamic component in spin-off boards we incorporate literature on stages 
in new firm development. In particular, we use stage-of-growth models specifically developed 
for ASOs as high-tech new ventures (Kazanjian 1988; Vohora et al. 2004; Clarysse and 
Moray 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006). Employing a stage-based and resource-based framework, 
Vohora et al. (2004) identify five stages that ASOs encounter in their development: (1) 
research stage, (2) opportunity framing stage, (3) pre-organization stage, (4) reorientation 
stage, and (5) sustainable returns stage. Furthermore, Vohora et al. (2004) argue that while the 
different stages are important it is the difficulties in moving from stage to stage that create 
critical junctures, which are the key challenges an ASO faces in its development. Critical 
junctures arise because the venture requires new configurations of resources, capabilities and 
networks if it is to progress to the next stage of development. If the critical junctures remain 
unresolved for a prolonged period of time, the venture will eventually fail. Four key critical 
junctures that spin-off companies need to overcome if they are to succeed are (1) opportunity 
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recognition, (2) entrepreneurial commitment by a venture champion, (3) attaining credibility 
in the business environment, and (4) achieving sustainable returns within their respective 
markets.  
Other researchers (e.g. Kazanjian 1998; Clarysse and Moray, 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006) 
came to a similar classification of stages: a research stage, during which the project prepares 
itself to formally turn into a spin-off, and a post-startup stage, during which external 
capitalization takes place. Each venture must pass through the previous stage in order to 
progress to the next one, but each stage involves an iterative, nonlinear process of 
development in which there may be a need to revisit some of the earlier decisions and 
activities. In addition, ventures face different problems that dominate during different stages. 
Kazanjian (1998) examined the relationship between stages of growth and the dominant tasks 
and found that in earlier stages the dominant tasks are product and technology development, 
securing finance and strategic positioning in a new product-market segment. In later stages 
acquisition of additional resources, sales and marketing, and organization and administration 
are the dominant tasks. 
The legal incorporation of the company is an important entrepreneurial event marking 
that the company moves from the pre-startup to the post-startup era (Clarysse and Moray 
2004). At this point in time the founding team evolves into the management team and a board 
of directors (Vanaelst et al. 2006). As shown in the study by Vanaelst et al. (2006) both the 
management team and the board may evolve. However, their focus was on examining changes 
in the founding and management team. We address this gap by focusing on changes in board 
accommodating stage-based aspects while seeking to understand when, why and how the 
changes in board composition occur in the trajectory of an ASO’s development.  
ASOs aim at finding appropriate board members to fill the gaps discovered in the process 
of forming the management team in the start-up stage (Timmons and Spinelli 2004; 
Ucbasaran et al. 2003).  During subsequent growth stages the gaps are discovered when 
difficulties arise and ASOs face critical junctures. Such gaps can represent the absence of 
relevant experience, know-how, networks, and other current needs that can be provided by 
outsiders. We thus draw on the resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer 1972; Johnson et al. 
1996; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In this view, the evolution of the board is a response to the 
changing resource needs in the firms. New board members are seen as resource providers 
playing value-adding roles in the ASO’s development (Selznick 1949; Boeker and Goodstein 
1991; Deakins et al. 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Given the limited resource base of a 
start-up, a board of directors is an excellent vehicle for accessing scarce and/or strategic 
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resources (Lynall et al. 2003). Following the logic of resource dependency, new members will 
be selected so that they bring necessary complementary resources to the firm. The resource 
dependence theory is concerned with reducing uncertainty regarding the flow of capital, 
information and other resources at the lowest cost. Hence, the scientist-entrepreneurs who 
have best access to critical resources that will move the firm forward will not attract new 
members to the board of directors. Instead, they take a place on the board themselves.  
In addition, most ventures typically look to personal acquaintances of the lead 
entrepreneur or team for their first outside directors (Timmons and Spinelli 2004). Scientist-
entrepreneurs, considering starting their own businesses, were shown to develop social 
networks with TTOs and more experienced academic entrepreneurs (Mosey and Wright 
2007). Social network literature is thus also relevant to our study (e.g. Granovetter 1985; 
Gulati and Gargiulo 1999), dealing with the influence of social networks on board formation 
and composition. In this view, the member addition process is driven by the actors’ social 
relations and interpersonal attraction (Forbes et al. 2006). The implication of social network 
theory for new member addition is that scientist-entrepreneurs are likely to recruit board 
members from their existing social networks (Birley 1985; Larson 1992; Westphal 1999) so 
that the likelihood of adding an outside director similar to the lead entrepreneur or the team is 
high (McPherson et al. 2001; Zahra and Pearce 1989; Ruef et al. 2003). New members will 
reflect the original founders’ social networks with ascribed and achieved characteristics 
similar to the founders.  
Our integrated theoretical framework is depicted in Figure 1.  
We expect that during the legal incorporation of the company the board members will 
reflect the existing personal networks of the founding team with characteristics similar to 
those of the founders, but bringing in resources that the founding team does not have. After 
legal incorporation the board may undergo changes as the venture needs to acquire outside 
resources to overcome critical junctures, solving various problems that arise in different 
development stages. The new members recruited in the post-startup stage will to a greater 
extent reflect the social networks of the existing members on board. That is, if the company 
has external stakeholders on the board, the composition of the board will also reflect the 
social networks of the principal stakeholders, such as the CEO and external financiers (Lynall 
et al. 2003). These new members are expected to bring critical resources that the top 
management team lacks, helping ASO to solve current dominant tasks and move it forward. 
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3. Methods and empirical context 
Given limited prior research on the evolution of boards, especially for young ASOs, our 
research design is a multiple case, inductive study (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 
1989). Multiple cases allow replication. In contrast to pooled logic where each observation is 
part of a larger sample, replication logic views multiple cases as a series of experiments, with 
each case confirming or not confirming the inferences drawn from the others (Yin 1994). 
Single-case studies offer insight into one particular example; multiple cases provide us with 
empirical richness and may also generate generalizeable and accurate theoretical insights 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
Following Eisenhardt (1989), our sample of ASOs was selected to give a substantial 
degree of variance regarding the stage of development, technological focus and institutional 
environments like university origin and VC industry support. This degree of variance is 
important to obtain insights into the process of how board composition changes over time and 
facilitates the investigation of replication across cases. 
t
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We have sampled eleven academic spin-off companies that were created to 
commercialize intellectual property (IP) initially generated within parent institutions. In all 
these companies at least one board change occurred. In all cases at least one of the scientist-
entrepreneurs was still involved as a top manager (CEO, CTO, R&D director, board chair or 
member) – a person who had taken the venture through the founding process and who was 
aware of the current operations of the company. The ASOs come from five different 
Norwegian research institutions and three US universities. All institutions are actively 
pursuing technology transfer through licensing and ASOs. However, these institutions are 
located in different areas, and have a different orientation towards the commercialization of 
research. This is reflected in their cultures, values and institutional norms, seen not least in 
varying levels of public and VC support.  
Norway has had a long history of ASOs for over a century. In international investigations, 
Norwegian universities and research institutes report a high number of spin-offs compared to 
many other countries (OECD 2003). However, until recently research results were the 
property of the individual professors. A substantial publicly funded support structure of 
technology transfer offices (TTOs), seed capital funds etc. has been built up following 
legislation in 2003 which was closely modelled after the US Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Many 
earlier spin-offs have become support companies for large national industries like oil, gas and 
metal processing, while the VC industry has traditionally been weak. The recent legislative 
changes and strong public role in the commercialization of research may make Norway 
representative of smaller western European countries.  
Silicon Valley, where four US cases in our sample come from, has had a strong VC 
industry and close informal networks between entrepreneurs (e.g. Saxenian 1994). The 
difference in venture capital between Silicon Valley and Michigan, where two other US cases 
come from, is that over a billion dollars of investments happens in the former region and 
about 10-20 millions in Michigan (interview with the founder of Semicon4). Some studies 
have found that US TTOs are relatively more oriented toward patenting and licensing than 
spin-offs when compared to other countries (Arundel and Bordoy 2007; OECD 2003). Thus, 
ASOs may be seen as fairly common in the US and Norway, but the surrounding networks 
and support structure vary widely. 
The cases represent different technology platforms covering engineering, biology, 
chemistry, physics, and computer sciences. Each of the ASOs’ core technology (or medicine, 
drug) is characterized as internationally new. All ASOs except spin-off Software have 
patented their core technology in and outside their country. There has been a steady growth in 
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employees in all cases. Finally, each case is at a different stage of development, allowing 
greater insights into the evolutionary aspects of board composition. Table 1 gives an overview 
of the sample used in our study. 
Biotech spin-offs tend to develop both a board of directors and a scientific advisory board 
(SAB) which is beyond the focus of this study. Only one Norwegian case in our sample had a 
SAB, the four others did not (including another biotech company). All US cases, even the 
four semiconductor companies, had a scientific or technical advisory board. We asked 
whether members of these advisory boards had contributed by helping to find and select new 
board members, and this was not the case. 
Data were collected through in-depth face-to-face interviews, followed by telephone 
interviews with representatives from the eleven ASOs from March 2006 to December 2006 in 
Norway and from January 2007 to May 2007 in the US. We collected background material on 
each of the institutions about how they organized their technology transfer activities. From 
this, a list of interviewees was compiled. In most cases we interviewed the current CEO who 
was usually one of the founders, a scientist-entrepreneur or an externally introduced 
“surrogate” entrepreneur (Franklin et al. 2001). In two cases we interviewed two members of 
the founding team on different occasions. As for Norwegian cases we could trace all board 
changes through the database. This limitation is thus addressed by checking the responses 
against the database and, if needed, asking additional questions after interviews. The original 
founder was an important respondent who knew the inside story of the venture throughout its 
entire life. The founders were targeted because they possessed the most comprehensive 
knowledge about the venture’s history, strategy, processes, and performance (Carter et al. 
1994). Our interviews focused on different founding team and board members, their 
background and expertise, how they got involved in the venture etc. Additional data on the 
venture’s resources, strategies, and industry environment were also gathered during the semi-
structured interviews and follow-up calls. 
The eleven companies were between two and nine years old when the interviews were 
conducted. The young age of the companies and the involvement of the original founder in 
strategic decisions like board changes improve the likelihood of informants accurately 
recalling events. All interviews lasted from one to two hours and were recorded and 
transcribed. 
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Besides interviews, we used several databases that contain accounting data and 
information on the board and top management. For the Norwegian cases we used the national 
registers, Brønnøysundregistrene, the official export and trade directory Nortrade, and the 
business search engine Purehelp. For the US cases we used the Link Silicon Valley directory 
supplemented by other sources, e.g. The San Jose Mercury News and extensive web searches. 
Such triangulation of data improved reliability by providing a check against the inaccuracy of 
informant responses (Yin 1994; Jick 1979). Triangulation was especially helpful in the cases 
where the informants in the older ASOs had difficulties recalling the date of events or names.  
In addition, we assured anonymity for companies and informants. Collectively, this 
combination improved the likelihood that the methods yield rich, detailed, and accurate 
accounts. 
Responses from the interviews and additional information were used to develop a case 
study database, which included table shells to record data (Miles and Huberman 1994). These 
table outlines ensured that data collection focused on the research questions and verified that 
the same information was collected for all cases. The individual case histories ranged between 
10 and 20 pages, including interview quotes, summary tables, and charts of key facts. For 
each case we also used a retrospective reconstruction of the early growth stage. Within-case 
analysis concentrated on developing generalizeable and unique patterns that emerged for each 
firm, and proceeded in an iterative fashion with data collection to provide better grounding 
and improve the conceptual insights. Once the individual case studies were complete, we used 
cross-case analysis, relying on methods suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) to develop common and differential factors. Conceptual insights 
concerning boards in ASOs were drawn out and refined during an iterative process as the case 
studies progressed. This iteration between theory and data helped to sharpen constructs, 
strengthen the internal validity of findings, and raise the generalizability of results. 
 
 
4. Findings and development of propositions 
As suggested by Vanaelst et al. (2006) pre-startup teams (before legal incorporation) 
differ from post-startup teams. This difference may have consequences for who is added to 
the board of directors. Pre-startup founding teams choose their first top management team 
(TMT) and board members during legal incorporation relying on their personal networks and 
estimates of additional resources they need to obtain from outside members. After legal 
incorporation, both post-startup team and board of directors may be involved in decisions 
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about board additions. Hence, in the discussion we differentiate between initial board 
composition, which is the result of board formation process in the start-up stage, and changes 
in board composition in the post-startup stages (depicted in Figure 1). A detailed description 
of the initial board composition, first change in board and other findings can be found in 
Table 2. 
 
4.1 Who is added and why in the start-up stage 
During the legal startup of the companies the founding teams consisted either solely of 
scientists or scientists and “privileged witnesses” (Vanaelst et al. 2006). Privileged witnesses 
are the advisors that guide the researchers in the pre-startup stages and with whom the 
researchers develop close relationships (ibid.). In our sample most of the privileged witnesses 
were part of the university community, e.g. TTO and incubator representatives, current and 
former MBA students, and industrial partners who carried out the research together with 
scientist-entrepreneurs. Our small data set indicates a difference between the US and the 
Norwegian cases. In the latter, the privileged witnesses came mainly from the TTOs, while in 
the US cases the privileged witnesses represented local seed funds at the university incubators 
and small VCs. Similar to the findings of Vanaelst et al. (2006) for Belgium, our results seem 
to confirm the universities’ active role as stakeholders in the development of ASOs in 
Norway. For the US, our data support other studies (e.g. Arundel and Bordoy 2007; OECD 
2003) indicating that TTO assistance seems to be concentrated on developing patenting and 
licence agreements. However, further investigations are needed to compare countries, a task, 
which is complicated further by large differences between universities. 
The advisory role of the privileged witnesses became formalized with the establishment 
of the board. Privileged witnesses took a seat on the board and together with scientist-
entrepreneurs formally committed to the spin-off in almost all cases.  In the case of Nutriment 
the TTO director appointed two members from his personal network, instead of taking a seat 
on the board himself. Only one ASO SemiCon1 formed a board which included outside 
members with whom the founders neither had previous relationships nor knew through 
personal acquaintances. This may be due to winning the first prize in the business plan 
competition at Stanford. As the founder stated, “After we won the business plan competition 
there we a lot of interest from the investors… we could pick those with experience in 
semiconductors…and network relevant to what we were trying to do”.
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These findings spur reflections on social networks and resource dependency. 
Entrepreneurs do look to personal acquaintances of the lead entrepreneur or team for their 
first board members. The process of board formation is mainly driven by the social networks 
of the founders. Putting it another way, during the pre-startup stages the founders have 
developed professional relationships with privileged witnesses who guided the founders from 
the research stage untill the venture was legally incorporated. Interaction with privileged 
witnesses turned them into “trusted informants” (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). These social 
relations between the scientists and privileged witnesses were thus primary predictors of 
initial board composition, as social network theory implies. Hence, 
 
Proposition 1: The board at founding will most likely consist of the scientist-entrepreneurs 
and people from the scientist-entrepreneurs’ networks. 
 
4.2 When do the main board changes occur during subsequent growth stages? 
Nine out of eleven cases in our sample have overcome the credibility threshold around 
and during first change in the board thus reaching the next Re-orientation or Proof of 
Viability stage. Following Vanaelst et al. (2006) Proof of Viability post-startup stage was 
characterized by proving the viability of the newly established venture and by the team 
bringing together necessary resources to develop it. Entrepreneurs in this stage had gained 
access to and acquired an initial stock of financial, human and physical resources, which were 
required for the business to begin to function. The credibility threshold refers to a lack of 
credibility that constrains the entrepreneur’s ability to access and acquire key resources: seed 
finance and human capital to form the entrepreneurial team (Vohora et al. 2004). Two cases 
that did not overcome the credibility threshold during first change were the ones that had 
experienced the influence of external factors - restructuring of the TTO and partner’s 
organizations involved in these ASOs through the board. This suggests that well-advised and 
deliberate board changes - as opposed to externally induced changes due to outside or 
unforeseen events - contribute to overcoming the threshold of credibility and taking the 
venture to the next stage. 
The only spin-off that seemed to have become sustainable and reached Sustainable 
returns or Maturity stage during the second change in board composition was Biotech1. This 
is most probably due to extremely large investments since the firm’s inception. Maturity stage 
means that the venture had proven viability, and founders had built up credibility outside the 
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scientific community and attracted additional resources. SemiCon2 seems to have reached the 
Maturity stage around the third change in board composition after the second round of fund 
raising and selection of a manufacturing partner.  Biomedical and Biotech2, the oldest cases 
in the sample, seem to have reached Maturity stage during the fourth change in board. For 
them overcoming the sustainability threshold meant going public.  
SemiCon1, SemiCon3 and SemiCon4 reported to be in the transition stage of overcoming 
the sustainability threshold and reaching the Maturity stage. These respondents emphasized 
the iterative, nonlinear nature of the development process. For instance, the founders in 
SemiCon1 were close to reaching the Maturity stage, but realized that the deficiency in 
management hindered them “to raise revenues and develop technology as fast as we 
[founders] could”. So, SemiCon1 decided to replace the old CEO with a new one.  
An interesting aspect of development stages in our cases is that many of the Norwegian 
ASOs mentioned that the first change in board was associated with “the actual start-up” of the 
company and overcoming the credibility threshold. Before this critical point, the companies 
had spent more time than planned on attracting investors, and the interviewees were 
disappointed with the TTOs in not being able to speed up the process. “Actual start-up” was 
in all cases related to finding “the right individual with the right [investor] contacts and large 
[industrial] networks”. None of the US spinoffs described the first change in board 
composition in terms of an actual start-up. 
It may be added that we have observed nine founder and four outside member departures 
from the board during the first three changes compared to 20 outside member additions during 
just the first change. The effect of these departures on ASO development was unclear. The 
scientist-entrepreneurs left their firms for several reasons: they saw a better opportunity to 
pursue or they wanted to return to university. The reason for founder departure was often 
related to board representation when venture capitalists or independent outsiders came on 
board. In this case, the scientist-entrepreneur took a senior management position on the TMT 
or moved to the SAB. 
Overall, our findings indicate that after legal incorporation the additions of the key board 
members (e.g. board chair, investor) are associated with the progress of a spin-off from one 
stage to another or at least they make the venture approach closer to the next stage. That is, 
the additions were associated with reaching entrepreneurial milestones, e.g. getting external 
capital, proving or sampling the product, finalizing deals with collaboration partners, finding 
new distributors, expanding to other markets, which all moved the venture forward. Hence,  
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Proposition 2a: The board composition will change as the academic spin-off grows.  
 
Proposition 2b: The first change in board composition will most likely be positively related 
to gaining credibility and moving to the Proof of Viability stage.   
 
Proposition 2c: Subsequent changes in board composition will most likely move the 
academic spin-off closer towards the Maturity stage.      
 
 
4.3 Why does the board change after the company’s legal incorporation? 
After legal incorporation and formation of the initial TMT and board, the scientist-
entrepreneurs in our cases tried to recruit key individuals outside the academic community. 
The initial resources of ASOs were limited to intangible resources, comprising of mainly 
technological assets and related know-how within a set of patents. The first boards had a 
limited set of complementary resources they could provide. However, the further ASO 
development required some initial financial investments or the co-optation of resources (Starr 
and MacMillan 1990) through existing relationships and external networks (Aldrich and 
Zimmer 1986). Hence, ASOs searched for new board members who would procure critical 
resources like seed or VC finance, market and industry knowledge, and management skills. 
Achieving this commitment relied heavily upon the level of social capital the scientist-
entrepreneurs were able to leverage through their personal contacts or those of initial board 
members.  
For all cases raising sufficient seed or venture capital was a key activity along with 
technology/drug development, like as in earlier investigations (Kazanjian 1988; Vohora et al. 
2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006). This was critical for acquiring other necessary resources to 
develop an embryonic ASO venture into a fully operational business to be able to engage in 
productive activities.  Hence, finance was the main resource obtained through new board 
members who were all outsiders and mostly investors (see Table 2 column 6). Prior industry 
experience, including networks and specific knowledge, were the second most reported 
resources obtained through new members. Finally, the competence “around the company” 
such as IP issues, legal advice and executive experience, which does not reside in the post-
startup TMT was the third main resource obtained.  
TTOs in Norway emphasize the importance of having people with start-up experience on 
the board. Surprisingly, prior start-up experience of board members was not among the first 
resources the board members were valued for, although several new members had started 
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companies before. This may be due to VC funding being more likely for high quality teams 
(Baum and Silverman 2004; Florin 2005). This suggests that the ability to acquire financial 
resources or industry-specific knowledge, developed during a previous start-up attempt, may 
be more valuable than the prior start-up experience itself.  
During the second change there were fifteen member additions in nine cases. In seven 
cases the new members were outsiders: either VCs or from industry. During next third change 
the new members added were again outsiders: seven investors, two from industry, and two 
CEOs. Few, the oldest cases, have had the fourth board change. There were strategic, 
resource-related, considerations in the decisions to add members to the board in all cases 
except for spin-offs Chemical and Optical. Here, the reason for the board changes was the re-
structuring of other companies that were represented on the board of Optical and Chemical. 
These members were simply replaced by new representatives. 
Thus, the board members added in the first rounds (during first and second changes) were 
mostly investors and people who could contribute with industry-specific networks and 
knowledge. The resources and capabilities obtained through these members were 
complementary to those of the TMT, which concentrated on mainly solving the development 
of technology/product task.   
During the third and subsequent board changes the new members were investors, 
professional executives and those who “knew the markets” in which customers and potential 
collaboration partners operated. However, people responsible for the company’s financial 
system and sales and marketing were appointed to the TMT indicating a shift in the TMT’s 
focus from product/technology development to internal efficiencies (Kazanjian 1988). Thus, 
new board members helped the TMT with such tasks as acquisition of other resources, 
organization and administration, and sales and marketing. In eight cases the CEO was 
replaced by a new one with much executive experience indicating the need for more 
formalized organizational and administrative skills and routines. In seven of these cases the 
external professional CEO was hired to replace scientist-entrepreneurs, TTO and university 
seed fund representatives who were functioning as CEOs in the firm.  Hence, as the resource 
dependence theory predicts, the boards increasingly consisted of members who could add 
value to the firm by bringing in different resources that the TMT needed depending on the 
current dominant task the ASO worked on. Thus, 
 
Proposition 3a: New board members will most likely bring critical resources that the top 
management team lacks, depending on the current dominant tasks. 
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Proposition 3b: New board members’ resources will most likely range from finance and 
industry experience in earlier stages to executive and market/sales experience in later stages. 
 
4.4 How are board members added? 
While attempting reaching the Proof of Viability stage the new board members were 
brought to the board through personal contacts of privileged witnesses, scientist-entrepreneurs 
and board chair in eight cases and of new CEO and investors in three cases (see Table 2 
column 6 and 8). Surprisingly, in seven cases an outsider who entered during first board 
change became chair and stayed with the ASO until the time we finished all our interviews 
(Table 2 column 7). This had consequences for subsequent changes: the common 
denominator for these cases was that the new members were added to the board primarily 
through the networks of this board chair. As the new chair was an investor and/or person with 
15 to 40 years of working experience in industry, the new members attracted to the board in 
subsequent rounds had similar backgrounds, comprising finance, executive and/or industry 
experience. Hence, the board composition from the second change reflected to a greater extent 
the social networks of the board chair as social network theory predicts. 
During the second change in six out of seven cases the new members were also added 
through the new chair. Nine cases in our sample had experienced a third change in board with 
the same pattern in terms of social networks as previous change. Again, outsiders were added 
through the chair’s network in eight cases. Few of our cases have experienced a fourth change 
so it is hard to infer firm conclusions from this; but the pattern was similar to the second and 
third board changes in terms of social networks.  
Besides, we expected that if the company had external stakeholders on the board, the 
composition of the board after legal start-up would also reflect the social networks of the 
principal stakeholders, such as the public research organization and external financiers (see 
Figure 1). These new members were expected to bring critical external resources. Our 
findings show mixed results. The initial boards in all Norwegian spin-off cases included a 
TTO member who represented the public research organization as the main external 
stakeholder. In half of the US cases the initial board included early stage VCs as external 
stakeholders. Contrary to our expectations, there seems to be a convergence over time in the 
sense that later board members are mainly selected from the network of the professional board 
chair. This board chair came from outside the venture during the first change in board 
composition and tended to remain in the company during all stages of growth influencing 
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subsequent board additions. Therefore, we separate the first change in board from the 
subsequent changes, termed board evolution process. In five cases the chair is indeed the 
largest external stakeholder and financier: either VC or industrial partner. In the remaining six 
cases the board chair is not the largest stakeholder. The process of board evolution can thus be 
characterized as driven mainly by the social networks of the board chair. Hence, 
 
Proposition 4: In the post-startup stages the new board members will most likely be recruited 
from the board chair’s network. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has sought to explore the process of board formation and board evolution in 
young academic spin-off companies (ASOs) in Norway and the US drawing on stage-based, 
resource dependence and social network theories. Our research questions are: (1) Which 
board members do ASOs add and why in the start-up stage? (2) When, why and how do 
changes in board composition occur in the subsequent stages of growth? 
Due to the limited number of cases, the conclusions and policy implications should be 
treated with care. However, since little is known about board dynamics in ASOs, our 
investigation represents a useful addition to the governance and spin-off literature and may 
provide a foundation for later empirical studies. We contribute by providing greater insight 
into dynamic aspects of board formation and evolution in new technology-based 
entrepreneurial firms (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Filatotchev et al. 2006; Clarysse et al. 2007), a 
relatively unstudied area in entrepreneurship and governance research (Huse 2007; Uhlaner et 
al. 2007). Overall, our findings indicate that stage-based, resource dependence and social 
network theories are important complements, which all provide partial explanations for board 
change processes, but have to be employed in combination to better understand the 
phenomenon. 
We have shown that the process of board formation is mainly driven by the social 
networks of the founders as social network theory predicts. During the pre-startup stages the 
founders develop professional relationships with “privileged witnesses” (Vanaelst et al. 
2006), i.e. coaches and trusted informants, who guide the founders from the research stage to 
legal incorporation. As a result, the board at founding consists of the scientist-entrepreneurs 
and people from the scientist-entrepreneurs’ networks.  
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Furthermore, our study has shown that the board undergoes changes as the ASO grows, 
and that these changes are closely related to overcoming critical junctures and reaching the 
next development stage. Particularly, the first change in board composition is positively 
related to gaining credibility and moving to the Proof of Viability stage, while subsequent 
changes most likely move the ASO closer to the next, Maturity stage.  New outside directors 
bring critical resources that the top management team lacks. They may thus be considered to 
play a value-adding role as resource dependence theory predicts.  
The very first board members were found mainly through the networks of founders, 
privileged witnesses, but also the chair and investors. Contrary to our expectations, the new 
board members in post-startup stages were not recruited from the social networks of the 
largest stakeholders such as universities and venture capitalists. There seemed to be a 
convergence over time in the sense that later board members were mainly selected from the 
network of the professional board chair. This chair came from outside the venture during the 
first board change and tended to remain in the company during all stages of growth 
influencing subsequent board additions. In less than half of the cases the chair represented the 
largest external stakeholder: VC or industry partner. Thus, regardless of whether the chair 
represented a principal stakeholder or not, the process of board evolution was mainly driven 
by the social networks of the chair. The role of the board chair in ASO development may, 
therefore, be more central than what is commonly assumed and requires further investigation, 
e.g. a large-scale quantitative study that tests the generalizability of this proposition.  
Our study adds to academic entrepreneurship research by relating changes in boards to 
stages and dominant tasks in spin-off development (Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006; 
Kazanjian 1988). We suggest that changes in board composition reflect the changing resource 
needs of the company during stages of growth. In each stage the top management team works 
on certain dominant tasks and acquires necessary additional resources through new board 
members. The members added in the first rounds are mostly investors and industry 
representatives helping to solve tasks related to securing financing and strategic positioning. 
The members added in later rounds are investors, professional executives and those with 
market-specific knowledge aiding with the acquisition of other resources, organization and 
administration, and sales and marketing.  
Finally, we contribute to research on boards by showing that the board is a dynamic 
concept (Uhlaner et al. 2007). As mentioned, board member additions seem to be associated 
with the venture’s progress from one stage to another. This may imply that tenure 
heterogeneity which arises from additions to the board may be beneficial to the firm. 
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Borrowing a categorization of stages of development from earlier ASO studies (Vohora et al. 
2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006), we find that board member additions are closely related to events 
such as external capital increase. Future research may attempt to use a more refined 
categorization of stages and milestones borrowing e.g. from finance and governance 
literature. For example, one could trace to what extent and how the changes in board 
composition are related to achieving important entrepreneurial milestones like going public 
(Shane and Stuart 2002; Filatotchev et al. 2006). More research remains to be done examining 
in detail to what extent and how board member departures influence the firm’s development. 
Our research has a number of implications. Changes in the board may be seen both as an 
effect of ASOs’ development and progress to a new stage, and as a driving force in this 
development. More longitudinal research is needed, but our data point to the latter effect and 
the role of key outside directors in overcoming critical junctures. An important policy 
message is therefore to include the perspective of board dynamics in mechanisms intended to 
support ASO development. For instance, certain types of public funding seeking to stimulate 
academic entrepreneurship could be made contingent on the ability to attract professional 
outside directors to the board of an ASO. 
The next important policy message stems from our evidence regarding the TTOs’ 
involvement in and contribution to ASOs. Compared to well-established US TTOs whose 
involvement was basically limited to developing patenting and licensing agreements, we 
found that young TTOs in Norway played a much more active role in ASOs. They were 
represented on the ASO board and in some cases the management team, picking new board 
members and participating in other strategic decisions. Despite this active involvement during 
the legal incorporation and early post-startup period, the Norwegian spin-offs seemed to have 
a slower rate of development in post-startup stages.  
The reason for the Norwegian TTOs’ active participation may be due to their aims to 
secure a future income for themselves and their universities and to demonstrate the legitimacy 
and importance of technology transfer and ASOs – following recent legislative changes that 
some academics did not welcome. There may thus be a conflict of interest for the TTO staff 
as representatives of the university (Mosey and Wright 2007), since involving outsiders may 
reduce their role and potential income. Public ASO support programs and seed capital funds, 
which exist in Norway and most other countries interested in stimulating academic 
entrepreneurship, should be aware of this and moderate the financial expectations to TTOs.  
Until recently, the legal establishment of a spin-off company was regarded as a significant 
event for Norwegian TTOs, and they received extra funding for this. The pitfall here is 
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therefore also related to premature formal establishment of an ASO before all necessary 
resources and capabilities have been acquired and developed. Public support mechanisms 
should be tailored so that they could prevent the premature formal establishment of an ASO. 
As shown in our data, after such early legal start-up some scientist-entrepreneurs were 
frustrated by a lack of progress. So, attracting the first key outside directors who were also the 
main resource providers was experienced as an “actual” start-up enabling the ASO to develop 
the business further. The challenge for TTOs is, in other words, to find a balance between 
acting as a representative of the university and as a wider societal institution. 
For policy-makers and practitioners we suggest that there may be a need to develop 
policies that meet the needs of ASOs in finding outside directors. Efforts to develop networks 
and relationships with professional board members – investors, industrial members, and 
executives – may be an important additional component in general and specific assistance 
programs. This may imply that TTOs should recruit staff with working experience in private 
high-tech sectors in established companies, not only in start-ups.  Such actions may help 
address the concerns that academic spin-offs are being created without the necessary 
resources to move the business forward.    
Our study has a number of limitations which will hopefully be addressed by future 
research. One limitation is methodological. We have conducted one or two interviews per 
firm using a limited number of cases. Overall, we attempted to address this limitation by 
studying cases that are in different stages of development, to better capture the evolutionary 
aspects of board composition. Future research might undertake longitudinal studies of a 
greater number of cases to trace the board evolution of firms through development stages.  
Next, additions and departures raise important governance issues in terms of how changes in 
the equity holdings are negotiated. We have been able to observe the effects of additions on 
firm development. Further research may explore departures, negotiation and tension issues, 
and examine whether the changes are conflict-loaded or resolved by the power that may come 
from the size of an individual’s equity holding.   
In spite of these limitations, we have attempted in this study to shed light on an unstudied 
topic, namely board formation and evolution of board composition in new technology-based 
firms, going beyond agency perspective. Our results indicate that the process of board 
formation is driven by the social networks of the founders, while the process of board 
evolution is mainly driven by social networks of the board chair with external board members 
adding value by bringing the additional resources that the management team lacks and, thus, 
contributing to the development of the venture. 
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Abstract 
We examine board features associated with new team member addition in academic spin-offs 
(ASOs) providing additional insights into the underexplored area of the dynamics of the top 
management team (TMT) in high tech new ventures. In particular, we draw on resource 
dependence perspective and investigate the role of board composition and networking in the 
new member addition process. The findings suggest that the board plays an important role in 
the new team member addition process. In particular, we find that board size and board 
networking activity facilitate team member addition. The hypothesis about the number of 
outside board members (who are neither TMT members nor TTO representative) and team 
member addition did not receive support. Implications are discussed. 
  
Keywords: top management teams, addition, board, academic spin-offs 
 
1. Introduction 
The strategic management and organizational behaviour literature contains an extensive 
body of work that has examined the relationship between management change characteristics 
and the need for organizational change. Managerial turnover as a form of organizational 
adaptation has been widely studied in the context of large established organizations (Wiersema 
and Bantel 1993; Romanelli and Tushman 1988), in which the replacement of top executives 
provides an important mechanism for the organization to overcome inertia (Tushman and 
Romanelli 1985) and adapt strategically to changing contexts (Helmich 1977; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). However, studies focusing on top management teams (TMT) in large 
established firms have failed to distinguish between the factors associated with team member 
entry and those associated with team member exit (Ucbasaran et al. 2003). 
In sharp contrast to large established firms, management turnover in the context of new 
ventures has almost been neglected. Few studies have attempted to address this gap (e.g. 
Forbes et al. 2006; Erikson and Berg-Utby 2009). Yet, entrepreneurship scholars and theorists 
have begun to acknowledge that the teams that lead entrepreneurial firms change over time, 
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and that new team members need to be brought in and founders, whose skills may become 
outdated, need to be replaced (Rubenson and Gupta 1996; Boeker and Wiltbank 2005). 
Overall, the studies of team dynamics demonstrate that the managerial transitions in new 
ventures may not always go smoothly and even be detrimental to the firm (e.g. Chandler et al. 
2005; Beckman et al. 2007). Still, these managerial transitions have not been studied 
extensively, and more research remains to be done examining the reasons for and skills of 
those entering and leaving the firm (Beckman et al. 2007).  The range of issues associated with 
managerial transitions is wide, including the dismissal and replacement of team members (e.g. 
Fiet et al. 1997; Boeker and Karichalil 2002) and team member entry (Forbes et al. 2006). 
Some studies have attempted to address both additions and departures (e.g. Ucbasaran et al. 
2003; Chandler et al. 2005). In this paper we focus on team member addition, which allows us 
to examine issues more thoroughly. 
In evolving team-based ventures, the addition of the new member is a critical and 
common development (Forbes et al. 2006). The decision about choosing and adding a new 
member is important because it may considerably change the existing human capital, which in 
terms of achieved attributes such as experience, is linked to increased levels of productivity 
(Becker 1975). Academic spin-off firm (ASO) founders need to fill skill gaps to facilitate the 
development of resources and capabilities, which enable the firm’s transition from a non-
commercial environment to the market (Vohora et al. 2004). Entrepreneurship scholars have 
demonstrated the positive linkages between the quality of the team’s past experience and firm 
performance (Burton et al. 2002; Chandler and Hanks 1998). Therefore, adding a new member 
to the team may potentially affect ASO firm growth and survival. 
Although the idea of increasing team diversity by adding a new member is not new, we 
have little knowledge of the factors associated with team member addition (Ucbasaran et al. 
2003; Vanaelst 2006). Vanaelst et al. (2006) have studied the entrepreneurial team 
development in ten Belgian spin-off cases. They examined the heterogeneity of the team 
members, which evolved through the firm’s life cycle, suggesting that people enter the team 
due the firm’s resource needs. Forbes et al. (2006) have explored team formation and 
elaborated on strategic choice perspective, e.g. resource seeking, and interpersonal attraction / 
social motives of team member addition. Drawing on resource dependence theory, Huse (2007) 
identified the importance of the board’s role of using a network when recruiting new top 
management team (TMT) members in privately-held threshold firms. 
The purpose of this study is to increase our understanding of the factors associated with 
team member entry.  We address this research gap by exploring the factors associated with the 
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new member addition to the team in ASO companies, which are usually based on technology 
formally transferred from the university or research institute. Since many ASOs, as high-tech 
firms, operate in industry niches characterized by high levels of growth and require highly 
skilled board members, the boards in these firms may play a greater role and have stronger 
influence on firm activities compared to other types of companies (Hambrick and Abrahamson 
1995; Forbes and Milliken 1999). Several entrepreneurial firm studies have demonstrated an 
active involvement of board members in the firm’s strategic decisions playing roles such as 
providing a sounding board and a source of advice in decision-making rather than merely 
performing monitoring and control (e.g. Johannisson and Huse 2000; Deakins et al. 2000; 
Rosenstein 1988). Furthermore, ASOs usually have a significant demand for finance and 
human capital, e.g. industry-specific knowledge and commercial expertise (Clarysse et al. 
2007; Wright et al. 2007). ASOs may attract experienced and well-connected directors to their 
boards who can aid in accessing critical external resources (Lynall et al. 2003). Consequently, 
in this study we attempt to examine the role of the board as a “pool of helpers” as an important 
predictor of new team member addition. In other words, we consider board size, number of 
outsiders (board members who are not part of TMT and the university community), and board 
contribution of networking.    
Thus, our paper extends previous research and makes a number of contributions. First, 
it studies managerial transitions in high-tech new ventures, rarely addressed by TMT studies, 
which mainly focused on mature firms (Ensley et al. 2002). Second, it responds to suggestions 
in the entrepreneurial team literature to use a broader definition of team turnover considering 
team member entry and exit (Ucbasaran et al. 2003). Specifically, we gather additional insights 
into team member additions in ASOs by considering board features associated with team 
member addition.  Moreover, we contribute to the governance research on privately-held firms, 
which emphasizes the need to go beyond agency theory (Uhlaner et al. 2007). We draw on the 
resource dependence perspective on the board’s role in TMT dynamics. Finally, we focus 
explicitly on the board in ASOs. Thus, we add to academic entrepreneurship where the number 
of studies on team and board level is still limited (Rothaermel et al. 2007; Djokovic and 
Souitaris 2008).  
Below we start by outlining the development of our hypotheses. Thereafter, we present 
the research design and data collection methods. Then we present the results. Finally, we 
discuss findings, implications, limitations and future research directions.  
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2. Hypotheses development 
2.1 Board resources and size 
The resource role of board members in start-ups is particularly important for increasing 
strategic flexibility and enabling firm growth and survival (Filatochev et al. 2006). Resource 
theories have been used to argue for a positive relationship between board size and corporate 
financial performance (Huse 2007). Resource dependency view holds that boards help firms to 
establish links with an external environment in order to secure resources, and a large board will 
fulfil this task better than a small board. The argument is that the greater the need for external 
linkages the larger the board should be (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
Larger boards have more contacts in or connections with stakeholder groups, other 
boards and other organizations, which increase their chance of receiving new information and 
gaining new insights to help to solve non-routine challenges (George et al. 2003).  Thus, each 
director may bring different linkages and resources to a board. Larger boards may therefore be 
better at identifying the appropriate member, which the TMT might need. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Board size is positively associated with subsequent team member 
addition in academic spin-offs. 
 
2.2 Board resources and outsiders 
Research also suggests that the proportion of inside versus outside members will affect 
the board’s involvement and influence (Sapienza et al. 2000). The proportion of outside board 
members has been found to be positively related to board involvement in strategic decisions 
(e.g. Johnson et al 1993). Outside directors are classified as non-management members of the 
board (Rosenstein et al. 1993). Outside directors bring in new resources and diversity of 
perspectives (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). They also bring their networks into the company. It is 
generally noted that firms with a higher proportion of outside board members who have greater 
number of interlocks (i.e. sit on two or more boards), will have a superior performance 
(Johnson et al. 1996). Also, the service role of directors, i.e. providing advice and counsel to 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), may impact new venture performance (Daily and Dalton 
1992; cf. George et al. 2003; Deakins et al. 2000).  
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The study by Vanaelst et al. (2006) illustrates how the entrepreneurial team evolves 
from the pre-founding team, consisting mainly of the researchers, to the founding team, which 
may include surrogate (external) entrepreneur and is ready to legally incorporate the ASO 
venture. Once the new venture is legally established, the founding team divides into two major 
teams: the management team and the board of directors (ibid.). The management team and the 
board of directors may represent separate entities or they may overlap. For instance, the 
scientist-entrepreneur may be a member of both the management team and the board, while a 
university technology transfer office (TTO) may place its representative on the board of the 
ASO. In this study, we term management, such as scientist-entrepreneurs, as board insiders. 
We also consider TTO members involved in ASOs as insiders since they are a part of 
university environment, and in the academic entrepreneurship literature they were shown to 
still need to develop networking and commercial skills if spin-offs are to be successful (Lockett 
et al. 2005). Other external board members who are not part of the TMT and do not belong to 
the university community are conceived of as outsiders. Outside board members may be, for 
instance, VC investors and industrial partners (Clarysse et al. 2007; Wright et al. 2004). The 
larger the number of outsiders on the board, the more external and diverse connections and 
interlocks the board will have. This increases the probability of finding an appropriate team 
member candidate from outside the academic environment.  Thus, we propose the existence of 
a relationship as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The number of outsiders on the board is positively associated with 
subsequent team member addition in academic spin-offs. 
 
2.3 Board networking role 
In threshold firms, as ASO ventures, the outside directors develop the contributions of 
the boards by using their networks (Huse 2007). An active networking strategy entails an 
increased board involvement and a greater number of interlocks (George et al. 2003). Informal 
strategic networks are of great importance to small firms, and directorates play a central role in 
creating, maintaining, and influencing important external contacts of the firm (Borch and Huse 
1993). The board’s networking involvement is connected to the creation of personal contacts, 
with representatives of its exchange partners or other people involved, and the board members’ 
involvement in environment-influencing activities as, for example, legitimizing, door-opening, 
and lobbying (ibid).   
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In this respect, the outside directors are found to be mainly active in using their 
networks to find and recruit key personnel, and in receiving additional financial resources 
during the stages of external capitalization (Rosenstein 1988; Borch and Huse 1993; Deakins et 
al. 2000). Finding appropriate team members can be challenging for scientist-entrepreneurs 
with networks limited to peers within academia (Cooper and Daily 1997; Ensley and Hmieleski 
2005; Mosey and Wright 2007), and the board members can aid them in finding and recruiting 
appropriate top management candidates using their connections. Previous studies also show 
that the outside directors aid entrepreneurs in the decision-making process within the firm 
through contacts, experience and other expertise they bring to the firm (Rosenstein 1988; 
Deakins et al. 2000).  Board members with well-developed networks have information that 
may improve their skills and competence to fulfil their strategic function (George et al. 2003), 
and thus enabling them to give better advice to entrepreneurs. Therefore, ASOs may benefit 
from boards that actively use their networks. Thus, we propose the existence of a relationship 
as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Board contribution of networking is positively associated with 
subsequent team member addition. 
 
 
3. Data and methods  
The data set originates from a survey given to the CEO of 353 companies considered as 
originated from Norwegian universities and public research institutes in autumn 2008. This 
sample constitutes the 318 companies, which are registered as having used the university TTO 
or technology licensing-like organization in the FORNY database. FORNY is a government 
program (under the Research Council of Norway) designed to increase the creation of wealth in 
Norway by supporting the commercialization of R&D results. The rest of the companies were 
found from other sources.  Anonymity for all companies and informants was assured. 53 firms 
reported that they are not academic spin-offs or they are no longer active. 135 academic spin-
off companies returned their questionnaires resulting in a response rate of 45 %. Due to 
missing values, 95 cases were included in the analysis. We registered 64 firms with new team 
member addition.  
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3.1 Dependent variable  
Our dependent variable is new team member addition. We asked the respondents to 
consider the most important/critical membership change. Then we asked them whether it was 
the person who entered (not left) the TMT. The firm was allocated a value of 1 if the new team 
member addition occurred, and a value of 0, otherwise.  
 
3.2 Independent variables 
Board size was measured with the question: How many persons are on the board? The 
number of outsiders was measured as the number of external board members who are neither 
TMT members nor TTO representatives. With regard to board contribution of networking, we 
asked a respondent to indicate to what extent s/he agrees with the following statement on the 
board networking role (Huse 2007a), i.e. to which degree on the Likert 7 point scale ranging 
from 1 (to a very small degree) to 7 (to a very large degree) the board contributes to 
networking (i.e. network building). 
 
3.3 Control variables 
We controlled for firm stage since ASO companies that are in later development stages 
may have more resources, experience, more information and more relationships (Finkle 1998), 
and the skills required by a team may vary between early stage and late stage firms (Hambrick 
and Mason 1984). We used five categories of development stages from research, product 
development and growth stages to maturity and declining stages (Kazanjian 1988; Vohora et al. 
2004).  
We also controlled for firm performance since firms with very poor and very high 
performance are shown to experience TMT change more often (e.g. Boeker and Karichalil 
2002; Boeker and Wiltbank 2005). The firm performance is often measured by sales revenues 
and profits for the past three years. Our sample ranges from early start-ups to more mature 
ASOs. Many of these firms have no sales or profit. Hence, the traditional measures are not 
appropriate. As suggested by Fredriksen and Klofsten (1999), a way to deal with this problem 
is by using an all-subjective measure of how the companies are developing according to a 
business plan. Therefore, we measure firm performance by asking the firms to estimate various 
performance variables and give 1 (much worse) through 7 (much better) to these variables 
since the firm’s foundation (Fredriksen and Klofsten 1999).  We chose 7 variables, which we 
considered as most applicable for ASOs. After the factor analysis we received 2 factors: 
growth (Cronbach’s alpha = .859) and product (Cronbach’s alpha = .711). The growth measure 
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consists of the following items: growth in sales, growth in market share, profitability and 
financing since the firm’s foundation. The product measure includes the quality of the firm’s 
product/service, the innovation in the form of new products/services, and customer satisfaction 
since the firm’s foundation. The traditional performance measures were incorporated in the 
question to what degree the firm is satisfied with its market share, profit, sales and ROA 
(Likert 7 point scale), which measures the satisfaction with the firm’s performance 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .937); the items were  inspired by Chen (2009).   
We also controlled for team size, tenure and team heterogeneity in functional and 
industry backgrounds as they, in previous studies, have been hypothesized and tested to 
moderate team member addition (e.g. Ucbasaran et al. 2003; Chandler et al. 2005). Team size 
is the number of persons who are in the management team (not included in the board). 
Heterogeneity in functional (sales, finance, etc.) and industry backgrounds was measured on 
the Likert 7 point scale ranging from 1 (to a very small degree) to 7 (to a very large degree), 
adapted from the survey carried out by Huse (2007a). This measure was composed by 
summated scales (Cronbach’s alpha = .660). Team tenure indicates the total sum of years the 
members have been on the TMT. 
 
4. Results 
We assessed common method bias by means of the Harman one-factor test (Aulakh & 
Gencturk, 2000; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) where the largest factor accounts for 24,2 % of the 
variance. This indicates that common method bias is not a major issue. A multi-collinearity 
assessment using the Variance Inflation Factors also indicates values within acceptable ranges. 
The test of the overall model fit and examination of residuals can be found in the appendix to 
the dissertation. Measures of correlation and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.  
Logistic regression analysis is an appropriate technique to use when assessing 
independent variables against a binary dependent variable. To test the significance in 
predicting the new team member addition of the independent variables over the control 
variables, we used a two-step logistic regression. All control variables were entered in the first 
step (Model 1) whereas all the focal variables were entered in the second step (Model 2).  
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Table 2 presents the results of our two-step regression. Model 1 representing only the 
control variables (i.e. firm growth, product, satisfaction with performance, development stage, 
team size, team tenure, team heterogeneity) is significant at the .01 level. One control variable, 
team functional and industrial heterogeneity, is positively and significantly related to 
subsequent team member addition at the .01 level.  
 The focal variables (i.e. board size, outsiders, board networking) were entered as a 
block in Model 2. The addition of the board variables to the equation with the control variables 
resulted in an improved model. This block is significant at the .001 level, and the overall model 
is significant at the .000 level. Two control variables, firm growth and team functional and 
industrial diversity, are significantly related to the subsequent team member entry at the .1 and 
.05 levels respectively. Board size is positively and marginally significantly related to the 
subsequent new team member addition (p < .1). Hence, Hypothesis 1 is marginally supported. 
The number of outsiders is positively, but not significantly related to the new member addition. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Hypothesis 3 regarding the positive relationship between 
board contribution of networking and subsequent new member addition, is supported. The level 
of board networking activity is positively and significantly associated with adding new 
members to the TMT (p < .01).  
In summary, ASO companies that have heterogeneous teams with regard to functional 
and industry backgrounds, larger and more active networking boards are more likely to add 
new members to their TMTs. As to firm growth, our findings seem to indicate that the better 
the firm’s growth is, the less need there is for adding new members to the team.  
 Table 2 Results of the logistic regression on team member addition 
 
Levels Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Firm controls Firm growth performance .70
( -.37)
.60† 
( -.50) 
 Firm product performance .92*
( -.08)
.88 
( -.13) 
 Satisfaction with firm performance 1.10
( .09)
1.09 
( .08) 
 Life cycle stage .98
( - .02)
1.34 
( .30) 
Team controls  Team size  1.40
( .34)
1.33 
( .29) 
 Team tenure 1.01
( .01)
1.03 
( .03) 
 Functional and industrial heterogeneity 1.67**
( .52)
1.60* 
( .47) 
   
Board  Board size (H1) 1.91† 
( .65) 
 Board outsiders (H2) 1.06 
( .06) 
 Board networking (H3) 1.76** 
( .56) 
   
 Constant .45 .00* 
 Model 2  18,580 34,448 
 Model 2 significance  .01** .00*** 
 -2 log likelihood  101,412 85,544 
 Overall predictive accuracy  70.5 % 80.0 % 
 Cox & Snell R2 .178 .304 
 Nagelkerke R2 .248 .424 
 Number of firms  95 95 
 
 
*** p < .001,    ** p < .01,    * p < .05,    † p < .10     
 
 
 5. Discussion  
In this paper, we sought to explore board factors associated with new team member 
addition in academic spin-offs. Drawing on the resource dependence perspective of active 
boards in small companies (Borch and Huse 2003; George et al. 2003; Huse 2007), we 
examined the role of the board, including composition and networking contribution, as drivers 
of new team member entry. Our findings suggest that the board plays an important role in the 
team member addition process. In particular, we find that board size and networking activity 
level facilitate the team member addition process in ASOs, while the number of outsiders – 
people who do not belong to either the TMT or university community – was not significant 
with regard to adding a new member to the TMT. 
Our investigation represents a useful addition to the team literature and governance 
literature, since little is known about the role of the board in TMT dynamics in ASOs as high-
tech new ventures (Ucbasaran et al. 2003; Ensley et al. 2002; Clarysse et al. 2007). We 
contribute by drawing on the resource dependence perspective on the board’s role as an 
important predictor of team member entry in ASO companies (Lynall et al. 2003; Uhlaner et al. 
2007).  An empirical contribution of our study to academic entrepreneurship is identifying 
factors associated with team member addition in ASOs (Rothaermel et al. 2007; Djokovic and 
Souitaris 2008).  ASO companies which have larger active networking boards are more likely 
to add new members to the team. However, a firm’s growth (which includes growth in sales, 
market share, profitability and financing) seems to lessen the likelihood of adding a new 
member. In other words, lack of growth increases the likelihood of new team member 
additions. This is consistent with open answers from the survey, in which the respondents 
mentioned “improved growth” and “increase in sales” as consequences of team member entry.    
A positive relationship between the functional and industry background diversity 
among TMT members and additions is similar to the findings demonstrated by previous studies 
(e.g. Chandler et al. 2005). In contrast to Ucbasaran et al. (2003) study of family firms, and 
Chandler et al. (2005) study of five year old emerging ventures, we do not find that team size is 
associated with subsequent team member addition. This may be due to the origin of ASOs 
from a non-commercial academic environment and that the firms we studied represented all 
development stages.  
For academic entrepreneurship and research on governance in privately-held firms, our 
study adds board composition and networking measures as variables that should be considered.  
The exploration of the factors at the board level shows that board size and board networking 
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contribution are positively related to new team member entry. This is in line with previous 
studies on boards that demonstrate the active role of the board recruiting key personnel and 
engaging in network building activities in VC-backed small and medium sized enterprises (e.g. 
Borch and Huse 1993; Deakins et al. 2000; Huse 2007). Also, we have been able to account for 
the firm’s development stage, which is important since various studies show that ASOs are 
threshold companies, which go through several stages of activity, and this influences TMT 
development (e.g. Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006). The number of outsiders - board 
members who are neither TMT members nor TTO representatives - was not found to be 
significantly associated with the additions of new team members in ASOs. This may suggest 
that what matters is the joint engagement in the networking activities by both internal and 
external board members and whom these board members know when it comes to finding new 
members to the TMT.  
 
5.1 Implications  
This study has several implications. First, the study indicates that the diversity in 
functional and industrial backgrounds of the team members is positively related to new 
member addition. Early stage technology-based firms were shown to overcome various 
thresholds (e.g. receiving VC funding, going public) when they had teams that were complete 
in terms of the functions of marketing, finance, operations, and engineering (Roure and 
Maidique 1986; Zimmerman 2008; Beckman et al. 2007) and heterogeneous in industry 
experience (Chandler et al. 2005; Vohora et al. 2004). For managers seeking further ASO 
development, this implies that they should adjust the team’s functional and industrial diversity 
as early as possible by adding members with relevant expertise in order to enable growth and 
overcome the thresholds that an ASO faces.  
Second, additional analyses do not uncover any significant interactions between the 
studied variables and firm’s development stage. Neither could we find significant interactions 
between the studied variables and firm performance except from the interaction between the 
board size and firm growth, which was marginally significant (p < .1) and positively related to 
subsequent team member entry. This suggests that the larger the board and the better the 
growth is, the more likely there will be added a new team member. The additional analyses 
also support our suggestion about the importance of the joint networking effort of both internal 
and external board members in the new team member addition process.  Although it is not 
significant, our third performance variable, which measures the satisfaction with firm 
performance regarding market share, profit, sales and ROA, is positively related to subsequent 
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team member addition. Most of the survey respondents are CEOs and original founders in 
CEO, board chair and other positions. Thus, this positive relationship may indicate that when 
the CEO/founder is satisfied with firm performance s/he will most probably have a positive 
attitude to the addition of new TMT members. Our results are only indicative. Hence, future 
research is needed to explore in-depth the role of team and board in various stages of firm 
development and under which conditions these factors become more pronounced. For instance, 
previous high-tech start-up studies have demonstrated the U-shaped relationship between TMT 
change (including founder departure and general additions and departures) and firm growth 
(e.g. Boeker and Karichalil 2002; Boeker and Wiltbank 2005). Both fast growth and a lack of 
start-up growth create the need for different top managers, but in the latter case “to help turn 
the new venture around” (Boeker and Wiltbank 2005: 125).  
Finally, our study suggests that ASOs with larger boards and greater levels of 
networking activity are more likely to add new members to their management teams. For 
academic founders, this means that when forming a board or negotiating board seats with e.g. 
powerful investors, they should pay attention to the records of potential board members with 
respect to previous networking and recruiting activities in other companies.  
 
5.2 Limitations and future research opportunities 
Our study has a number of limitations which will hopefully be addressed by future 
research. First, we considered only the strategic choice perspective in this paper, which implies 
the addition of the member according to the wishes of the existing team members. An 
institutional perspective, according to which the addition may be imposed by external 
institutional forces, e.g. influential owners, is outside the scope of this study. Second, our study 
is cross-sectional which means that we could not capture the underlying processes behind the 
relationships assessed.  Third, this is a study of Norwegian ASOs, and there is obviously a need 
for more studies in other comparable countries and contexts. Fourth, we have only focused on 
team member addition, while the other side of team turnover - team member exit – could also 
be investigated as these events are apparently related, although they may have different drivers. 
Future research should investigate what drives team member exits. Consequences of TMT 
member addition are important as well. For instance, Beckman et al. (2007) show that high-
tech venture teams that add members obtain IPO faster. The results of our survey seem to 
indicate that most important additions to the team were usually positive with a new/better 
competence brought by the new member on the team as a result, which opens for new growth 
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opportunities or even increased sales. However, future research should address the question of 
the consequences of team member entry for the new venture.  
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Abstract 
This study explores design characteristics associated with venture capital financed academic 
spin-off firms (ASO). In particular, we address the role of prior finance as well as 
management team and board design features. We analyze 106 firms using hierarchical 
logistic regression. We find that prior finance and management team characteristics are 
important predictors of receiving venture capital funding. Particularly, portfolio seed 
funding, capital from industrial partners, team size and cognitive diversity among 
management team members are design features associated with venture capital acquisition.  
 
Keywords: venture capital, financing, team, board, diversity  
 
1. Introduction 
The formation of high-growth academic spin-off companies (ASO) is one of the main 
policy goals of governments and universities (Rothaermel et al. 2007; Wright et al. 2007). 
ASOs are usually based on technology formally transferred from the parent organization, 
which is a university or research institute. Finance conduces to the creation of wealth through 
ASO formation; however, access to venture capital (VC) is a major barrier that ASOs face 
(Wright et al. 2006). According to Wright et al. (2006), potential VC investors perceive the 
risk of having to build management teams as greater in ASOs than in other high-tech 
companies. Their concerns are related to the quality of the management team and that 
scientist-entrepreneurs may not have the credibility to recruit management with commercial 
expertise or to attract customers (ibid).    
  The importance of the topic of ASO creation is also reflected by the increasing 
literature related to academic spin-offs (see O’Shea et al. 2004; Rothaermel et al. 2007; 
Djokovic and Souitaris 2008 for reviews). ASO researchers have primarily tried to explain the 
variation in spin-off activity and suggest policies that would increase this activity in the 
universities. Previous ASO studies have mainly focused on the following factors that affect 
the spin-off creation process (O’Shea et al. 2005): the personal characteristics of the 
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entrepreneurs (motivation, research quality etc.); the institutional factors like universities’ 
policies, procedures, practices on commercialization; incentive structures and rewards for 
researchers and technology transfer office (TTO) staff; and various external factors (e.g. 
knowledge infrastructure of the region, enactment of Bayh-Dole Act etc.).  
Few studies have investigated to what extent these stimulating university policies and 
activities have actually improved the performance of the new ventures. The study by Ensley 
and Hmieleski (2005) shows that ASOs are more immature with regard to their top 
management team (TMT) development and perform significantly lower in terms of net cash 
flow and revenue growth than independent new ventures. Although TMT is recognized as one 
of the most critical factors related to new venture performance, as Ensley and Hmieleski 
(2005) state, TMT role in ASO development is still not well investigated in the literature and 
university support still tends to focus primarily on technology and marketing. Even fewer 
studies have addressed the role of boards in ASOs (Clarysse et al. 2007). This is surprising 
because to enable their transition from a non-commercial environment to the market ASO 
companies, along with resources and capabilities (Vohora et al. 2004), including the 
management team’s human capital, need to develop board (Filatotchev et al. 2006). Having 
board members who are able to contribute to the development of the firm resources may 
considerably increase the ASO’s growth and survival (Huse 2007).   
In this study we seek to assess ASO design characteristics associated with venture 
capital acquisition. VC acquisition is indicative of venture success because ties to VC 
investors increase a firm’s chances of survival (Shane and Stuart 2002). Further, in 
entrepreneurship research, VC investors are typically considered to be value-adding investors, 
contributing value to the companies in excess of their monetary investments (Baum and 
Silverman 2004). Apart from being established in the literature, VC acquisition suits our 
context and allows us to examine characteristics across multiple high-tech industries, e.g. oil 
and gas, energy and environment, ICT and biotech-related industries, that have different 
profiles on traditional financial metrics such as turnover and ROI (cf. Beckman et al. 2007). 
The existence of and the need to fill a gap between the demand for finance from 
scientist-entrepreneurs involved in ASOs and the willingness of suppliers to provide this 
finance has been widely recognized in policy initiatives in the US (Shane 2004) and Europe 
(Wright et al. 2006). A VC firm’s supply of risk capital has been considered a major solution 
to bridge the equity gap for ASOs and a primary source of funds for new firms based on new 
technologies usually originated from universities, like biotechnology (Zucker et al. 1998). 
However, as the study by Wright et al. (2006) demonstrates, there is a mismatch between the 
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expectations of ASOs and VC providers, which results in the so-called equity gap. While 
TTOs and ASOs consider venture capital as more important in the early seed stage, the 
venture capitalists prefer to invest after the seed stage. The ASO may also face problems in 
attracting investments due to its origin from a non-commercial environment. For example, 
there has been growing recognition of the notion that ventures need to be in a pre-prepared 
state that enables VC firms to evaluate them more easily (e.g. Zacharakis et al. 1999). The 
ASO’s understanding of the requirements of potential external funders may be quite low. 
Venture capitalists often mention TMT quality as an important funding criterion (MacMillan 
et al. 1985; Zacharakis and Meyer 1998). Therefore, the TMTs that have an essential diversity 
of knowledge and skills may be more likely to capture the interest and attention of investors. 
In the same vein, the boards with diverse experiences and backgrounds are more likely to 
cope well with a task of networking, connecting ASOs to potential finance providers.   
The purpose of this study is, thus, to examine the role of prior finance and 
management team and board design features associated with VC financed ASOs. In line with 
Cohen and Bailey (1997: 243), the design features are defined as characteristics of “the task, 
group, and organization that can be directly manipulated by managers to create the conditions 
for effective performance” (cf. Stewart 2006). Particularly, we seek to examine the role of 
different types of early stage finance such as finance from the portfolio seed funds, informal 
and industrial investors as important predictors of VC acquisition in ASOs. Moreover, we are 
concerned with the trade-offs affiliated with team size and diversity in management teams and 
company boards. 
This paper extends previous research and makes a number of contributions. First, we 
contribute to academic entrepreneurship and VC literature by linking several types of early 
stage finance - from the seed funds to the informal investors and industry - to the ASO ability 
to acquire VC capital. We find that portfolio seed funding and capital from industrial partners, 
but not the support from informal investors, are design features associated with successful VC 
acquisitions. Second, the paper extends our understanding of the role of the TMT (Ensley and 
Hmieleski 2005) and boards (Clarysse et al. 2007) in ASOs by linking their design 
characteristics to VC financing.  We find that only team size and cognitive diversity among 
management team members are design features associated with VC acquisitions. Thus, the 
paper contributes to high-tech entrepreneurship studies, in which the role of teams has 
recently made a re-emergence as a critical component (Ensley et al. 2006; Wright et al. 
2007a), and adds to research on boards in privately-held firms (Uhlaner et al. 2007). 
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Below, we start by outlining the development of our hypotheses.  Next, we discuss the 
research design and data collection methods. Then we provide definitions of the selected 
dependent, independent, and control variables, followed by a discussion of the findings. 
Finally, we conclude and discuss implications, future research directions and limitations of 
the study.  
 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1. Prior finance characteristics and venture capital acquisition 
Dasgupta and David (1994) argue that there are no economic forces that operate 
automatically to maintain dynamic efficiency in the interactions between university-based 
open science and commercial R&D. There is considerable uncertainty associated with 
commercialization of research results because university innovations are often embryonic in 
nature (Colyvas et al. 2002; Jensen and Thursby 2001). Thus, there are few economic 
incentives for single firms to invest in developing early-stage projects with high uncertainty 
and long payback time. This leads to the general situation that private actors are reluctant to 
invest in early-stage technologies. Lockett et al. (2002) found that although the UK venture 
capital firms have become more willing to invest in new technology-based firms, there was 
still a reluctance to invest in the earliest stages of technology development, such as seed and 
start-up funding. Business angel funding could be an alternative, but these investors will often 
invest smaller amounts and are often not a main source for ASOs (Wright et al. 2007). This 
implies that some kind of governmental financial support is needed in order to facilitate the 
formation of ASOs. 
The gap between the demand for finance from scientist-entrepreneurs and the 
willingness of financiers to supply this funding is recognized by policy makers in many 
countries and considerable amounts of resources have been allocated to promote the creation 
of ASOs from public funded research (Feldman et al. 2002; Wright et al. 2006). The 
recognition of this “market failure” or “financing gap” for high-growth ventures has lead 
governments around the world to increasingly channel public financing to research and early-
stage ventures (Jaaskelainen et al. 2007; Leleux and Surlemont 2003; Lerner 2002; Wright et 
al. 2006). However, the rationales and effects associated with these programs are 
controversial (Armour and Cumming 2004; Jaaskelainen et al. 2007; Leleux and Surlemont 
2003; Lerner 2002). In addition to the apprehension that the private sector provides 
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insufficient capital to new firms, Lerner (2002) argues that all government efforts in this arena 
are predicated on the assumption that the government either can identify investments which 
will ultimately yield high social and/or private returns or can encourage financial 
intermediaries to do so. A consensus on both these claims remains elusive, and the design of 
government programs is still a highly experimental activity. Furthermore, especially in 
Europe, seed capital funds are usually set up as an intermediary in order to reduce uncertainty 
related to technical and commercial issues (Murray 2007). Thus, one should expect that some 
of the ASOs financed with governmental and seed capital funds will be capable of securing 
venture capital funding as they become more mature and uncertainty related to technical and 
commercial issues is reduced.  
A traditional view on external financing of high-tech new ventures, including ASOs, 
implies that ASOs may first attract start-up support from a university and/or government seed 
funds, then the capital from informal investors (so-called business angels) and in some cases 
from industry until the VC investors become interested in the venture (Benjamin and Margulis 
1996). However, the assumption that there is a relay race between informal investors and VCs 
has been questioned in several studies (Freear et al. 1997; Sørheim 2005). The most 
prominent reason for this seems to be differences in investment strategies as informal 
investors are more concerned about avoiding bad investments rather than “hitting a home run” 
(Mason and Harrison 2002).  
ASOs face the challenge of making the venture “investor ready” (Douglas and 
Shepherd 2002) to acquire venture capital by, for example, developing successful prototypes, 
assembling an experienced TMT, customer testing and early sales, and thorough intellectual 
property (IP) due diligence. The support of the industrial partner in the ASO may make it 
easier to access resources, exchange information and establish legitimacy (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). The decision to invest and the level of investment committed to a venture is 
contingent upon external investors perception of the credibility of the venture in terms of 
whether the risks involved are acceptable (Wright et al. 2004). Collaboration with an 
industrial partner generates the credibility of an ASO early on and may facilitate greater 
commitment by VC investors (ibid). 
This means that financial choices made in the very early stages of an ASO are 
expected to heavily influence the capital acquisition process in later stages.   Thus, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Prior finance design characteristics will make an independent contribution to 
the venture capital acquisition function in academic spin-offs. 
 
 
2.2 Management team design characteristics and venture capital acquisition 
Team size is an important measure in TMT research. In the meta-analyses of team and 
performance, management and project teams are shown to benefit more when having larger 
team size (Stewart 2006). Larger teams have been found to be linked to better performance 
and growth in high-tech ventures (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Cooper and Daily 
1997). Chandler et al. (2005) demonstrate that larger initial team size provides an advantage 
for organizations that are not more than 5-years old.  
Another important measure is diversity or member heterogeneity (Stewart 2006). 
Diversity in entrepreneurial teams that brings together people with different skills, 
experiences and backgrounds is usually seen as advantageous in new ventures, and the 
positive  linkages between the quality of the team’s past experience and firm performance 
were demonstrated by entrepreneurship scholars (e.g. Burton et al. 2002; Chandler and Hanks 
1998; Beckman et al. 2007). Other scholars doubt the positive consequences of diversity, 
claiming that it leads to more conflict, but often failing to find support for this in 
entrepreneurial settings (e.g. Ensley et al. 2002; Chandler et al. 2005). These contradicting 
views call for a more nuanced debate of the heterogeneity puzzle, and the question arises as to 
what type of diversity in ASO teams is beneficial.  
The diversity dimensions that have systematically been studied in the TMT research 
are different demographic diversity characteristics like gender, age etc., personality diversity 
and more directly task-related cognitive (or background) diversity characteristics like 
educational or functional background (Stewart 1996; Kearney et al. 2009). Following this 
distinction, we focus on demographic, personality and cognitive diversity respectively. The 
personality diversity characteristic varies across settings and needs to be additionally studied 
on a team-level (Stewart 2006). For ASO teams having personality diversity may be 
advantageous because it can be helpful in creating innovative and new insights with respect to 
e.g. technology development, product improvement and marketing tasks. Similar to Kearney 
et al. (2009), we argue that age diversity is a more appropriate indicator of demographic 
diversity than gender, ethnicity, or nationality in entrepreneurial setting. Among the positive 
consequences of age diversity are greater firm performance and better ability to address 
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strategic issues (Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Richard and Shelor 2002). Age diversity in 
management teams reflects a varied set of experiences, views and social ties that may 
ultimately appear attractive to external financiers. 
When tasks are complex and non-routine - as with ASO development - cognitive 
diversity should have a beneficial effect on firm performance (Stewart 1996; Beckman et al. 
2007).  Educational and functional backgrounds, as mentioned, belong to the cognitive 
diversity dimension. A diverse set of educational backgrounds in the TMT reflects diversity in 
its cognitive base, which positively influence strategic decision making (Hambrick and Mason 
1984; Wiersema and Bantel 1992). Zimmerman (2008) found that diversity in the TMT’s 
educational background is associated with greater capital raised through an IPO. The positive 
relationship between functional heterogeneity and firm performance has been widely 
supported in several new venture studies (e.g. Roure and Maidique 1986; Zimmerman 2008; 
Beckman et al. 2007; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005).  
In addition to educational and functional backgrounds, TMTs may vary in background 
characteristics such as industry, start-up experience, management and international 
experience, which are all important cognitive features associated with entrepreneurial success 
(Packalen 2007). Investors view industry experience as one of the main predictors of new 
venture success (Hall and Hofer 1993). Greater diversity in industry backgrounds reflects a 
varied set of different points of view on technology, competitive tactics, knowledge of how 
industry operates, which all may produce innovative solutions, give competitive advantage to 
the new venture and enhance understanding of customer demands (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1990; Boeker and Karichalil 2002). The positive consequences of diversity in 
start-up (or entrepreneurial, founding) experience are that they may enhance a team member’s 
human capital (Ucbasaran et al. 2003; Packalen 2007) since many tasks in new ventures are 
unique and tacit in nature and can only be learned by doing (Shepherd et al. 2000). Diversity 
in management experience may indicate quality of the management team in an ASO, which is 
one of the major concerns of the VC investors (Wright et al. 2006). Heterogeneity in industry 
background, prior start-up and management experience were all shown to be associated with 
improved performance (e.g Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Colombo and Grilli 2005; 
Roure and Maidique 1986). Hence, variation along all these characteristics makes a new 
venture more attractive to external stakeholders and to investors.   
A final characteristic, which we argue to be an important element of the cognitive 
diversity dimension in the context of ASOs, is heterogeneity in prior international experience 
(e.g. experience of having worked abroad). ASOs are often based on completely new 
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technologies that give significant technical advances in the scientific field (Del Campo et al., 
1999) and they develop new products with significant value to customer (Shane 2004), which 
sometimes makes them enter or even create new markets and industries for their technologies 
and products, e.g. biotech industry (Jong 2006). Such newness necessitates interaction with 
e.g. industrial partners and customers across borders, and the presence of varied international 
experience on the TMT should facilitate such interactions. Team members with international 
experience are better equipped to deal with the uncertainties and ambiguities associated with 
international operations and are more confident and effective in foreign environments 
(Sambharya 1996). International background diversity may, thus, be a positive signal to 
potential investors.  In summary, we therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Management team design characteristics will make an independent 
contribution to the venture capital acquisition function in academic spin-offs 
 
 
2.3 Board design characteristics and venture capital acquisition 
Boards help firms to establish links with external environment in order to secure 
resources, including finance, and a large board will fulfil this task better than a small board. 
The argument is that the greater the need for external linkages the larger the board should be 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). A positive relationship can also be assumed between the 
existence of knowledge and competence among board members and the board’s advisory 
contributions (Huse 2007). Gabrielsson and Huse (2002) found that the board size was larger 
in Swedish VC-backed industrial firms compared to non-VC backed firms. Hence, we expect 
a positive relationship between a large board and company’s ability to attract VC.  
Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest that the board attributes, composition and 
contingencies (e.g. firm size) determine strategic outcome and, in turn, the performance of the 
company. The resource role of board members in start-ups is particularly important for 
increasing strategic flexibility and enabling firm growth and survival (Filatotchev et al. 2006). 
Diverse board members differ in their educational and social background, business and 
professional experience, age, gender, personality and so on (Milliken and Martins 1996). As 
with the TMT, we distinguish between demographic (age), personality and cognitive diversity 
characteristics.  
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The most relevant knowledge and skills of the board are the functional area knowledge 
and skills that include the accounting, finance, marketing, and law, and the firm-specific 
knowledge and skills, including the knowledge of how the firm operates, how technology 
works, how to develop the product and set it into production (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). We 
assume that the board members who represent a broader range of work experience in related 
industries will make better use of the firm-specific knowledge and skills than the members 
with almost no or single industry experience. Hence, among cognitive diversity characteristics 
we emphasize diversity in industry and functional backgrounds as more appropriate design 
features. With respect to board’s networking and resource roles we also consider diversity in 
education and international backgrounds as important components of board cognitive 
diversity. Board members with varied industry, education, functional and international 
backgrounds may have alternative networks with several representatives of the firm’s 
exchange partners and other informants, e.g. potential VC investors (Huse 2007). Hence, 
having diverse and well-experienced board members may make a new venture more attractive 
to VC investors. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Board design characteristics will make an independent contribution to the 
venture capital acquisition function in academic spin-offs. 
 
 
3. Data and methods 
The data set originates from a survey given to the CEO of 353 companies considered 
as originated from Norwegian universities and public research institutes in autumn 2008. This 
sample constitutes the 318 companies, which are registered as having used the university 
technology transfer office or technology licensing-like organization in the FORNY database. 
FORNY is a government program designed to increase creation of wealth in Norway by 
supporting the commercialization of R&D results. The rest of the companies were found in 
other sources.  Anonymity for all companies and informants was assured. 53 firms reported 
that they are not academic spin-offs or they are no longer active. 135 academic spin-off 
companies returned their questionnaires resulting in a response rate of 45 %. Due to missing 
values, 106 cases were included in the analysis.  
We registered 28 firms with VC financing. The firms represent a broad range of 
industries such as ICT, health, oil and gas, energy and environment, medical and 
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biotechnology, maritime and offshore, and others.  As for the innovation degree and scope, 
most of the firms were highly innovative. That is, most of the firms have reported that the 
product/service or technology they develop or the markets they aim at are completely new. 
Thirteen firms answered that a similar product/service, technology or market exists. And most 
of the firms had a new product/service, technology or market internationally. Only eight firms 
had a new product/service, technology or market in the firm country, locally.  
 
3.1 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is whether or not the ASO received funding from a venture 
capitalist coded as a dummy variable, i.e. the firm was allocated a value of 1 if a respondent 
reported that the firm has received external capital from VC investors, and the firm was 
allocated a value of 0 if the firm had never received external capital from VCs. We have two 
separate markers for VC finance, the first a direct question, the second question addresses 
how many rounds with VC finance the company has received. When the latter is 
dichotomously coded, they exhibit a perfect correlation with the employed measure (1.000, p 
< .001). 
  
3.2 Independent variables 
3.2.1 Prior finance measures 
Type of prior finance. We asked the firms to check a set of alternatives with regard to 
prior finance. These measures were coded dichotomously into seed capital, industrial capital 
and private (informal) capital. 
 
3.2.2 Management team measures 
Team member heterogeneity. We asked a respondent to which degree the TMT 
members represented a variety in the Functional background (sales, finance, etc.) on the 
Likert 7 point scale ranging from 1 (to very small degree) to 7 (to very large degree). The 
index was inspired by Huse’s (2007a). Similar questions were posed with regard to 
personality, age, education background, industry background, start-up experience, 
management and international experience. 
Team size. Team size was measured by the following question: How many persons are 
in the management team (not included in the board)?  
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3.2.3 Board measures 
Board member heterogeneity. We asked a respondent to which degree the board 
members represented a variety in the Functional background (sales, finance, etc.) on the 
Likert 7 point scale ranging from 1 (to very small degree) to 7 (to very large degree). Similar 
questions were posed with regard to personality, age, education background, industry 
background, and international experience. The index was inspired by Huse’s (2007a) 
comprehensive study of value creating boards. 
Board size. Board size was measured with the question: How many persons are on the 
board?   
 
3.3 Control variables 
We control for firm stage, age and size as larger and older ASOs may have more 
resources, experience, more information and more relationships (Finkle 1998). The skills 
required by a team may vary between younger and older firms (Hambrick and Mason 1984). 
We used five categories of cycle stages from product development to maturity and declining 
stages (Kazanjian 1988). Firm age is the number of years since the business was formally 
incorporated.  Firm size is measured as full time employment equivalents.   
 
3.4 Common method bias 
Harman’s one-factor test was used to test for common source bias (Aulakh and 
Gencturk 2000; Podsakoff and Organ 1986). A principal component analysis (PCA) was 
conducted on all 23 items used in this study, and if the study has a common method variance 
bias, a single factor should emerge or one general factor would account for most of the 
covariance in the independent and criterion variables. The standard algorithm extracted seven 
components with Eigenvalues > 1, and the largest component accounts for 25.6 % of the total 
variance. This post hoc analysis indicates that common source bias is not an issue.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
Measures of correlation are reported in Table 1.  
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 Hierarchical logistic regression analysis is an appropriate technique when assessing 
multiple themes against a binary dependent variable. Since we hypothesized on the overall 
theme level, we present, and assess, four blocks: the first block includes the control variables 
firm stage, size, and age, in the second block we add the prior financing measures, in the third 
- management team variables, and the fourth - the board measures. Thus, three models beyond 
the control variables are presented in order to assess ASO design characteristics associated 
with VC acquisitions. The test of the overall model fit can be found in the appendix to the 
dissertation. 
Our four step model is shown in Table 2.  
Model 1 contains the control variables. Model 2 demonstrates support for hypothesis 
H1. This model is significant at the .001 level. Prior seed and industry funding are both found 
to be significant at the 0.05 level. Financing by informal investors has apparently no effect on 
subsequent VC acquisition. In fact, the data indicate that the presence of informal investors 
may have a negative effect on subsequent VC financing.  
Model 3 demonstrates support for H2. This model includes management team member 
heterogeneity and team size variables. It appears that team size and functional and industry 
backgrounds representing cognitive diversity are positively associated with attracting VC 
financing (p < .05 and p < .1). Personality diversity is negatively associated with receiving 
VC financing (p < .1). Model 4 does not exhibit support for H3, although educational 
diversity in boards, which is negatively related to VC acquisition, is found to be significant at 
the 0.05 level. 
In summary, prior portfolio seed and industry financing appear to be the predominant 
predictors of subsequent VC funding. However, cognitive diversity in terms of variation in 
functional and industry backgrounds and management team size are both associated with VC 
financing, although team personality diversity and board educational diversity are negatively 
associated.  The presence of the positive relationship for functional background and team size 
in our findings seems to be in line with the literature on diversity and performance. Meta-
analytical studies of teams and performance provide support for that cognitive diversity (e.g. 
functional heterogeneity, etc.) is desirable in the creative settings, like in ASO context, which 
require the teams’ engagement in applying knowledge and expertise in non-routine tasks 
(Stewart 2006). The similar support is provided for the team size, and is consistent with the 
notion that additional members are desirable when the team (like in ASO context) is required 
to interact with, and obtain, resources such as supplies and expertise from a complex 
environment.  A negative relationship of personality diversity may be rooted in the conflict. 
    Table 2 Hierarchical logistic regression model results 
 
  Variables Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Controls Firm size  1,00 1,00 ,99 ,99 
 Firm age ,98 ,94 ,88 ,84 
 Cycle stage ,97 ,86 1,53 1,64 
      
Finance level  Seed financing   4,63** 3,89* 5,30* 
 Informal investors  ,84 ,79 ,75 
 Industrial investors   3,33* 3,40† 5,14* 
      
TMT Level  Team size    1,51* 1,54* 
 Functional background diversity   1,78* 2,29** 
 Industry background diversity   1,40 1,59† 
 Educational diversity   ,90  ,94 
 Diversity in startup experience   1,45 1,44 
 Diversity in management experience   ,82 1,01 
 Diversity in international experience   ,86 ,73 
 Personality diversity   ,68† ,73 
 Age diversity   ,80 ,79 
      
Board level Board size    ,89 
 Board functional diversity    ,86 
 Board industry background diversity    ,89 
 Board educational diversity    ,56* 
 Board international experience diversity    1,31 
 Board personality diversity    1,00 
 Board age diversity    ,96 
 Constant    ,02 
 Model 2  ,248 16,296 34,810 42,762 
 Model 2 significance  ns ,012 ,003 ,005 
  Model 2  ,248 16,048 18,514 7,952 
  Model  2 significance  ns ,001 ,030 ns 
 -2 log likelihood  122,151 106,103 87,589 79,64 
 Overall predictive accuracy  73,6% 75,5% 79,2% 82,1% 
 Cox & Snell R2 ,002 ,143 ,280  ,332 
 Nagelkerke R2 ,003 ,208 ,409 ,485 
 Number of firms  106 106 106 106 
    † p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
 
 When negative sides of the conflict prevail upon positive (task) conflict on the team it may 
result in poor performance (Ensley et al. 2002).  
While knowledge and skills of the board members are about doing, other 
characteristics including age and education or school attended may rather be about being 
(Huse 2007).  Board members may have a good reputation providing ASOs with prestige and 
helping with networking and resource tasks, but they do not necessarily need to have relevant 
education or competence with respect to key issues that ASOs face (e.g. technology 
development). This may be reflected in the negative relationship of educational diversity. 
Alternatively, the negative relationship may be due to that educational diversity among board 
members in our context resembles an ascribed (demographic) rather than more directly task-
related (cognitive) characteristic. As shown in meta-analytical group studies demographic 
diversity typically has a slightly negative effect (Stewart 2006). 
 
 
5. Discussion with conclusions  
This paper has sought to explore characteristics such as the role of prior finance, 
management team and board design features associated with venture capital-financed 
academic spin-off companies. Our study brings a novel contribution to academic 
entrepreneurship research by relating early stage finance and team and board design 
characteristics to ASO performance. Our investigation also represents a useful addition to the 
team and governance literature, since little is known about the TMT and board’s role in 
venture capital acquisition in high-tech new ventures (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Wright et 
al. 2007a; Clarysse et al. 2007; Uhlaner et al. 2007). Overall, we find that prior portfolio seed 
and industry financing are the predominant predictors of subsequent VC funding. We find that 
ASOs with larger teams and higher cognitive diversity previously financed by seed funds and 
industry are more likely to attract VC funding than ASOs with board educational diversity 
and with support from informal investors.  
Empirically, we contribute in several ways. First, we consider early types of financing 
from the seed funds, informal investors, and industry as important predictors of VC 
acquisition by ASOs. Second, we find that management teams with higher cognitive diversity 
in terms functional and industry background are more likely to receive VC funding. These 
findings extend and refine previous research, confirming that the human capital of the 
management team may usefully predict entrepreneurial success (Ucbasaran et al. 2003; 
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Beckman et al. 2007; Zimmerman 2008). Third, as boards in high-tech ventures exhibit 
greater levels of influence on firm development compared to other types of firms (Forbes and 
Milliken 1999; Huse 2007), we tried to integrate board design features associated with 
receiving VC financing into our model.   
 Further, our findings indicate that previous funding by informal investors does not 
assure obtaining VC financing. It is often claimed that informal investors do seed stage deals 
that they hope will develop into ventures that attract start-up financing from venture 
capitalists or they invest in ventures whose growth prospects are too small to be of interest to 
a venture capitalist (De Clercq et al. 2006). Additional analysis shows that there are no 
significant differences in perceptually-measured growth variables (e.g. firm’s satisfaction with 
performance in terms of market share and firm sales) between the groups of ASOs financed 
by informal and VC investors. This could be explained by the nature of the informal investors. 
They are often interlinked with other informal investors (and not to VCs) (Sørheim and 
Landström 2001; Sørheim 2003). This means that informal investors probably will be the 
main source of finance in future financing rounds. Another explanation to this could be that 
informal investors and entrepreneurs respond negatively to VC terms (which could be 
considered as negative treatment of current owners). Moreover, the reader should also bear in 
mind that in total VCs make very few investments compared to the total of investments from 
informal investors. This means that only a small fraction of investments from informal 
investors would be of interest to VCs. 
This study has several implications and offers several future research avenues. First, 
this study suggests that the combination of seed funding and alliances with industrial partners 
is positively related to an ASO’s ability to attract VC. For policy makers, this means that 
different types of public support schemes should be designed in order to facilitate 
involvement from strategic industrial partners. Second, when forming a team, TTOs and 
entrepreneurs should pay attention to the cognitive diversity. Like in other high-tech ventures 
the cognitive diversity expressed in functional and industry background variation is positively 
associated with the ASO’s ability to attract VC funding. Yet, our results demonstrate that 
prior portfolio seed and industry financing appear to be the more important predictors of 
receiving VC financing than a management team’s cognitive diversity. This may imply that 
the management team’s ability to accumulate seed and industrial financing prior to seeking 
VC support plays a greater role than the team’s cognitive diversity per se. Future 
investigations may test this hypothesis. Third, board design characteristics do not appear to be 
as important as prior finance and TMT design features, yet the overall model, which accounts 
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for all these three levels, remains strong. For future research on boards in high-tech firms, this 
means that the board’s role and, particularly, the extent to which the human aspects of the 
board (not mere control function) contribute to entrepreneurial success is an attractive 
research path, which needs more systematical investigation. Finally, our findings indicate that 
there is no relay race between VCs and an informal investor. Hence, future research studies on 
entrepreneurial financing should focus on this issue more explicitly. The question is whether 
there is a “lock in” effect, meaning that funding from informal investors in early stages is a 
negative signal to potential VC investors and, thus, an obstacle for obtaining future financing 
from VCs. Or is it the other way around, meaning that finance from informal investors is a 
part of a deliberate strategy. Such a strategy could be rooted in skepticism about the terms 
introduced by venture capitalists, which is demonstrated by the founders of ASOs who 
deliberately choose this route of finance because they want to have “total control” (both 
related to cash flow and control rights).  
 Our study has a number of limitations which will hopefully be addressed by future 
research.  First, our study is cross-sectional, and some of the team and board characteristics 
found may be attributed to the teams and boards after they have received VC funding. We 
could partially control for this issue. We performed an additional analysis with the variable 
that accounts for whether there were changes in the management team after the investment 
was made and we received the similar results as in our main analysis. Yet, future researchers 
need to attempt to conduct a longitudinal study to ensure the proper sequence of events and 
characteristics measured. Second, even if this study indicate that cooperation between 
informal investors and VCs is limited when it comes to investments in ASOs we still have 
limited knowledge about this phenomena. There is a need for future studies addressing the 
issues of finance, TMT and board in ASOs in more detail. Third, this is a study of Norwegian 
ASOs, and there is need for more studies in other comparable countries and contexts. For 
example, risk capital markets in the US are far more developed compared to Norway. A 
market place with more professional actors might influence the interplay between investors 
focusing on different stages of the lifecycle of an ASO.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Questionnaire: Question selection for papers 3 and 4  
 
 
 
 
 A4 How many full-time equivalents are there in the firm:  
   2004   2005 2006 2007 2008 Estimation for 2009 
  Total number of FTEs  ….. …… …. ….. ….. …….. 
 
 
 
A10a 
 
Since the firm’s foundation, how is: 
Much 
worse  
Much
better
  the firm’s growth in sales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  the growth in market share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  the quality of the firm’s product/service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  the innovation in the form of new products/services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  the customer satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  the firm’s profitability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  the firm’s financing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
A10b 
 
Our firm is satisfied with: 
 
Completely 
disagree  
Completely 
agree
 •  market share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  profit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  sales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  return on assets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
 
  What role do you have in the firm? (Check in all boxes that are relevant) Are you:  
 
   1  Founder of the firm             2 CEO           3  If other, please specify …………   
A1 Organization identification number or firm name:      ……………………………. 
 
A2a What university/research institute do(es) the technology/founders 
come from?  
 
………………………..
A2b Which TTO or other Commercialization Unit did your firm deal with?   
………………………… 
A7 In which phase of the firm’s life cycle is your firm now? (Tick one box) 
 
         0 Early phase: We evaluate the commercial potential and strengthen intellectual rights; we apply 
                for a patent or try to protect technology which will be at the core of our product/service. 
         1 Development phase: We are developing a product/service, which to limited degree is introduced 
                in the market. Revenues are very low. 
         2 Start-up-/introduction phase: Our product/service is gradually being introduced in the market.  
                
         3 Growth phase: Our firm grows fast and investments may be necessary for further development.  
              Our product/service can be introduced in several markets, and the sales are increasing.  
         4 Maturity phase: The sales are flattening out. Our firm has reached all potential customers 
               in the targeted markets.  
  
B3 How many members are in your top management team (TMT)? 
 
_____ members 
B4 How many members are in your board of directors? 
 
_____ members
B5 How many members are in both the TMT and board? _____ members
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  B13b   What was (were) the reason(s) that the member has entered management? 
  
Rank the reasons to why the member has entered the TMT (1 – most important reason, etc.) 
 
  • We wanted this member on the team because of his/her competence ……   
  • The member was going to replace a person who left the firm  ……   
  • Our firm grew and we needed an additional manager to lead our new departments ……   
  • Largest stakeholder(s) wished the member to join the TMT  …..   
  • Other reasons, please specify …………………………..    
 
 
B14 Which positive and/or negative consequences did membership change have for the firm’s 
growth/performance? 
 
• in case of member’s entrance: ............................................... 
 
• in case of member’s departure:………………………………… 
 
 
 
B18a   Our TMT members represent a variety in the: To a small 
degree  
To a large
degree
  Functional background (sales, finance etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Industrial background  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Education background  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Personality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Previous experience of starting up ventures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Management experience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  International experience (worked abroad, of foreign origin) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
C1  Has the firm contacted and possibly received the  
      financial capital from the following:  
No, has not 
tried 
Has tried, but did not 
receive capital 
Has received 
capital 
 Family 1   2   3 
 Seed fund 1   2   3 
 Incubator 1   2   3 
 Industrial or public R&D grant  1   2   3 
 Other support from the Research Council of Norway 1   2   3 
 Other, specify____________ 1   2   3 
 
 
 
 
 
B6 Please name the total number of years all members served on the TMT?              _____ years 
Consider the most important/critical membership change in the TMT or board: 
B8 Was it:  
 1  the person who left the TMT or board  
 2  the person who entered the TMT or board    
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D5   Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following 
statements on the contribution made by the board:  
 
Totally 
disagree  
Totally
agree
 •  Board members contribute to networking, network building 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  Firm and board often use board members’ network to get 
advice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
D6 Our board members represent a variety of  Totally  
disagree  
Totally 
agree
  Functional backgrounds (e.g. sales, finance) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Industrial backgrounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Educational backgrounds  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Personalities  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Ages  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  International experience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Means, standard deviations and tests for differences in means between the responding 
firms and those not responding to the survey 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
Respondents 
 
Non-respondents 
 
T-statistic 
Sample size  
 
82 137 n/a 
Number of employees 
 
3.38 
(s.d. 5.16) 
 
4.31 
(s.d. 21.36) 
.390 
Firm age 
 
5.71 
(s.d. 3.23) 
 
5.92 
(s.d. 3.43) 
.448 
Operating revenues 
 
2 939 047 
(s.d. 4 507 240) 
5 366 294 
(s.d. 2.740E7) 
 
.795 
 
Notes: s.d. standard deviation  
 
C2 When was the first external capital from private investors (not family) 
received? 
Year: _____  2 Never 
C3 When was the first external capital from industrial partners received? 
 
Year: _____  2 Never 
C4 When was the first external capital from venture capital investors 
received? 
Year: _____  2 Never 
C5 How many times did your firm receive the capital from venture 
capital investors? 
 
____  times 
D8    How many board members have the following background:   __ Venture capital investors 
 
 __ TTO / commercialization unit representatives __ External members (not employees)
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Table 2 Hosmer and Lemeshow measure of overall model fit for paper 3 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test  
Step Chi-square Df Sig. 
1 13.015 8 .111
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test (Model 2) 
  Add = ,00 Add = 1,00 
Total   Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 9 8.298 1 1.702 10
2 6 6.682 4 3.318 10
3 7 5.263 3 4.737 10
4 4 3.840 6 6.160 10
5 2 2.701 8 7.299 10
6 0 1.899 10 8.101 10
7 0 1.183 10 8.817 10
8 1 .696 9 9.304 10
9 2 .383 8 9.617 10
10 0 .054 5 4.946 5
 
Comment:  
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow’s test provides a comprehensive statistical measure of predictive accuracy that is based 
on the actual prediction of the dependent variable (Hair et al. 2006*). This statistical test measures the 
correspondence of the actual and predicted values of the dependent variable. In this case, better model fit is 
indicated by a smaller difference in the observed and predicted classification.  
 
The test indicates that there are no significant differences between actual and expected values.  This means that 
the model fit is acceptable.  
 
*Hair, J. F. Jr., W. C. Black, B. J. Babin and R. E. Anderson (2006), Multivariate data analysis, Upper Saddle 
River, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
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Figure 1 Examining residuals: plots of Δχ2, ΔD and Δβ (standardized) versus the estimated 
probability (paper 3) 
 
Comments:  
 
When checking for cases which are not fitted well 
by the model and/or which are particularly 
influential on the model parameters Hosmer and 
Lemeshow** (2000) recommend diagnostics delta 
chi-squared, delta deviance and delta B 
(standardized) versus the estimated logistic 
probabilities. All of these statistics show the effect 
of removing each case from the model. If a case is 
not well fitted by the model, removing it will result 
in a large change in the chi-squared and deviance 
values; if the case has a large influence on value of 
the fitted parameters, this will be reflected in a 
large value of delta B.  
 
We will investigate the most extreme points at the top right of the Δχ2 and ΔD graphs. The cases whom the 
model does not fit are 14, 20 and 38. What is common for these cases is that they have diverse teams with regard 
to functional and industrial backgrounds, large and networking boards, however, they did not add a new member 
on the team. This may be attributed to the early stages of firm development (early stage for cases 14 and 20 and 
development stage for case 38), which may imply that the need for adding external members with necessary 
competence to the team of researchers is somewhat reduced. Overall, these cases go against our general finding.   
 
According to Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), we use four as an approximation to the ninety-fifth percentile of 
the distribution of delta chi-squared and delta deviance values. That is the values of delta chi-squared and delta 
deviance greater than four should be considered significant. It can be seen from Δχ2 and ΔD graphs that none of 
the values (except for the extreme points) are greater than four, which indicates that the model fits well.  
 
Plot of Δβ vs. predicted probability shows how influential each case is in determining the model parameters. 
Case 14, and perhaps case 38, stand out. The main reason for this is that firm 14 has very much higher team 
tenure, 30 years, compared to others (mean team tenure is 12 years). Firms 14 and 38 also go against the general 
finding that firms with larger and more networking boards are more likely to add new member to the top 
management team. Removing these cases had very little effect on the results. Therefore, the presence of the 
influential cases is not an issue.  
 
** Hosmer, D. W. and S. Lemeshow (2000), Applied logistic regression, New York: Wiley, 2nd ed. 
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Table 3 Examining residuals: outliers (paper 3) 
 
Casewise Listb 
Case Selected Statusa
Observed 
Predicted Predicted Group
Temporary Variable 
Add Resid ZResid 
14 S 0** .957 1 -.957 -4.713 
20 S 0** .959 1 -.959 -4.842 
38 S 0** .939 1 -.939 -3.940 
a. S = Selected, U = Unselected cases, and ** = Misclassified cases. 
b. Cases with studentized residuals greater than 2,000 are listed. 
 
Comment: Only three cases have been misclassified. Given the low levels of misclassification and based on the 
analysis of these cases presented above no further analysis of misclassification is necessary. 
 
 
Figure 2 Examining residuals: plot of Cook’s D versus the estimated probability (paper 3) 
 
  
Comments: 
 
Cook’s D measures the total effect of the case on the 
model as a whole, i.e. how much deleting a given case 
affects residuals for all cases.   
 
According to Hamilton*** (1992) the cases, which are 
especially influential will have Cook’s D value larger 
than 4 / n (cf. Eikemo and Clausen 2007****), i.e. 4 / 
95 in our case. Hence, Cook’s D value is about .04. Six 
cases that have Cook’s D values above the calculated 
one are 14, 20, 38, 59, 91 and 108.  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion based on the residual analysis (paper 3): 
 
The possible remedy is to filter out influential cases identified from the plots and using calculated critical Cook’s 
D value, and run logistic regression. After using filter, the Cox & Shell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 are increased to 
.588 and .859 correspondingly in the new model. The overall predictive accuracy is increased from 80 % (in 
original model) to 93.1 % in the new model. B-coefficients have slightly changed, but not significantly. Hence, 
the coefficients do not change the interpretation of the results. Overall, the new logistic regression model without 
influential cases produces similar results. This confirms that the presence of the influential cases is not a major 
issue.     
 
***Hamilton, L. C. (1992), Regression with graphics, Belmont: Duxbury. 
**** Eikemo, T.A. and Clausen, T. H. (2007), Kvantitativ analyse med SPSS: en praktisk innføring i kvantitative 
analyseteknikker, (Quantitative analysis in SPSS: a practical introduction into quantitative analysis 
techniques) Trondheim: Tapir akademisk forlaget. 
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Table 4 Hosmer and Lemeshow measure of overall model fit for paper 4 
 
 
 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test (H&L) 
 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 6,260 8 ,618
 
 
 Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
  
VC = ,00 VC = 1,00 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 11 10,975 0 ,025 11
2 11 10,837 0 ,163 11
3 10 10,554 1 ,446 11
4 11 10,168 0 ,832 11
5 10 9,452 1 1,548 11
6 7 8,570 4 2,430 11
7 9 7,063 2 3,937 11
8 4 5,915 7 5,085 11
9 4 3,526 7 7,474 11
10 1 ,940 6 6,060 7
 
Comment: The test indicates that the model fit is acceptable.  
 
Similar diagnostics was conducted for paper 4 as it was presented above for paper 3. The results indicate no 
problems with residuals or cases with unusual impacts. The diagnostics for paper 4 is not appended.  
 
